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
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AMERICA

1812—BEFORE AND AFTER

1803—1820



MONTICELLO, THE HOME OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, NEAR CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

AMERICA

Great Crises In Our History
Told by Its Makers

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Volume V
1812—Before and After
1803—1820

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VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS
OF THE
UNITED STATES

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1812—BEFORE AND AFTER
1803—1820

WASHINGTON CITY IN ITS INFANCY

By Abigail Adams

ABIGAIL ADAMS, wife of our second President, John Adams, wrote this letter in Washington, November 21, 1800, to her daughter in Milton, Massachusetts. It was near the end of Adams's administration that Washington became the seat of the Federal government, its site having been selected by President Washington in 1791, at the request of Congress.

During the first few years, as this letter intimates, the large scale on which the plans for the city were drawn was in such striking contrast to its actual size that it was derisively called "The City of Magnificent Distances," "The Wilderness City," and so on.

Mrs. Adams was one of the most influential women of her day. Her husband's published letters to her indicate a woman of keenness, sagacity and geniality, and they illuminate the history and social life of the time.

you see from Baltimore until you reach the city, which is only so in name. Here and there is a small cot, without a glass window, interspersed among the forests, through which you travel miles without seeing any human being. In the city there are buildings enough, if they were compact and finished, to accom-

I ARRIVED here on Sunday last, and without meeting with any accident worth noticing, except losing ourselves when we left Baltimore, and going eight or nine miles on the Frederick road, by which means we were obliged to go the other eight through woods, where we wandered two hours without finding a guide or the path. Fortunately, a straggling black came up with us, and we engaged him as a guide, to extricate us out of our difficulty; but woods are all

modate Congress and those attached to it; but as they are, and scattered as they are, I see not great comfort for them.

The river, which runs up to Alexandria, is in full view of my window, and I see the vessels as they pass and repass. The house is upon a grand and superb scale, requiring about thirty servants to attend and keep the apartments in proper order, and perform the ordinary business of the house and stables; an establishment very well proportioned to the President's salary. The lighting the apartments, from the kitchen to parlors and chambers, is a tax indeed; and the fires we are obliged to keep to secure us from daily agues is another very cheering comfort. To assist us in this great castle, and render less attendance necessary, bells are wholly wanting, not one single one being hung through the whole house, and promises are all you can obtain. This is so great an inconvenience that I know not what to do, or how to do. The ladies from Georgetown and in the city have many of them visited me. Yesterday I returned fifteen visits—but such a place as Georgetown appears—why, our Milton [Massachusetts] is beautiful. But no comparisons—if they will put me up some bells, and let me have wood enough to keep fires, I design to be pleased.

I could content myself almost anywhere three months; but, surrounded with forests, can you believe that wood is not to be had, because people cannot be found to cut and cart it! Briesler entered into a con-

tract with a man to supply him with wood. A small part, a few cords only, has he been able to get. Most of that was expended to dry the walls of the house before we came in, and yesterday the man told him it was impossible for him to procure it to be cut and carted. He has had recourse to coals; but we cannot get grates made and set. We have, indeed, come into a new country.

You must keep all this to yourself, and when asked how I like it, say that I write you the situation is beautiful, which is true. The house is made habitable, but there is not a single apartment finished, and all within, except the plastering, has been done since Briesler came. We have not the least fence, yard, or other convenience without, and the great unfinished audience-room I make a drying-room of, to hang up the clothes in. The principal stairs are not up, and will not be this winter. Six chambers are made comfortable; two are occupied by the President and Mr. Shaw; two lower rooms, one for a common parlor, and one for a levee-room. Upstairs there is the oval room, which is designed for the drawing-room, and has the crimson furniture in it. It is a very handsome room now; but, when completed it will be beautiful.

If the twelve years in which this place has been considered as the future seat of government had been improved, as they would have been if in New England, very many of the present inconveniences would have been removed. It is a beautiful spot, capable of every

improvement, and, the more I view it the more I am delighted with it.

Since I sat down to write I have been called down to a servant from Mount Vernon, with a billet from Major Custis, and a haunch of venison, and a kind, congratulatory letter from Mrs. Lewis, upon my arrival in the city, with Mrs. Washington's love, inviting me to Mount Vernon, where, health permitting, I will go before I leave this place.

The Senate is much behindhand. No Congress has yet been made. 'Tis said —— —— is on his way, but travels with so many delicacies in his rear that he can not get on fast, lest some of them should suffer.

Thomas comes in and says a House is made; so tomorrow, though Saturday, the President will meet them. Adieu, my dear. Give my love to your brother, and tell him he is ever present upon my mind.

DECATUR CAPTURES AND BURNS THE "PHILADELPHIA"

By James Fenimore Cooper

COOPER, from whose early authoritative "*History of the Navy of the United States*" is taken this spirited account of an act which Admiral Nelson, the hero of Trafalgar, pronounced "the most daring of the age," was singularly well qualified to describe such an exploit. He himself had been a midshipman in the early American Navy, and had seen service in the Mediterranean, where Decatur immortalized himself on February 16, 1804, during our war with Tripoli.

This was the last struggle by Europeans or Americans with the notorious corsairs or pirates of North Africa, who had made war on commerce in the Mediterranean for several centuries. Their depredations had become particularly bold and atrocious in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, merchant ships being subject to capture unless tribute had been paid.

In 1815 Decatur negotiated a treaty with the North African States which ended the enslaving of Americans.

helm was put hard down, and the yards were ordered to be braced sharp up. While the ship was coming

AT half-past eleven, Tripoli then being in plain sight, distant a little more than a league, satisfied that he could neither overtake the chase, nor force her ashore, Captain Bainbridge, of the Philadelphia, ordered the helm a-port, to haul directly off the land into deep water. The next cast of the lead, when this order was executed, gave but eight fathoms, and this was immediately followed by casts that gave seven, and six and a half. At this moment, the wind was nearly abeam, and the ship had eight knots way on her. When the cry of "half-six" was heard, the

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up fast to the wind, and before she had lost any of her way, she struck a reef forward, and shot up on it, until she lifted between five and six feet.

This was an appalling accident to occur on the coast of such an enemy, at that season of the year, and with no other cruiser near! It was first attempted to force the vessel ahead, under the impression that the best water was to seaward; but on sounding around the ship, it was found that she had run up with such force as to lie nearly cradled on the rocks; there being only 14 feet of water under the fore-chains, while the ship drew, before striking, $18\frac{1}{2}$ feet forward. Astern there were not 18 feet of water, instead of $20\frac{1}{2}$, which the frigate needed. . . .

The ship had no sooner struck than the gunboats run down alongside of her, and took possession. The barbarians rushed into the vessel, and began to plunder their captives. Not only were the clothes which the Americans had collected in their bags and bundles, taken from them, but many officers and men were stripped half-naked. They were hurried into boats, and sent to Tripoli, and even on the passage the business of plundering went on. The officers were respected little more than the common men, and, while in the boat, Captain Bainbridge himself was robbed of his epaulets, gloves, watch, and money. His cravat was even torn from his neck. He wore a miniature of his wife, and of this the Tripolitans endeavored to deprive him also, but, a youthful and attached

husband, he resisted so seriously that the attempt was relinquished. . . .

Means had been found to communicate with Captain Bainbridge; and several letters were received from that officer, pointing out different methods of annoying the enemy. In a letter of the date of the 5th of December, 1803, Captain Bainbridge suggested the possibility of destroying the Philadelphia, which ship was slowly fitting for sea, there being little doubt of her being sent out as a cruiser, as soon as the mild season should return. Commodore Preble listened to the suggestion, and being much in the society of the commander of the vessel that was most in company with the Constitution, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, he mentioned the project to that spirited officer. The expedition was just suited to the ardor and temperament of Decatur, and the possession of the prize at once afforded the means of carrying it into effect. . . .

It is scarcely necessary to say that the accommodations were none of the best, with so many persons cooped up in a vessel of between forty and fifty tons; and to make the matter worse, it was soon found that the salted meat put on board was spoiled, and that there was little besides bread and water left to subsist on. The weather, however, was pleasant, and the wind favorable, and the two vessels got in sight of Tripoli on the afternoon of the 9th. To prevent suspicions, the Intrepid now went ahead of the Siren.

The orders of Lieutenant-Commander Decatur

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were clear and simple. The spar-deck was first to be carried, then the gun-deck; after which a distribution of the party was made, in order to set fire to the ship. . . .

As the ketch drew in with the land, the ship became visible. She lay not quite a mile within the entrance, riding to the wind, and abreast of the town. Her foremast, which had been cut away while she was on the reef, had not yet been replaced, her main and mizzentopmasts were housed, and her lower yards were on the gunwales. Her lower standing rigging, however, was in its place, and, as was shortly afterward ascertained, her guns were loaded and shotted. Just within her lay two corsairs, with a few gunboats, and a galley or two. . . .

About 10 o'clock the Intrepid reached the eastern entrance of the bay, or the passage between the rocks and the shoal. The wind was nearly east, and, as she steered directly for the frigate, it was well abaft the beam. There was a young moon, and as these bold adventurers were slowly advancing into the hostile port all around them was tranquil and apparently without distrust. For near an hour they were stealing slowly along, the air gradually failing, until their motion became scarcely perceptible.

Most of the officers and men of the ketch had been ordered to lie on the deck, where they were concealed by low bulwarks, or weather-boards, and by the different objects that belong to a vessel. As it is the practice of those seas to carry many men even in the

smallest craft, the appearance of ten or twelve would excite no alarm, and this number was visible. The commanding officer himself stood near the pilot, Mr. Catalano, who was to act as interpreter. The quartermaster at the helm was ordered to stand directly for the frigate's bows, it being the intention to lay the ship aboard in that place, as the mode of attack which would least expose the assailants to her fire.

The *Intrepid* was still at a considerable distance from the *Philadelphia*, when the latter hailed. The pilot answered that the ketch belonged to Malta, and was on a trading voyage; that she had been nearly wrecked, and had lost her anchors in the late gale, and that her commander wished to ride by the frigate during the night. This conversation lasted some time, Decatur instructing the pilot to tell the frigate's people with what he was laden, in order to amuse them, and the *Intrepid* gradually drew nearer, until there was every prospect of her running foul of the *Philadelphia*, in a minute or two, and at the very spot contemplated. But the wind suddenly shifted, and took the ketch aback. The instant the southerly puff struck her, her head fell off and she got a stern-board; the ship, at the same moment, tending to the new current of air. The effect of this unexpected change was to bring the ketch directly under the frigate's broadside, at the distance of about forty yards, where she lay perfectly becalmed, or, if anything, drifting slowly astern, exposed to nearly every one of the *Philadelphia's* larboard guns.

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Not the smallest suspicion appears to have been yet excited on board the frigate, though several of her people were looking over the rails, and notwithstanding the moonlight. So completely were the Turks deceived, that they lowered a boat, and sent it with a fast. Some of the ketch's men, in the mean time, had got into her boat, and had run a line to the frigate's forechains. As they returned, they met the frigate's boat, took the fast it brought, which came from the after part of the ship, and passed it into their own vessel. These fasts were put into the hands of the men, as they lay on the ketch's deck, and they began cautiously to breast the *Intrepid* alongside of the *Philadelphia*, without rising. As soon as the latter got near enough to the ship, the Turks discovered her anchors, and they sternly ordered the ketch to keep off, as she had deceived them; preparing, at the same time, to cut the fasts. All this passed in a moment, when the cry of "*Amerikanos*" was heard in the ship. The people of the *Intrepid*, by a strong pull, brought their vessel alongside of the frigate, where she was secured, quick as thought. Up to this moment, not a whisper had betrayed the presence of the men concealed. The instructions had been positive to keep quiet until commanded to show themselves; and no precipitation, even in that trying moment, deranged the plan.

Lieutenant-Commandant Decatur was standing ready for a spring, with Messrs. Laws and Morris quite near him. As soon as close enough, he jumped

at the frigate's chain-plates, and while clinging to the ship himself, he gave the order to board. The two midshipmen were at his side, and all the officers and men of the *Intrepid* arose and followed. The three gentlemen named were in the chains together, and Lieutenant-Commandant Decatur and Mr. Morris sprang at the rail above them, while Mr. Laws dashed at a port. To the latter would have belonged the honor of having been first in this gallant assault, but wearing a boarding-belt, his pistols were caught between the gun and the side of the port. Mr. Decatur's foot slipped in springing, and Mr. Charles Morris first stood upon the quarter-deck of the *Philadelphia*. In an instant, Lieutenant-Commandant Decatur and Mr. Laws were at his side, while heads and bodies appeared coming over the rail and through the ports in all directions.

The surprise appears to have been as perfect as the assault was rapid and earnest. Most of the Turks on deck crowded forward, and all ran over to the star-board side, as their enemies poured in on the larboard. A few were aft, but as soon as charged they leaped into the sea. Indeed, the constant plunges into the water gave the assailants the assurance that their enemies were fast lessening in numbers by flight. It took but a minute or two to clear the spar-deck, though there was more of a struggle below. Still, so admirably managed was the attack, and so complete the surprise, that the resistance was trifling. In less

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than ten minutes Mr. Decatur was on the quarter-deck again in undisturbed possession of his prize.

There can be no doubt that this gallant officer now felt bitter regrets that it was not in his power to bring away the ship he had so nobly recovered. Not only were his orders on this point peremptory, however, but the frigate had not a sail bent, nor a yard crossed, and she wanted her foremast. It was next to impossible, therefore, to remove her, and the command was given to pass up the combustibles from the ketch.

The duty of setting fire to the prize appears to have been executed with as much promptitude and order, as every other part of the service. The officers distributed themselves, agreeably to the previous instructions, and the men soon appeared with the necessary means. Each party acted by itself and as it got ready. So rapid were they all in their movements, that the men with combustibles had scarcely time to get as low as the cock-pit and after store-rooms, before the fires were lighted over their heads. When the officer entrusted with the duty last mentioned had got through he found the after-hatches filled with smoke from the fire in the ward-room and steerage, and he was obliged to make his escape by the forward ladders.

The Americans were in the ship from twenty to twenty-five minutes, and they were literally driven out of her by the flames. The vessel had got to be so dry in that low latitude that she burned like pine; and the combustibles had been as judiciously prepared, as

they were steadily used. The last party up were the people who had been in the store-rooms, and when they reached the deck they found most of their companions already in the *Intrepid*. Joining them, and ascertaining that all was ready, the order was given to cast off. Notwithstanding the daring character of the enterprise in general, Decatur and his party now ran the greatest risk they had incurred that night. So fierce had the conflagration already become, that the flames began to pour out of the ports, and the head-fast having been cast off, the ketch fell astern, with her jigger flapping against the quarter-gallery, and her boom foul. The fire showed itself in the window at this critical moment; and beneath was all the ammunition of the party, covered with a tarpaulin. To increase the risk, the stern-fast was jammed. By using swords, however, for there was not time to look for an ax, the hawser was cut, and the *Intrepid* was extricated from the most imminent danger by a vigorous shove. As she swung clear of the frigate, the flames reached the rigging, up which they went hissing, like a rocket, the tar having oozed from the ropes, which had been saturated with that inflammable matter. Matches could not have kindled with greater quickness.

The sweeps were now manned. Up to this moment, everything had been done earnestly, though without noise, but as soon as they felt that they had got command of their ketch again, and by two or three vigorous strokes had sent her away from the

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frigate, the people of the *Intrepid* ceased rowing, and as one man they gave three cheers for victory. This appeared to arouse the Turks from their stupor; for the cry had hardly ended when the batteries, the two corsairs, and the galley poured in their fire. The men laid hold of the sweeps again, of which the *Intrepid* had eight of a side, and favored by a light air, they went rapidly down the harbor.

The spectacle that followed is described as having been both beautiful and sublime. The entire bay was illuminated by the conflagration, the roar of cannon was constant, and Tripoli was in a clamor. The appearance of the ship was, in the highest degree, magnificent; and to add to the effect, as her guns heated, they began to go off. Owing to the shift of wind, and the position into which she had tended, she, in some measure, returned the enemy's fire, as one of her broadsides was discharged in the direction of the town, and the other toward Fort English. The most singular effect of this conflagration was on board the ship, where the flames having run up the rigging and masts, collected under the tops, and fell over, giving the whole the appearance of glowing columns and fiery capitals. . . .

The success of this gallant exploit laid the foundation of the name which Decatur subsequently acquired in the navy. The country generally applauded the feat; and the commanding officer was raised from the station of a lieutenant to that of a captain. Most of the midshipmen engaged were also promoted, and

Lieutenant-Commandant Decatur received a sword.

In the service the enterprise has ever been regarded as one of its most brilliant achievements; and to this day it is deemed a high honor to have been one among the *Intrepid's* crew. The effect on the squadron then abroad can scarcely be appreciated; as its seamen began to consider themselves invincible, if not invulnerable, and were ready for any service in which men could be employed.

WHY AND HOW BURR KILLED HAMILTON

HAMILTON'S POSITION—FROM HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

A SHORT time before the Hamilton-Burr duel was fought on July 11, 1804, Alexander Hamilton wrote the first of the accompanying statements, taken from his biography by Allan McLane Hamilton (Scribner's). The second document is Hamilton's opinion of Aaron Burr, expressed in a confidential letter to a friend, John Rutledge, dated January 4, 1801. Hearing of this, Burr demanded of Hamilton a "prompt unqualified acknowledgment or denial," and to the latter's reply Burr rejoined: "Having considered your letter attentively, I regret to find in it nothing of that sincerity and delicacy which you profess to value. Political opposition can never absolve gentlemen from the necessity of a rigid adherence to the laws of honor and the rules of decorum."

Hamilton's letter to his wife was dated a week before the duel, of which the final document is a report in the *New York Evening Post* of July 12, 1804.

the utmost importance to them, in various views.

3. I feel a sense of obligation towards my creditors; who in case of accident to me, by the forced

ON MY expected interview with Colonel Burr, I think it proper to make some remarks explanatory of my conduct, motives and views.

I was certainly desirous of avoiding this interview for the most cogent reasons.

1. My religious and moral principles are strongly opposed to the practice of duelling, and it would ever give me pain to be obliged to shed the blood of a fellow creature in a private combat forbidden by the laws.

2. My wife and children are extremely dear to me, and my life is of

sale of my property, may be in some degree sufferers. I did not think myself at liberty as a man of probity, lightly to expose them to this hazard.

4. I am conscious of no ill will to Colonel Burr, distinct from political opposition, which, I trust, has proceeded from pure and upright motives.

Lastly, I shall hazard much, and can possibly gain nothing by the issue of the interview.

But it was, as I conceive, impossible for me to avoid it. There were intrinsic difficulties in the thing, and artificial embarrassments, from the manner of proceeding on the part of Colonel Burr.

Intrinsic, because it is not to be denied, that my animadversions on the political principles, character, and views of Colonel Burr have been extremely severe; and on different occasions, I, in common with many others, have made very unfavorable criticisms on particular instances of the private conduct of this gentleman.

In proportion as these impressions were entertained with sincerity, and uttered with motives and for purposes which might appear to me commendable, would be the difficulty (until they could be removed by evidence of their being erroneous) of explanation or apology. The disavowal required of me by Colonel Burr, in a general and indefinite form, was out of my power, if it had really been proper for me to submit to be so questioned; but I was sincerely of opinion that this could not be, and in this opinion, I was confirmed by that of a very moderate and judicious friend

whom I consulted. Besides that, Colonel Burr appeared to me to assume, in the first instance, a tone unnecessarily peremptory and menacing, and in the second, positively offensive. Yet I wished, as far as might be practicable, to leave a door open to accommodation. This, I think, will be inferred from the written communications made by me and by my direction, and would be confirmed by the conversations between Mr. Van Ness and myself, which arose out of the subject.

I am not sure whether, under all the circumstances, I did not go further in the attempt to accommodate, than a punctilious delicacy will justify. If so, I hope the motives I have stated will excuse me.

It is not my design, by what I have said, to affix any odium on the conduct of Colonel Burr, in this case. He doubtless has heard of animadversions of mine, which bore very hard upon him; and it is probable that as usual they were accompanied with some falsehoods. He may have supposed himself under a necessity of acting as he has done. I hope the grounds of his proceeding have been such as ought to satisfy his own conscience.

I trust, at the same time, that the world will do me the justice to believe that I have not censured him on light grounds, nor from unworthy inducements. I certainly have had strong reasons for what I may have said, though it is possible that in some particulars, I may have been influenced by misconstruction or misinformation. It is also my ardent wish that I may

have been more mistaken than I think I have been, and that he, by his future conduct, may show himself worthy of all confidence and esteem, and prove an ornament and blessing to the country.

As well because it is possible that I may have injured Colonel Burr, however convinced myself that my opinions and declarations have been well founded, as from my general principles and temper in relation to similar affairs, I have resolved, if our interview is conducted in the usual manner, and it pleases God to give me the opportunity, to reserve and throw away my first fire, and I have thoughts of even reserving my second fire—and thus giving a double opportunity to Colonel Burr to pause and to reflect.

It is not, however, my intention to enter into any explanations on the ground. Apology from principle, I hope, rather than pride, is out of the question.

To those who, with me, abhorring the practice of duelling, may think that I ought on no account to have added to the number of bad examples, I answer that my relative situation, as well in public as private, enforcing all the considerations which constitute what men of the world denominate honor, imposed on me (as I thought) a peculiar necessity not to decline the call. The ability to be in future useful, whether in resisting mischief or effecting good, in those crises of our public affairs which seem likely to happen, would probably be inseparable from a conformity with public prejudice in this particular.

HAMILTON'S OPINION OF BURR

H E [Burr] is in every sense a profligate; a voluptuary in the extreme, with uncommon habits of expense; in his profession extortionate to a proverb; suspected on strong grounds of having corruptly served the views of the Holland Company, in the capacity of a member of our Legislature; and understood to have been guilty of several breaches of probity in his pecuniary transactions. His very friends do not insist upon his integrity.

2. The fair emoluments of any station, under our government, will not equal his expenses in that station; still less will they suffice to extricate him from his embarrassments. He must therefore from the necessity of his station have recourse to unworthy expedients. These may be a bargain and sale with some foreign power, or combinations with public agents in projects of gain by means of the public moneys; perhaps and probably, to enlarge the sphere—a war.

3. He is without doubt insolvent for a large deficit. All his visible property is deeply mortgaged, and he is known to owe other large debts for which there is no specific security. Of the number of these is a judgment in favor of Mr. Angerstien for a sum which with interest amounts to about 80,000 dollars.

4. He has no pretensions to the station from services. He acted in different capacities in the last war finally with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in a regi-

ment, and gave indications of being a good officer; but without having had the opportunity of performing any distinguished action. At a critical period of the war he resigned his commission, assigning for cause ill-health, and went to repose at Paramus in the State of New Jersey. If his health was bad he might without difficulty have obtained a furlough and was not obliged to resign. He was afterwards seen in his usual health. The circumstance never projected nor aided in producing a single measure of important public utility.

5. He has constantly sided with the party hostile to Federal measures before and since the present Constitution of the United States. In opposing the adoption of this Constitution he was engaged covertly and insidiously; because, as he said at the time "it was too strong and too weak," and he has been uniformly the opposer of the Federal administration.

6. No mortal can tell what his political principles are. He has talked all round the compass. At times he has dealt in all the jargon of Jacobinism; at other times he has proclaimed decidedly the total insufficiency of the Federal government and the necessity of changes to one far more energetic. The truth seems to be that he has no plan but that of getting power by any means and keeping it by all means. It is probable that if he has any theory it is that of a simple despotism. He has intimated that he thinks the present French Constitution not a bad one.

7. He is of a temper bold enough to think no enterprise too hazardous and sanguine enough to think none too difficult. He has censured the leaders of the Federal party as wanting in vigor and enterprise, for not having established a strong government when they were in possession of the power and influence.

8. Discerning men of all parties agree in ascribing to him an irregular and inordinate ambition. Like Catiline, he is indefatigable in courting the young and the profligate. He knows well the weak sides of human nature, and takes care to play in with the passions of all with whom he has intercourse. By natural disposition, the haughtiest of men, he is at the same time the most creeping to answer his purposes. Cold and collected by nature and habit, he never loses sight of his object and scruples no means of accomplishing it. He is artful and intriguing to an inconceivable degree. In short all his conduct indicates that he has in view nothing less than the establishment of supreme power in his own person. Of this nothing can be a surer index than that having in fact high-toned notions of government, he has nevertheless constantly opposed the Federal and courted the popular party. As he never can effect his wish by the aid of good men, he will court and employ able and daring scoundrels of every party, and by availing himself of their assistance and of all the bad passions of society, he will in all likelihood attempt an usurpation.

8. [sic] Within the last three weeks at his own table, he drank these toasts successively 1—The French Republic, 2—The Commissioners who negotiated the convention, 3—Bonaparte, 4—Lafayette: and he countenanced and seconded the positions openly advanced by one of his guests that it was the interest of this country to leave it free to the belligerent powers to sell their prizes in our ports and to build and equip ships for their respective uses; a doctrine which evidently aims at turning all the naval resources of the United States into the channel of France; and which by making these states the most pernicious enemy of Great Britain would compel her to go to war with us.

9. Though possessing infinite art, cunning and address, he is yet to give proofs of great or solid abilities. It is certain that at the bar he is more remarkable for ingenuity and dexterity, than for sound judgment or good logic. From the character of his understanding and heart it is likely that any innovation which he may effect will be such as to serve the turn of his own power, not such as will issue in establishments favorable to the permanent security and prosperity of the nation—founded upon the principles of a strong free and regular government.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO HIS WIFE ELIZABETH HAMILTON

THIS letter, my very dear Eliza, will not be delivered to you unless I shall first have terminated my earthly career, to begin, as I humbly hope, from redeeming grace and divine mercy, a happy immortality.

If it had been possible for me to have avoided the interview, my love for you and my precious children would have been alone a decisive motive. But it was not possible, without sacrifices which would have rendered me unworthy of your esteem. I need not tell you of the pangs I feel from the idea of quitting you, and exposing you to the anguish which I know you would feel. Nor could I dwell on the topic lest it should unman me.

The consolations of Religion, my beloved, can alone support you; and these you have a right to enjoy. Fly to the bosom of your God and be comforted.

With my last idea I shall cherish the sweet hope of meeting you in a better world.

Adieu best of wives—best of women.

Embrace all my darling children for me.

A CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT OF THE HAMILTON-BURR DUEL

IT WAS nearly seven in the morning when the boat which carried General Hamilton, his friend Mr. Pendleton, and the surgeon mutually agreed on, Doctor Hosack, reached that part of the Jersey shore called the Weahawk. There they found Mr. Burr and his friend Mr. Van Ness, who, as I am told, had been employed since their arrival, with coats off, in clearing away the bushes, limbs of trees, etc., so as to make a fair opening. The parties in a few moments were at their allotted situations. When Mr. Pendleton gave the word, Mr. Burr raised his arm slowly, deliberately took his aim, and fired. His ball entered General Hamilton's right side. As soon as the bullet struck him, he raised himself involuntarily on his toes, turned a little to the left (at which moment his pistol went off), and fell upon his face. Mr. Pendleton immediately called out for Dr. Hosack, who, in running to the spot, had to pass Mr. Van Ness and Colonel Burr; but Van Ness had the cool precaution to cover his principal with an umbrella, so that Dr. Hosack should not be able to swear that he saw him on the field.

THE LEWIS AND CLARK EXPEDITION

By Reuben Gold Thwaites

THWAITES, the American historian, has written the best general account of this famous exploring expedition, based upon the journals kept by Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, who were sent by President Jefferson, authorized by Congress, in 1804, to explore the Louisiana Territory recently purchased from France. This account is taken from Thwaites' "Rocky Mountain Explorations," published by D. Appleton & Company.

Starting from St. Louis, Missouri, on May 14, 1804, the party of thirty-five men and one woman (Sacajawea) did not get back to the Mississippi River until September, 1806, having traveled 8,500 miles to and from the Pacific coast.

In recognition of the exploit, Captain Lewis, who had been Jefferson's secretary, received a grant of land and was appointed Governor of Louisiana. Clark, who was a brother of George Rogers Clark, the Revolutionary frontiersman, became Governor of the Northwest Territory.

for attacks from Indians were feared, especially on the lower reaches of the Missouri; a pirogue or open

AT FOUR in the afternoon of the fourteenth of May, 1804, "all in health and readiness to set out," the expedition left camp at River Du-bois, "in the presence of many of the neighboring inhabitants, and proceeded on under a jentle brease up the Missouri." Clark was in charge of the embarkation, for Lewis was attending to the last business details in St. Louis. The flotilla consisted of three craft—a keel boat fifty-five feet long, drawing three feet of water, carrying a sail, propelled by twenty-two oars, with both forecastle and cabin, and the center guarded by a breastwork,

boat with seven oars, and another with six, both of them carrying sails. The party comprised, in addition to Clark, three sergeants (Ordway, Pryor, and Floyd), twenty-three privates, two interpreters (Drouillard and Charbonneau), Charbonneau's Indian squaw Sacajawea, and the negro York.

Lewis had not expected Clark to leave until the fifteenth, but the latter's plans were perfected a day ahead of time, and he was anxious to be off. Arriving the following noon at St. Charles, then a French hamlet of some four hundred and fifty inhabitants—"pore, polite, and harmonious," his journal aptly describes them—he lay there until the twentieth, when his friend joined him, the latter having been accompanied twenty-four miles overland from St. Louis by several citizens of that place, and a small knot of United States military officers, who had but recently taken part in the territorial transfer from France. At their head was Captain Stoddard, serving as military governor of Upper Louisiana, pending its reorganization by Congress.

The people of St. Charles hospitably entertained the visitors, and on the following day the expedition set out "under three Cheers from the gentlemen on the bank." During the succeeding two or three days many settlers flocked to the shores to watch the little fleet toiling up the great muddy stream, and good-naturedly to wish the company joy in their undertaking. On the twenty-fifth of May the explorers passed La Charette, the last white settlement on the

river—the home of Daniel Boone, still a vigorous hunter at a ripe, old age. Upon the sixth of June buffalo signs were seen; on the eleventh they first shot bears. . . .

Rapids were now frequently met with, necessitating the use in the swift water of towing-lines and kedge-anchors, a work much impeded by heavy growths, along the banks, of bushes and gigantic weeds. "Ticks and musquitos," and great swarms of "knats," begin to be "verry troublesome," necessitating smudge fires and mosquito-bars. The men frequently suffer from snake-bites, sunstroke and stomach complaints. Both Lewis and Clark now play the part of physicians, and administer simple, though sometimes drastic, remedies for these disorders; the journals make frequent mention of strange doses and vigorous bleeding. Sometimes storms drench them in their rude camp; or, suddenly bursting upon their craft in open river, necessitate great ado with anchors and cables until the flurry is over.

Two days later (August 20th) occurred the first and only death. Sergeant Charles Floyd, a man of firmness and resolution, being "taken verry bad all at once with a Bilieuse Chorlick. . . . Died with a great deal of composure." This event took place a short distance below the present Sioux City, about 850 miles above the mouth of the Missouri. . . .

The explorers were now in a paradise of game. Great herds of buffaloes, sometimes 5,000 strong, were grazing in the plains, the fattest of them falling

easy victims to the excellent aims of the hunters. Elk, deer, antelopes, turkeys, and squirrels were abundant, and gave variety to their meals, for which the navigators generally tied up at the bank and joined the land party around the huge campfires. Prairie dogs, whose little burrows punctured the plains in every direction, interested the explorers. One day there was a general attempt to drown out one of these nimble miners; but, although all joined for some time in freely pouring water down the hole, the task was finally abandoned as impracticable. Prairie wolves nightly howled about their camps in surprising numbers and in several varieties.

Worn by the fatigue of a day's hard work at the oars or the towing-line or pushing-pole, or perhaps by long hours of tramping or hunting upon the rolling plains, which were frequently furrowed by deep ravines, each member of the party earned his night's rest. But as they lay under the stars, around the generous fires of driftwood, great clouds of mosquitoes not infrequently robbed them of sleep. The two great leaders were possessed of mosquito-bars, which generally enabled them to rest with comparative comfort, although sometimes even these were ineffectual; but apparently none of the others enjoyed these luxuries, and buried their heads within their blankets, almost to the point of suffocation. Once they had camped upon a sand-bar, in mid river. By the light of the moon the guard saw the banks caving in above and below. Alarming the sleepers, they had barely

time to launch and board their boats before the very spot where they had lain slipped into the turbid current. In the upper reaches of the river, the following year, grizzly bears and stampeded buffalo herds were added to the list of night terrors. . . .

The principal Mandan village was on a bluff overlooking the Missouri, above the present Bismarck, N. D. Three miles below, "on the north side of the river, in an extensive and well-timbered bottom," the expedition settled itself for the winter within huts of cottonwood logs, surrounded by a stout palisade of the same timber, the establishment being named, "in honor of our friendly neighbors," Fort Mandan. In reaching this point, 1,600 miles above the mouth of the Missouri, they had occupied, including delays of every sort, 173 days, thus making an average progress of a trifle over nine miles a day.

During the five months spent at Fort Mandan the leaders were never free from care, for their position was one involving danger and the necessity for exercising both tact and firmness. At first the Mandans, while nominally friendly, quite naturally suspected the motives of these newcomers. With the French trappers and traders who either dwelt or frequently sojourned among them in behalf of the British fur companies, they were on intimate terms; and the Scotch, Irish, and English agents of these organizations were received upon their periodical visits with much consideration. The aims of these white men from the north were similar to their own—the preser-

vation of the wilderness as a great hunting-ground, the only exploitation permissible being that which contributed to the market for pelts.

The chiefs were plainly told that the United States now owned the country, that loyalty to the Great Father at Washington was henceforth obligatory, and that they must no longer receive medals and flags from the British. At the same time, they were informed that the exploration had no other object than to acquaint the Great Father with his new children, and that upon its return arrangements would be made for sending traders into the country, with better goods and fairer treatment than had hitherto been obtained from the Canadian companies. Long before the close of the winter Lewis and Clark had gained a fair degree of popularity among these simple people, and the British agents were correspondingly discomfited. . . .

A week out from Fort Mandan (April 14th) the expedition reached the mouth of what the leaders named Charbonneau Creek. This was the highest point on the Missouri, to which whites had thus far ascended, except that two Frenchmen, having lost their way, had proceeded a few miles farther up. All beyond was unknown to civilized men. On the twenty-sixth the mouth of the Yellowstone was reached. Here, Lewis in his journal recommends that a trading-post be established—eight hundred yards above the junction, on a high, well-timbered plain, overlooking a lake-like widening of the Missouri.

In these upper regions, where signs of coal were frequently seen, and in places alkali whitened the ground like snow, "game is very abundant and gentle"; two hunters could, Lewis thinks, "conveniently supply a regiment with provisions." Big-horns, monster elk, black and grizzly bears, antelopes, and great herds of buffaloes are daily met; they feast on beavers, Lewis thinking "the tale a most delicious morsel," and wondering greatly at the industry of these animals, which in some spots fell for their numerous dams many acres of timber as thick as a man's body; wolves increase, and the nimble coyotes begin to interest them.

The huge and savage grizzly was, in some respects, the most formidable obstacle encountered by the intrepid explorers; compared with these bulky, ferocious beasts, Indians occasioned small alarm. By the time the party were a month out from the Mandans, Lewis could write: "I find that the curiosity of our party is pretty well satisfied with respect to this animal. . . . (he) has staggered the resolution (of) several of them." A few days later came a disagreeable experience with a grizzly, in which he and seven of his men, as yet unable to locate the vulnerable parts, found it impossible to kill the creature save after a persistent fusillade from their short-range rifles. "These bear," he says, "being so hard to die rather intimidates us all; I must confess that I do not like the gentlemen and had rather fight two Indians than one bear." . . .

Once, at the dead of night, a large buffalo bull invaded their camp. Apparently attracted by the light, he swam the river, and climbing over their best pirogue—but fortunately not seriously injuring it—he charged the fires at full speed, passing within a few inches of the heads of the sleeping men, and made for Lewis and Clark's tent. Lewis's dog, his constant companion throughout the expedition, caused the burly beast to change his course, and he was off in a flash; all this, before the sentinel could arouse the camp, which was now in uproar, the men rushing out with guns in hand, inquiring for the cause of the disturbance. . . .

The third of June they came to where the river "split in two," and were greatly puzzled to know which way to go. To take the wrong branch, that did not lead toward the Columbia, would lose them the whole of the season, and probably so dishearten the party that the expedition might have to be abandoned. The utmost circumspection was necessary in order to arrive at the right decision. Both streams were carefully investigated by advance parties, being measured as to width, depth, and character, and velocity of current. The men thought the north or right-hand fork the larger of the two, and therefore the main Missouri; but Lewis and Clark were satisfied that the other was the true channel, and by common consent this was chosen. On this, as on many other occasions, the joint judgment of the captains proved to be superior to that of their assistants. . . .

On the fourth of August, Lewis came to where the Jefferson forks into three streams. At first puzzled to know which to take, he decided to follow the middle one, and left the usual note to Clark on a pole at the junction. But when Clark arrived with his boats there was no pole, for being green, the beavers had carried it off; whereupon he ascended the northwest fork, not being able to judge so well as Lewis, who had the advantage of hill-top views. But the difficulties of passage up this rapid stream were so great, that after a day's rough travel Clark returned to the forks, there finding Lewis awaiting him. Naming the northwest fork Wisdom, and the southwest Philanthropy—virtues which they ascribed to President Jefferson—they regarded the middle stream as the Jefferson, and continued its ascent. Lewis kept on his way afoot, while Clark—suffering from “the rageing fury of a turner on my ankle musle”—followed with the craft.

The river now passed for much of the way under perpendicular cliffs of rocks, infested by rattlesnakes. The mountains were not high, yet covered with snow, showing that the altitude was great, although the ascent had been scarcely perceptible. “I do not believe,” writes Lewis, “that the world can furnish an (other) example of a river running to the extent which the Missouri and Jefferson rivers do through such mountainous country, and at the same time so navigable as they are.” . . .

The following day (August 12th), Lewis reached the source of the Missouri—a spring of ice-cold water “issuing from the base of a low mountain or hill.” Two miles below this, “McNeal had exultingly stood with a foot on each side of this little rivulet, and thanked his God that he had lived to bestride the mighty & heretofore deemed endless Missouri.” A little later in the day, the captain crossed the divide and reached “a handsome, bold, running creek of cold, clear water, where I first tasted the water of the great Columbia river”; this was the Lemhi, an upper tributary of the Columbia. . . .

They thereupon struck off to the northward, seeking “the great river which lay in the plains beyond the mountains.” The route taken was over the heavily timbered Bitterroot Mountains, which are slashed by deep gorges, down which rush torrential streams. This formidable region, “a perfect maze of bewildering ridges,” was then and still is traversed by the Lolo or Northern Nez Perce trail, followed from time immemorial by Indians traveling between the upper waters of the Missouri and those of the Columbia.

Having left the region of game, the party were soon pressed for provisions, and were obliged to kill several of their horses for food. Blinding snowstorms in mid-September greatly impeded progress; the sides of the mountains were steep and rocky, with insecure foothold, especially during the frequent showers of sleet; the nights were cold, raw, and often wet; great

areas strewn with fallen timber sometimes appeared almost impassable barriers; and not infrequently the rude path was dangerously near the edges of steep precipices, from which men or horses were in constant fear of being dashed to pieces. Thus they toiled on, through the dense and gloomy forests of pine, sometimes scaling steep ridges, at others descending rocky slopes at the peril of their lives, or threading the thick timber of marshy bottoms. Some of their horses fell through exhaustion, to be at once used as food; and the men themselves were so disheartened that Clark found it necessary to forge ahead with a party of hunters to find level country and game, by way of "reviving ther sperits." . . .

After safely braving the formidable Short Narrows of the Columbia—"swelling, boiling & whorling in every direction"—they passed camps of savages who were more familiar with white men, many of them being clad in civilized clothing obtained from the coast traders; if possible, these were even more tricky than their fellows above, and like them, dwelt in mortal fear of the Snakes and Shoshoni whom Lewis and Clark had met upon the sources of the river.

On the first of November they reached Pacific tide-water, and soon were amid rich bottom-lands and abundant elk, deer, and other game, among which were sea-otters; and dense fogs frequently veiled the pleasing landscape. On the fourth, the natives at one village came in state to see them, tricked out in scarlet and blue blankets, sailor jackets, overalls,

shirts and hats, in addition to their usual costume—assuming, disagreeable, thievish fellows, freely laying their hands on small things about the camp, but treated by the diplomatic explorers “with every attention and friendship.” Three days later (the 7th), breakers could be heard during a storm, and Clark exultingly writes: “Great joy in camp—we are in view of the Ocian.” The river was here from five to seven miles wide, with bold, rocky shores, and “The Seas roled and tossed the Canoes in such a manner this evening that Several of our party were sea sick.”

Finally, after being weather-bound for six days, in “a dismal niche scarcely largely to contain us, our baggage half a mile from us,” and canoes weighted down with stones to prevent their dashing against the rocks, the wind lulled, they proceeded (November 15th) around a blustery point, and there found a “butifull Sand beech thro which runs a Small river from the hills.”

The continent had at last been spanned by American explorers.

CROSSING THE GREAT DIVIDE

By Captain Meriwether Lewis

IN THIS vivid record of one of the most dramatic stages of their journey from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, Captain Lewis, writing in his journal on August 17, 1805, tells of his and Captain William Clark's experiences in crossing the Rocky Mountains. That feat accomplished, the party started down the Columbia River on October 16, and on November 7 came in sight of the Pacific Ocean, on the shores of which they spent the winter of 1805-6.

Both Lewis and Clark kept elaborate and valuable journals which, however, were not published during their lifetime. A paraphrase by Nicholas Biddle, a friend of Jefferson's, appeared in 1814 and has run through several editions. Not until 1903 were these historic treasures published in complete form, the accompanying extract being a part of the first authentic record of the expedition.

I felt quite as much gratified at this information as the Indians appeared to be. Shortly after Captain Clark arrived with the interpreter Charbono, and the Indian woman, who proved to be a sister of the Chief Cameahwait. The meeting of

THIS morning I arose very early and dispatched Drewyer and the Indian down the river. Sent Shields to hunt. I made McNeal cook the remainder of our meat which afforded a slight breakfast for ourselves and the chief. Drewyer had been gone about two hours when an Indian who had straggled some little distance down the river returned and reported that the white men were coming, that he had seen them just below. They all appeared transported with joy, and the chief repeated his fraternal hug.

those people was really affecting, particularly between Sah-cah-gar-we-ah [Sacajawea] and an Indian woman, who had been taken prisoner at the same time with her and who, had afterwards escaped from the Minnetares and rejoined her nation. At noon the canoes arrived, and we had the satisfaction once more to find ourselves all together, with a flattering prospect of being able to obtain as many horses shortly as would enable us to prosecute our voyage by land should that by water be deemed inadvisable.

We now formed our camp just below the junction of the forks on the larboard side in a level smooth bottom covered with a fine turf of greensward. Here we unloaded our canoes and arranged our baggage on shore; formed a canopy of one of our large sails and planted some willow brush in the ground to form a shade for the Indians to set under while we spoke to them, which we thought it best to do this evening. Accordingly about 4 P. M. we called them together and through the medium of Labuish, Charbono and Sah-cah-gar-we-ah, we communicated to them fully the objects which had brought us into this distant part of the country, in which we took care to make them a conspicuous object of our own good wishes and the care of our government. We made them sensible of their dependence on the will of our government for every species of merchandise as well for their defense and comfort; and apprised them of the strength of our government and its friendly dispositions towards them. We also gave them as a reason

why we wished to penetrate the country as far as the ocean to the west of them was to examine and find out a more direct way to bring merchandise to them. That as no trade could be carried on with them before our return to our homes that it was mutually advantageous to them as well as to ourselves, that they should render us such aids as they had it in their power to furnish in order to hasten our voyage and of course our return home, that such were their horses to transport our baggage without which we could not subsist, and that a pilot to conduct us through the mountains was also necessary if we could not descend the river by water, but that we did not ask either their horses or their services without giving a satisfactory compensation in return, that at present we wished them to collect as many horses as were necessary to transport our baggage to their village on the Columbia where we would then trade with them at our leisure for such horses as they could spare us.

They appeared well pleased with what had been said. The chief thanked us for friendship towards himself and nation and declared his wish to serve us in every respect, that he was sorry to find that it must yet be some time before they could be furnished with firearms but said they could live as they had done heretofore until we brought them as we had promised. He said they had not horses enough with them at present to remove our baggage to their village over the mountain, but that he would return to-morrow and encourage his people to come over with

their horses and that he would bring his own and assist us. This was complying with all we wished at present. We next inquired who were chiefs among them. Cameahwait pointed out two others whom he said were chiefs. We gave him a medal of the small size with the likeness of Mr. Jefferson the President of the United States in relief on one side and clasp hands with a pipe and tomahawk on the other, to the other chiefs we gave each a small medal which were struck in the president of George Washing[ton] Esq. We also gave small medals of the last description to two young men whom the first chief informed us were good young men and much respected among them. We gave the first chief a uniform coat, shirt, a pair of scarlet leggings, a carrot of tobacco and some small articles. To each of the others we gave a shi[r]t, legging[s], handkerchief, a knife, some tobacco and a few small articles. We also distributed a good quantity paint, moccasins, awles, knives, beads, looking-glasses, &c. among the other Indians and gave them a plentiful meal of lyed corn which was the first they had ever eaten in their lives. They were much pleased with it. Every article about us appeared to excite astonishment in their minds; the appearance of the men, their arms, the canoes, our manner of working them, the black man York, and the sagacity of my dog were equally objects of admiration. I also shot my air-gun which was so perfectly incomprehensible that they immediately denominated it the great medicine. The idea which the Indians mean to convey by this appellation is some-

thing that emanates from or acts immediately by the influence or power of the Great Spirit; or that, in which, the power of God is manifest by its incomprehensible power of action. Our hunters killed 4 deer and an antelope this evening of which we also gave the Indians a good proportion. The ceremony of our council and smoking the pipe was in conformity of the custom of this nation performed barefoot. On those occasions points of etiquette are quite as much attended to by the Indians as among civilized nations. To keep Indians in a good humor you must not fatigue them with too much business at one time. Therefore after the council we gave them to eat and amused them a while by showing them such articles as we thought would be entertaining to them, and then renewed our inquiries with respect to the country. The information we derived was only a repetition of that they had given me before and in which they appeared to be so candid that I could not avoid yielding confidence to what they had said. Captain Clark and myself now concerted measures for our future operations, and it was mutually agreed that he should set out to-morrow morning with eleven men furnished with axes and other necessary tools for making canoes, their arms, accoutrements and as much of their baggage as they could carry; also to take the Indians, Charbono and the Indian woman with him; that on his arrival at the Shoshone camp he was to leave Charbono and the Indian woman to hasten the return of the Indians with their horses to this place, and to proceed himself with the eleven men down

the Columbia in order to examine the river and if he found it navigable and could obtain timber to set about making canoes immediately. In the meantime I was to bring on the party and baggage to the Shoshone camp, calculating that by the time I should reach that place that he would have sufficiently informed himself with respect to the state of the river &c. as to determine us whether to prosecute our journey from thence by land or water. In the former case we should want all the horses which we could purchase, and in the latter only to hire the Indians to transport our baggage to the place at which we made the canoes. In order to inform me as early as possible of the state of the river he was to send back one of the men with the necessary information as soon as he should satisfy himself on this subject. This plan being settled we gave orders accordingly and the men prepared for an early march. The nights are very cold and the sun excessively hot in the day. We have no fuel here but a few dry willow brush and from the appearance of the country I am confident we shall not find game here to subsist us many days. These are additional reasons why I conceive it necessary to get under way as soon as possible. This morning Captain Clark had delayed until 7 A. M. before he set out just about which time Drewyer arrived with the Indian; he left the canoes to come on after him, and immediately set out and joined me as has been before mentioned. The spirits of the men were now much elated at the prospect of getting horses.

THE "BIRD-WOMAN" WHO GUIDED LEWIS AND CLARK

By Grace Raymond Hebard

SACAJAWEA, which is the Indian name for Bird-Woman, was a Shoshone guide whom Lewis and Clark refer to in their journals as the only woman who accompanied them on their famous expedition in 1804-06. This account of her, by Grace Raymond Hebard, Librarian of the University of Wyoming, taken from *The Journal of American History*, is based upon the Lewis and Clark records and upon other authentic sources recently come to light.

Several memorials have been erected to Sacajawea. The first was through an appropriation from the Wyoming Legislature to erect a monument over her grave at the Shoshone Agency, Wyoming. There Sacajawea is believed to have died in 1884, at the age of one hundred and sixteen years.

On one occasion at the risk of her life Sacajawea rescued from a swamped canoe the records of the expedition and other articles of great value to the explorers.

receive any personal recognition of the services she rendered these explorers during their unparalleled journey to the then unknown Northwest. But the

TO have one's deeds extolled after a century has passed, when they were hardly recognized when executed, has been the common fate particularly of that class of individuals known as explorers; for the service rendered must be subjected to the test of time and the benefits derived as a result of the exploration must be carefully weighed before applause may be adequately given.

The only woman who accompanied Lewis and Clark across the continent to the Pacific Coast during the seasons of 1804-6, did not in her lifetime re-

century that has passed since that event has brought a keener appreciation of her services from those who have taken interest to examine and unravel records of her deeds as a genius of a guide. This woman was a Shoshone Indian who was known by the name of Sacajawea. As she was a wife of a French interpreter, Touissant Charboneau, conventionality might demand that she be known as Mrs. Charboneau; but we prefer to call her more familiarly by her tribal name, because it was her native instincts and intelligence that gave her a place in history rather than that she was the wife of an interpreter. The story of the part that Sacajawea played in this continental expedition is as fascinating as a piece of knighthood fiction; that it is history adds to the charm.

Wyoming was not traversed by these explorers either on the journey to the coast or on the return, yet it claims the distinction of having had this Indian woman guide a resident within its borders for many years and holds now all that is mortal of this "native born American." The facts leading to the establishment beyond doubt of the identity of the Wyoming woman with that of the woman guide are presented in detail now for the first time. This statement of identity has been met with ridicule, doubt, suspicion, denial. Ridicule has been turned to consideration; doubt to belief; suspicion to admission; denial to acceptance for fact after fact has been presented and corroborated by those of unquestioned integrity.

Sacajawea's life has two periods: that about which we know; that about which nothing can be learned. It is this latter period that has been the stumbling block, "the winter of our discontent." We see her in the vigor of her splendid young womanhood; she disappears as mysteriously as she appeared; when she again is visible it is as the aged Sacajawea, white-haired and well preserved, whose fatal ailment could only be attributed to "old age."

When Lewis and Clark with their party of men, in the fall of 1804, reached the Mandan Indian Villages, not far from the present site of Bismarck, North Dakota, they engaged an Indian interpreter who was to accompany them in the spring on their farther western voyage. This French Canadian interpreter, Charboneau, had at that time at least two wives, Sacajawea, the younger, having been sold to him as a slave when she was a child of five years. When he made her his wife she was about fourteen years old. The following year, February 11th, 1805, she gave birth to a son who was destined to occupy a unique position in the expedition which continued its western journey on the seventh of April of that same year. Sacajawea strapped her little papoose, not yet two months old, on her back and practically carried him in this cuddled position, with his view of the surrounding country limited to what he could see from over his mother's shoulder, to the coast and return, a distance of over 5,000 miles. This youthful traveler has been known as "Little Touissant," "Little Char-

boneau," but he was called "Baptiste" by Clark and also at various other times when, grown older, he in his turn acted as guide, for he possessed the native instincts and cleverness characteristic of his mother. It is as "Baptiste" that he was known at the time of his death and his children have taken this as their family name.

A century ago the Shoshone Indians made their home around and along the Snake river in Idaho, just west of the Bitter Root Mountains, or, as they are now called, the Rockies. It was in this locality that the Minnetarees, or Blackfeet, swept down and, in mighty battle, slew many of the Shoshones, taking others into captivity. At this time Sacajawea, with a girl friend, was stolen and taken over the mountains toward the East. The girl friend escaped but Sacajawea was forced to the Mandan Village and sold. In journeying west with Lewis and Clark from the Mandans, in the spring of 1805, Sacajawea became more and more conscious that the country over which they were going was that over which she had been taken when in captivity five years previous, and when, after traveling many days, no one of the expedition knew where he was or the true direction to pursue, the party depended entirely upon the instincts and guidance of the Indian woman. The homing bird knew the direction was right, but intelligence had not yet awakened.

At this time Sacajawea was not only helpful as a guide, but also rendered invaluable service on May

fourteenth, when her husband, through his clumsiness, turned over the canoe containing all of the papers, instruments, medicine and almost every other article indispensable to the journey, without which it would have been impossible to proceed. Had these properties been lost it would have been necessary to retrace three thousand miles in order to replenish the destroyed goods, which requirement in itself would have postponed the journey for at least a year. At the risk of her own life and that of her child, Sacajawea plunged into the stream, righted the boat, rescued the papers and packages that already were floating down the stream. Several days after this when a new river was discovered, Lewis and Clark named it after her. It is now known as Crooked Creek.

In the summer of 1805 the party camped on the exact spot, the junction of the Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin rivers, where Sacajawea had been captured. From this point on she recognized familiar landmarks and the path to the West became more and more a matter of memory rather than of instinct. She found for Clark the pass in the mountain through which the party went, on the other side encountering what threatened to be hostile Indians. These Indians, the Shoshones, thought their old enemy, the Blackfeet, had returned to renew their war. Lewis advanced on horseback alone, having discovered an Indian chief with bow and arrows on an elegant horse without saddle. This Indian proved to be a Cameahwait, the

chief of the Shoshone tribe. Lewis took his blanket which he had in his knapsack and after holding it up with both hands by two corners, threw it over his head unfolded so to appear as if he were trying to spread it on the ground. This was a signal of peace to signify that it was to serve as a seat for a distinguished guest and is the usual sign of friendliness among Indians of the West. At the same time Lewis kept calling "tabba bone," which, as taught to them by Sacajawea, signifies "white man." While doing these things he rolled up his sleeves to show the white skin of his arms, for the many months of sun and weather had tanned both face and hands to the color of an Indian.

A few days after this event Clark, who with Charboneau and Sacajawea had explored another region, made his appearance; upon his approach toward the Indians, Sacajawea commenced to dance with joy and excitement and sucked her fingers which was to indicate that the warriors in place of being hostile were of her own tribe. She at once discovered her treasured girl friend whom she embraced with the most "tender affection" and to her infinite delight recognized in the chief her long-lost brother. The Lewis and Clark Journals speak of the most ardent manner in which the feelings of the brother and sister were expressed. Sacajawea threw her blanket over him and with her head on his shoulder "wept profusely." Here she learned that all of her family had died except two brothers and a son of her eldest sister, "a

small boy, who was immediately adopted by her." This last fact, insignificant as it may appear, proves a strong point in establishing Sacajawea's identity. There is no record to show what became of this boy after adoption, whether he went on with the party or whether on its return he went with his adopted mother to the Mandan villages. No record can be traced of him from that time until recent years when we find him living as the brother of Baptiste and son of Sacajawea, he being known as Basil.

Sacajawea was home again, not to stay, however, for she never hesitated in her choice to continue with the white man's party rather than to be reunited with her tribe. The expedition at this point purchased horses which were absolutely necessary for the continuance of the journey, as the canoes which had done service to this point now had to be abandoned and the journey made overland until the waters of the Columbia became navigable. Sacajawea discovered a plot which was to drive the horses away that had been purchased from her brother and leave the expedition stranded, with the alternate of having to return by boat or press forward on foot, an impossible task owing to the scarcity of food. Here again she made herself valuable by giving information to Lewis and Clark, even though she had to testify to the treachery of her own brother and his people.

Charboneau was the interpreter, she the guide, though many times she had to come to his rescue. One interesting circumstance will illustrate this im-

portant service. There was a controversy in which two chiefs were implicated over some horses, at a time when the possession of horses meant success or failure. These chiefs, Twisted-Hair and Neeshnepah-keekook (Cut Nose), were of the Chopunn tribe. One of Lewis and Clark's men took the wording of the trial in English and turned the English into French for Charboneau, who translated this French into Hidatsa for Sacajawea, while Sacajawea gave this Hidatsa in Shoshone to the Shoshone prisoner, who in turn adapted this Shoshone to Chopunnish for the contesting Indian chiefs. A recital of all of the service that this Indian woman rendered to the expedition would require a daily extract from the Lewis and Clark Journals, for it was as constant as it was unselfish.

How Lewis and Clark who selected all of the men who were to accompany them for varied and special qualifications which would best and most miscellaneously serve the expedition, failed to include some one of the medical profession or one skilled in surgical science is a matter quite beyond comprehension. Along these lines, however, Sacajawea added to her value, for her native and secret knowledge of medicinal herbs and plants and their curative properties was of extreme worth in time of sickness. Again it is difficult to imagine when starvation seemed to be the only outcome what would have been the result if she had not concocted messes made from seeds and plants and had not known of the riches stored away in the prairie dog holes where were found artichokes as

valuable as potatoes. The coast was finally reached December 7, 1805, where the party made winter quarters at Clatsop, four thousand, one hundred and thirty-five miles from St. Louis, the starting point.

March, 1806, found the party ready to retrace the many weary miles. The entire party that left Mandan reached that point in August of this same year. At this point we must abandon the exploring party and confine ourselves to the movements of the actors who are most vitally connected with the history of our Indian Princess, for such a title she could have rightfully claimed through her royal blood. Charboneau received from Lewis and Clark for his services the sum of \$500 and a few odd cents. There is no record to show that Sacajawea received any compensation by gift or word. It is true we find the following in the journal: "This man (Charboneau) has been very serviceable to us, and his wife particularly useful among the Shoshones. Indeed she has borne with a patience truly admirable the fatigues of so long a route incumbered with the charge of an infant, who is even now only nineteen months old. She was very observant. She had a good memory, remembering locations not seen since her childhood. In trouble she was full of resources, plucky and determined. With her helpless infant she rode with the men, guiding us unerringly through mountain passes and lonely places. Intelligent, cheerful, resourceful, tireless, faithful, she inspired us all."



SACAJAWEA, THE BIRD WOMAN, WHO GUIDED LEWIS AND CLARK ON THEIR
EXPEDITION TO THE PACIFIC
(From the Statue in City Park, Portland, Oregon)

The finding of letters written a hundred years ago shows that Sacajawea was more keenly appreciated than we had been led to believe. This evidence was first made public by an article in the *Century Magazine*, the letter having been written August 20, 1806, by Clark on his voyage down the river after leaving Mandan.

"Charbono:

You have been a long time with me and have conducted yourself in such a manner as to gain my friendship. Your woman who accompanied you that long, dangerous and fatiguing route to the Pacific Ocean and back deserved a greater reward for her attention and services on the route that we had in our power to give her at the Mandans."

THE INDIAN DEFENDS HIS RELIGION

By Red Jacket

RED JACKET, whose Indian name was Sagoyewatha, signifying "he keeps them awake," made this speech against the foundation of a Christian mission among the Senecas, in 1805. His English name was acquired through his pride in a scarlet coat given him shortly after the Revolution by a British officer.

Red Jacket's eloquence won him a place of power in the councils of his tribe, and he has been considered the best orator the Indian race ever produced.

Though at first strongly in favor of the education of his people, Red Jacket subsequently opposed both schools and Christianity. Late in life he became a confirmed drunkard, and was deposed by a council of chiefs in 1827, but was soon restored to his old rank. Another of his appellations is "the last of the Senecas."

FRRIEND AND BROTHER: It was the will of the Great Spirit that we should meet together this day. He orders all things and has given us a fine day for our council. He has taken His garment from before the sun and caused it to shine with brightness upon us. Our eyes are opened that we see clearly; our ears are unstopped that we have been able to hear distinctly the words you have spoken. For all these favors we thank the Great Spirit, and Him only.

Brother, this council fire was kindled by you. It was at your request that we came together at this time. We have listened with attention to what you have said. You requested us to speak our minds freely. This gives us great joy; for we now consider that we stand upright before you and can speak what

we think. All have heard your voice and all speak to you now as one man. Our minds are agreed.

Brother, you say you want an answer to your talk before you leave this place. It is right you should have one, as you are a great distance from home and we do not wish to detain you. But first we will look back a little and tell you what our fathers have told us and what we have heard from the white people.

Brother, listen to what we say. There was a time when our forefathers owned this great island. Their seats extended from the rising to the setting sun. The Great Spirit had made it for the use of the Indians. He had created the buffalo, the deer, and other animals for food. He made the bear and the beaver. Their skins served us for clothing. He had scattered them over the country and taught us how to take them. He had caused the earth to produce corn for bread. All this He had done for His red children because He loved them. If we had some disputes about our hunting-ground they were generally settled without the shedding of much blood.

But an evil day came upon us. Your forefathers crossed the great water and landed on this island. Their numbers were small. They found friends and not enemies. They told us they had fled from their own country for fear of wicked men and had come here to enjoy their religion. They had asked for a small seat. We took pity on them, granted their request, and they sat down among us. We gave them corn and meat; they gave us poison in return.

The white people, brother, had now found our country. Tidings were carried back and more came among us. Yet we did not fear them. We took them to be friends. They called us brothers. We believed them and gave them a larger seat. At length their numbers had greatly increased. They wanted more land; they wanted our country. Our eyes were opened and our minds became uneasy. Wars took place. Indians were hired to fight against Indians, and many of our people were destroyed. They also brought strong liquor among us. It was strong and powerful, and had slain thousands.

Brother, our seats were once large and yours were small. You have now become a great people, and we have scarcely a place left to spread our blankets. You have got our country, but are not yet satisfied; you want to force your religion upon us.

Brother, continue to listen. You say that you are sent to instruct us how to worship the Great Spirit agreeably to His mind; and, if we do not take hold of the religion which you white people teach, we shall be unhappy hereafter. You say that you are right and we are lost. How do we know this to be true? We understand that your religion is written in a Book. If it was intended for us, as well as you, why has not the Great Spirit given to us, and not only to us, but why did He not give to our forefathers the knowledge of that Book, with the means of understanding it rightly? We only know what you tell us

about it. How shall we know when to believe, being so often deceived by the white people?

Brother, you say there is but one way to worship and serve the Great Spirit. If there is but one religion, why do you white people differ so much about it? Why not all agreed, as you can all read the Book?

Brother, we do not understand these things. We are told that your religion was given to your forefathers and has been handed down from father to son. We also have a religion which was given our forefathers and has been handed down to us, their children. We worship in our way. It teaches us to be thankful for all the favors we receive, to love each other, and to be united. We never quarrel about religion.

Brother, the Great Spirit has made us all, but He has made a great difference between His white and His red children. He has given us different complexions and different customs.

To you He has given the arts. To these He has not opened our eyes. We know these things to be true. Since He has made so great a difference between us in other things, why may we not conclude that He has given us a different religion according to our understanding?

The Great Spirit does right. He knows what is best for His children; we are satisfied. Brother, we do not wish to destroy your religion or take it from you. We only want to enjoy our own.

Brother, you say you have not come to get our land

or our money, but to enlighten our minds. I will now tell you that I have been at your meetings and saw you collect money from the meeting. I can not tell what this money was intended for, but suppose it was for your minister; and, if we should conform to your way of thinking, perhaps you may want some from us.

Brother, we are told that you have been preaching to the white people in this place. These people are our neighbors. We are acquainted with them. We will wait a little while and see what effect your preaching has upon them. If we find it does them good, makes them honest, and less disposed to cheat Indians, we will consider again of what you have said.

Brother, you have now heard our answer to your talk, and this is all we have to say at present. As we are going to part, we will come and take you by the hand, and hope the Great Spirit will protect you on your journey and return you safe to your friends.

TESTIMONY FROM THE TRIAL OF AARON BURR

By Jacob Allbright

THIS is the testimony on which the prosecution mainly depended to convict Colonel Burr at his third and last trial at Richmond, Virginia, in 1807-8. Burr had been previously arrested at Frankfort, Kentucky, and had been successfully defended by Henry Clay in an exciting trial. He was again arrested at Natchez, Mississippi, in January, 1807, but was released by the Grand Jury, and in February of that year he was arrested the third time, charged with both treason and a misdemeanor. To convict him of treason, proof of an overt act was necessary. To establish such proof, reliance was placed chiefly on Allbright's testimony. Burr was not convicted.

The real purpose of his attempted western expedition has never been satisfactorily explained, but it certainly was not politically honorable.

MR. HAY.—Our object is to prove by his testimony the actual assemblage of men on Blennerhassett's island, and it goes of course to prove directly the overt act.

Jacob Allbright.—The first I knew of this business was, I was hired on the island to help to build a kiln for drying corn, and after working some time, Mrs. Blennerhassett told me, that Mr. Blennerhassett and Colonel Burr were going to lay in provisions for an army for a

year. I went to the mill, where I carried the corn to be ground after it had been dried. I worked four weeks on that business in the island. Last fall (or in September) after Blennerhassett had come home (he had been promising me cash for some time) I stepped up to him. He had no money at the time;

but would pay me next day, or soon. Says he, "Mr. Allbright, you are a Dutchman." But he asked me first and foremost, whether I would not join with him and go down the river? I told him, I did not know what they were upon; and he said, "Mr. Allbright, we are going to settle a new country." And I gave him an answer, that I would not like to leave my family. He said, he did not want any families to go along with him. Then he said to me, "You are a Dutchman, and a common man; and as the Dutch are apt to be scared by high men, if you'll go to New Lancaster, where the Dutch live, and get me twenty or thirty to go with us, I will give you as many dollars." New Lancaster was some distance off. I went home then, and gave him no answer upon that. In a few days after the boats came and landed at the island. The snow was about two or three inches deep, and I went out a hunting. I was on the Ohio side; I met two men; I knew they belonged to the boats, but I wanted to find out; and they asked me whether I had not given my consent to go along with Blennerhassett down the river? As we got into a conversation together they named themselves Colonel Burr's men, belonging to the boats, landed at the island. When they asked me, whether I had not consented to go down with Blennerhassett, I put a question to them. I told them I did not know what they were about; and one of the gentlemen told me, they were going to take a silver mine from the Spanish. I asked the gentlemen, whether they would not allow, that this would

raise war with America? They replied, no. These were only a few men; and if they went with a good army, they would give up the country and nothing more said about it. I had all this conversation with the two men. These men showed me what fine rifles they had, going down the river with them. Then I went to the island and Blennerhassett paid me off in Kentucky notes. People however didn't like these notes very well, and I went over to the bank at Kan-hawa to change them. I got two of the notes changed; and one, a ten dollar note, was returned to my hand, for which I wished to get silver from Blennerhassett. I went to the island the day the proclamation came out. But before I went to Blennerhassett's house, I heard he was not at home, but at Marietta. I went on the Virginia side, where I met three other men, belonging to the boats, with three complete rifles. They made a call upon me, to take them to the island in my canoe, and I accepted [excepted?] to it; but afterwards I carried the third man, who stood close by my canoe, over to the island. After being some time on the island, I went down to the four boats. Blennerhassett was not at home yet; and I met some of the boat people shooting at a mark. They had a fire between the bank and boats. I saw this in the day time.

Mr. Hay.—How many boats were there?

Answer. Four.

I waited at the house till Blennerhassett came home. He appeared very much scared. One of the boat-

men came up to him for something, and he told him, "Don't trouble me, I have trouble enough already." He went up to his chamber; and I saw no more of him. I asked an old gentleman who was there, and with whom I was well acquainted, to go up to his chamber, and change my note for silver. He did go, and brought me silver. By and by I heard that they were going to start that night. Thinks I, "I'll see the end of it." This was the night of the very day that Blennerhassett got back from Marietta. He got back before night. When night came on, I was among the men and also in the kitchen; and saw the boat-men running bullets. One of them spoke out to the others, "Boys, let's mould as many bullets, as we can fire twelve rounds." After that, I saw no more till after twelve o'clock at night. Then Blennerhassett came down from the chamber, and called up some of his servants; he had four or five trunks. There were not trusty hands enough to carry them to the boats; and some person called after my name, and asked me to help them; and I carried one of the trunks and moved along with them. When we got down, some person, I don't particularly know who, but think it was Blennerhassett himself, asked me to stand by the trunks, till they were put in the boats. When the last of them went off, I saw men standing in a circle on the shore. I went up to them; perhaps they were five or six rods from me. The first thing that I noticed, was their laying plans and consulting how Blennerhassett and Comfort Tyler should get safe by Galliopolis. One

Nahum Bennett was called forward, and when he came, Blennerhassett asked him, whether he had not two smart horses? Nahum Bennett answered no; he had but one. Then Blennerhassett told him to go to Captain Dennie, and get his sorrel horse; and Nahum Bennett told him, that the sorrel horse had no shoes on; and Blennerhassett said, the roads were soft and would not hurt the horse. Blennerhassett told Nahum Bennett to meet him and Comfort Tyler with the horses, somewhere about Galliopolis: Bennett inquired how he was to find him out, should he inquire for him? "No." "Have you no friends there?" "No." Mrs. Blennerhassett then came forward, and she told Blennerhassett and Comfort Tyler, that they must take a canoe and get into it before they got to Galliopolis, and sail down the stream of the Ohio; for nobody would mind a couple of men going down the stream. She said she'd pay for the canoe. Blennerhassett told Nahum Bennett to take the two horses and pass round Galliopolis before day, and then they might surround [go round] Galliopolis. After that, a man by the name of Tupper, laid his hands upon Blennerhassett, and said, "Your body is in my hands, in the name of the commonwealth." Some such words as that he mentioned. When Tupper made that motion, there were seven or eight muskets leveled at him. Tupper looked about him and said, "Gentlemen, I hope you will not do the like." One of the gentlemen who was nearest, about two yards off, said, "I'd as lieve as not." Tupper then changed his

speech, and said he wished him to escape safe down the river, and wished him luck. Tupper before told Blennerhassett he should stay and stand his trial. But Blennerhassett said no; that the people in the neighborhood were coming down next day to take him, and he would go. Next day after, I saw the Wood county militia going down. The people went off in boats that night about one.

Question. All?

Answer. All but one, who was a doctor. All belonging to the boats had some kind of arms. Some of the boats were on the shore and some not.

Mr. Hay.—How many men were there in all?

Answer. About twenty or thirty: I did not, however, count them. Every man belonging to the boats that I took notice of, had arms.

Mr. Coleman (one of the jury). What day, month, or year, was this?

Answer. In the fall of the year. I don't recollect the month or particular time, but there was snow on the ground.

Mr. Hay.—Do you recollect whether it snows in September?

Answer. I do not know.

Mr. Sheppard (one of the jury). Was Tupper a magistrate or officer?

Answer. I know not.

Question. Where had Blennerhassett been?

Answer. In Kentucky.

Mr. Wirt.—Had you seen Colonel Burr on the island?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Was he there before Blennerhassett went to Kentucky?

Answer. He was. . . .

Question. Did the boats quit the island at the time of hearing about the proclamation?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Did the Wood county militia go there next day?

Answer. Yes.

Question by Mr. Parker (one of the jury). . . . How long did Aaron Burr remain on the island?

Answer. I do not recollect.

Question by the same. How long had he been there before the departure of the boats?

To this question, he first answered, that he did not know; and that Mr. Burr never returned back to the island: but after some reflection he said, that he had been there about six weeks before the departure of the boats.

THE CHESAPEAKE OUTRAGE

By Vice-Admiral B. C. Berkeley and Commodore James Barron

THE first of these documents is the order issued June 1, 1807, by Admiral Berkeley, commander-in-chief of the British squadron in American waters, to his subordinates to search the Chesapeake for deserters. The second document is the American Commodore Barron's report of April 7, 1807, to the Navy Department about the deserters in question, and the third is his report of the attack made upon his ship June 22, 1807, by the British frigate Leopard.

The additional communications passed between the Leopard and Chesapeake the day of the fight.

This attack and search of the Chesapeake, three of whose crew were killed and eighteen wounded, resulted in the British reclaiming four deserters found aboard the ship. It was one of the chief occurrences that led up to the War of 1812. Eventually the British government repudiated the action, restored the seamen and also paid an indemnity.

WHEREAS, many seamen, subjects of His Britannic Majesty, and serving in His Majesty's ships and vessels . . . while at anchor in the Chesapeake, deserted and entered on board the United States' frigate the Chesapeake, and openly paraded the streets of Norfolk, in sight of their officers, under the American flag, protected by the magistrates of the town, and the recruiting officer belonging to the above-mentioned American frigate; which magistrates and naval officer refused giving them up, although demanded by His Britan-

nic Majesty's consul, as well as the captains of the ships from which the said men had deserted; the captains and commanders of His Majesty's ships and

vessels under my command are, therefore, hereby required and directed, in case of meeting with the American frigate Chesapeake at sea, and without the limits of the United States, to show to the captain of her this order, and to require to search his ship for the deserters from the before-mentioned ships, and to proceed and search for the same. And, if a similar demand should be made by the American, he is permitted to search for deserters from their service, according to the customs and usages of civilized nations, on terms of peace and amity with each other.

G. C. BERKELEY.

I HAVE the honor to enclose you the result of my inquiries relating to the men mentioned in your letter of yesterday. . . .

William Ware, pressed from on board the brig Neptune, Captain Crafts, by the British frigate Melampus, in the Bay of Biscay, and has served on board the said frigate fifteen months.

William Ware is a native American; born on Pipe creek, Frederick county, State of Maryland, at Bruce's Mills, and served his time at said Mills; he also lived at Ellicott's mills, near Baltimore, and drove a wagon several years between Hagerstown and Baltimore; he also served eighteen months on board the United States' frigate Chesapeake, under the command of Commodore Morris and Captain James Barron; he is an Indian looking man.

Daniel Martin was pressed at the same time and place; he is a native of Westport, in Massachusetts,

about thirty miles to the eastward of Newport, Rhode Island; served his time out of New York with Captain Marrowby in the *Caledonian*; refers to Mr. Benjamin Davis, merchant, and Mr. Benjamin Corce, of Westport; he is a colored man.

John Strachan, born on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, Queen Anne's county, between Centreville and Queen's town; refers to Mr. John Price and ——— Pratt, Esq., on Kent island, who know his relations; Strachan sailed in the brig *Martha Bland*, Captain Wivill, from Norfolk to Dublin, and from thence to Liverpool; he there left the brig, and shipped on board an English Guineaman; he was pressed on board the *Melampus*, off Cape Finisterre; to better his situation he consented to enter, being determined to make his escape when opportunity offered; he served on board the frigate two years; he is a white man, about five feet seven inches high.

William Ware and John Strachan have protections; Daniel Martin says he lost his after leaving the frigate.

John Little, alias Francis, and Ambrose Watts, escaped from the *Melampus* at the same time; known to the above persons to be Americans, but have not been entered by my recruiting officer.

William Ware, Daniel Martin, and John Strachan, state that, some time in February last, there was an entertainment on board the *Melampus*, lying then in Hampton Roads; that while the officers of ——— were engaged, and all the ship's boats, except the captain's

gig, being hoisted in, themselves, and the two other men mentioned, availed themselves of a moment to seize the gig and row off; that, as soon as they had got into the boat, they were hailed to know what they were going to do; they replied they were going ashore; a brisk fire of musketry instantly commenced from the ship; that, in defiance of balls, and the hazard of their lives, they continued to pull, and finally effected their escape to land, namely, Lowell's Point; that they then carefully hauled up the boat on the beach, rolled up the coat, and placed that and the oars in the boat, gave three cheers, and moved up the country.

YESTERDAY at 6., A. M., the wind became favorable, and knowing your anxiety that the ship should sail with all possible despatch, we weighed from our station in Hampton Roads and stood to sea. In Lynnhaven Bay we passed two British men of war, one of them the *Bellona*, the other the *Melampus*; their colors flying, and their appearance friendly. Some time afterwards, we observed one of the two line-of-battle ships that lay off Cape Henry to get under way, and stand to sea; at this time the wind became light, and it was not until near four in the afternoon that the ship under way came within hail. Cape Henry then bearing northwest by west, distance three leagues, the communication, which appeared to be her commander's object for speaking the Chesapeake, he said he would send on board; on which I

ordered the Chesapeake to be hove to for his convenience.

On the arrival of the officer he presented me with the enclosed paper (No. 1.) from the captain of the Leopard, and a copy of an order from Admiral Berkeley, which another officer afterwards took back, to which I gave the enclosed answer, (No. 2.) and was waiting for his reply. About this time I observed some appearance of a hostile nature, and said to Captain Gordon that it was possible they were serious, and requested him to have his men sent to their quarters with as little noise as possible, not using those ceremonies which we should have done with an avowed enemy, as I fully supposed their arrangements were more menace than anything serious. Captain Gordon immediately gave the orders to the officers and men to go to quarters, and have all things in readiness; but before a match could be lighted, or the quarter-bill of any division examined, or the lumber on the gun-deck, such as sails, cables, &c., could be cleared, the commander of the Leopard hailed; I could not hear what he said, and was talking to him, as I supposed, when she commenced a heavy fire, which did great execution.

It is distressing to me to acknowledge, that I found from the advantage they had gained over our unprepared and suspicious state, did not warrant a longer opposition; nor should I have exposed this ship and crew to so galling a fire had it not been with the hope of getting the gun-deck clear, so as to have made a more formidable defense; consequently our

resistance was but feeble. In about twenty minutes after I ordered the colors to be struck, and sent Lieutenant Smith on board the Leopard to inform her commander that I considered the Chesapeake her prize. To this message I received no answer; the Leopard's boat soon after came on board, and the officer who came in her demanded the muster book. I replied the ship and books were theirs, and if he expected to see the men he must find them. They called on the purser who delivered his book, and the men were examined; and the three men demanded at Washington, and one man more, were taken away. On their departure from the ship I wrote the commander of the Leopard the enclosed, (No. 3,) to which I received the answer, (No. 4) On finding that the men were his only object, and that he refused to consider the ship his prize, and the officers and crew his prisoners, I called a council of our officers, and requested their opinion relative to the conduct it was now our duty to pursue. The result was that the ship should return to Hampton Roads, and there wait your further orders. Enclosed you have a list of the unfortunate killed and wounded, as also a statement of the damage sustained in the hull, spars, and rigging of the ship. . . .

With great respect, I have the honor to be, sir,
your obedient servant,

JAMES BARRON.

Hon. Robert Smith, Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

No. 1

The captain of His Britannic Majesty's ship Leopard has the honor to enclose the captain of the United States' ship Chesapeake an order from the honorable Vice Admiral Berkeley, commander-in-chief of His Majesty's ships on the North American station, respecting some deserters from the ships (therein mentioned) under his command, and supposed to be now serving as part of the crew of the Chesapeake.

The captain of the Leopard will not presume to say anything in addition to what the commander-in-chief has stated, more than to express a hope that every circumstance respecting them may be adjusted in a manner that the harmony subsisting between the two countries may remain undisturbed.

To the Commander of the U. S. S. Chesapeake.

No. 2

I know of no such men as you describe. The officers that were on the recruiting service for this ship were particularly instructed by the Government, through me, not to enter any deserters from His Britannic Majesty's ships, nor do I know of any being here. I am also instructed never to permit the crew of any ship that I command to be mustered by any other but their own officers. It is my disposition to preserve harmony, and I hope this answer to your despatch may prove satisfactory.

JAMES BARRON.

To the Commander of His Britannic Majesty's
Ship Leopard.

No. 3

I consider the frigate Chesapeake your prize, and am ready to deliver her to any officer authorized to receive her. By the return of the boat I shall expect your answer. . . .

JAMES BARRON.

To the Commander of His Britannic Majesty's
Ship Leopard.

No. 4

Having to the utmost of my power fulfilled the instructions of my commander-in-chief, I have nothing more to desire, and must in consequence proceed to join the remainder of the squadron, repeating that I am ready to give you every assistance in my power, and do most sincerely deplore that any lives should have been lost in the execution of a service which might have been adjusted more amicably not only with respect to ourselves, but the nations to which we respectively belong. . . .

S. P. HUMPHREYS.

To the Commander of the United States' Ship
Chesapeake.

FULTON WRITES ABOUT HIS FIRST TRIP TO ALBANY

FULTON wrote the first of these two letters to the American Citizen, in September, 1807, the day the Clermont returned to New York from Albany on its first trip up and down the Hudson, proving that a steamboat could travel five miles or more an hour. The second letter was to his friend Joel Barlow, the poet, with whom he had lived in Paris while making his preliminary experiments.

Fulton did not actually invent the steamboat, but his was the first one that "worked," and his success was due largely to the help he received from Robert R. Livingston. Thurston, the engineer-historian says, "Fulton's service cannot be overestimated . . . He placed steam navigation on a safe and permanent basis."

Following these Fulton letters is one by H. Freeland, an eye-witness of the event which immortalized Fulton and revolutionized marine travel. It is a reminiscence written in 1856.

twenty-four hours; distance, one hundred and ten miles. On Wednesday I departed from the Chancellor's at nine in the morning, and arrived at Albany at five in the afternoon: distance, forty miles; time,

I ARRIVED this afternoon at four o'clock in the steamboat from Albany. As the success of my experiment gives me great hopes that such boats may be rendered of great importance to my country, to prevent erroneous opinions and give some satisfaction to my friends of useful improvements, you will have the goodness to publish the following statement of facts:

I left New York on Monday at one o'clock and arrived at Clermont, the seat of Chancellor Livingston, at one o'clock on Tuesday: time,

eight hours. The sum is one hundred and fifty miles in thirty-two hours, equal to near five miles an hour.

On Thursday, at nine o'clock in the morning, I left Albany, and arrived at the Chancellor's at six in the evening. I started from thence at seven, and arrived at New York at four in the afternoon: time, thirty hours; space run through, one hundred and fifty miles, equal to five miles an hour. Throughout my whole way, both going and returning, the wind was ahead. No advantage could be derived from my sails. The whole has therefore been performed by the power of the steam-engine.

MY steamboat voyage to Albany and back has turned out rather more favorably than I had calculated. The distance from New York to Albany is one hundred and fifty miles. I ran it up in thirty-two hours, and down in thirty. I had a light breeze against me the whole way, both going and coming; and the voyage has been performed wholly by the power of the steam-engine. I overtook many sloops and schooners beating to windward, and parted with them.

The power of propelling boats by steam is now fully proved. The morning I left New York there were not perhaps thirty persons in the city who believed that the boat would ever move one mile an hour or be of the least utility; and, while we were putting off from the wharf, which was crowded with spectators, I heard a number of sarcastic remarks.

This is the way in which ignorant men compliment what they call philosophers and projectors.

Having employed much time, money, and zeal in accomplishing this work, it gives me, as it will you, great pleasure to see it answer my expectations. It will give a cheap and quick conveyance to the merchandise on the Mississippi, Missouri and other great rivers, which are now laying open their treasures to the enterprise of our countrymen; and, although the prospect of personal emolument has been some inducement to me, yet I feel infinitely more pleasure in reflecting on the immense advantage my country will derive.

THE FIRST VOYAGE OF THE CLERMONT

By an Eye-Witness

IT WAS the early autumn of the year 1807 that a knot of villagers was gathered on a high bluff just opposite Poughkeepsie, on the west bank of the Hudson, attracted by the appearance of a strange, dark looking craft, which was slowly making its way up the river. Some imagined it to be a sea monster, while others did not hesitate to express their belief that it was a sign of the approaching judgment. What seemed strange in the vessel was the substitution of lofty and straight black smoke-pipes rising from the deck, instead of the gracefully tapered masts that commonly stood on the vessels navigating the stream, and, in place of the spars and rigging, the curious play of the working-beam and pistons and the slow turning and splashing of the huge and naked paddle-wheels met the astonished gaze. The dense clouds of smoke, as they rose wave upon wave, added still more to the wonderment of the rustics.

This strange looking craft was the Clermont on her trial trip to Albany, and of the little knot of villagers mentioned above, the writer, then a boy in his eighth year, with his parents, formed a part; and I well remember the scene, one so well fitted to impress a lasting picture upon the mind of a child accustomed to watch the vessels that passed up and down the river.

90 THE FIRST VOYAGE OF THE CLERMONT

The forms of four persons were distinctly visible on the deck as she passed the bluff,—one of whom, doubtless, was Robert Fulton, who had on board with him all the cherished hopes of years, the most precious cargo the wonderful boat could carry.

On her return trip the curiosity she excited was scarcely less intense; the whole country talked of nothing but the sea monster belching forth fire and smoke. The fishermen became terrified and rowed homewards, and they saw nothing but destruction devastating their fishing grounds, while the wreaths of black vapor and the rushing noise of the paddle-wheels, foaming with the stirred up waters, produced great excitement among the boatmen, until it was more intelligent than before; for the character of that curious boat, and the nature of the enterprise which she was pioneering, had been ascertained.

From that time, Robert Fulton, Esq., became known and respected as the author and builder of the first steam packet, from which we plainly see the rapid improvement in commerce and civilization. Who can doubt that Fulton's first packet boat has been the model steamer? Except in finer finish and greater size, there is no difference between it and the splendid steamships now crossing the Atlantic. Who can doubt that Fulton saw the meeting of all nations upon his boats, gathering together in unity and harmony, that the "freedom of the seas would be the happiness of the earth"? Who can doubt that Fulton saw the world circumnavigated by steam, and that

his invention was carrying the messages of freedom to every land, that no man could tell all its benefits, or describe all its wonders? What a wonderful achievement! What a splendid triumph!

HOW JEFFERSON'S EMBARGO PARALYZED TRADE

By Josiah Quincy

JOSIAH QUINCY was one of the most prominent of the extreme Federalists who opposed Jefferson and Madison. He was the spokesman in Congress of New England interests that joined with the Southern tobacco planters in denouncing the Embargo of 1807 which forbade the sailing of American vessels with cargoes for foreign ports, and the Enforcement Act of 1808 which put heavy penalties on the violation of the embargo. These retaliatory acts were provoked by England and France, then at war, whose navies were harassing neutral American ships, the crews of which were being impressed into British service.

Bryant's poem is now the best known expression of the feeling the Embargo aroused in New England. Without having accomplished its object, the act was repealed in 1809.

Quincy was one of the earliest to denounce slavery in Congress, and declared in a speech made in 1811 that the purchase of Louisiana was a sufficient cause for the dissolution of the Union.

ne exeat regno, but a new republican writ, ne exeat republicâ. Freeman, in the pride of their liberty,

A WHOLE people is laboring under a most grievous oppression. All the business of the nation is deranged. All its active hopes are frustrated. All its industry stagnant. Its numerous products hastening to their market, are stopped in their course. A dam is thrown across the current, and every hour the strength and the tendency toward resistance is accumulating. The scene we are now witnessing is altogether unparalleled in history. The tales of fiction have no parallel for it. A new writ is executed upon a whole people. Not, indeed, the old monarchical writ, ne

have restraints imposed on them which despotism never exercised. They are fastened down to the soil by the enchantment of law; and their property vanishes in the very process of preservation. It is impossible for us to separate and leave such a people at such a moment as this, without administering some opiate to their distress. Some hope, however distant, of alleviation must be proffered; some prospect of relief opened. Otherwise, justly might we fear for the result of such an unexampled pressure. Who can say what counsels despair might suggest, or what weapons it might furnish? . . .

The embargo power, which now holds in its palsy-ing grip all the hopes of this nation, is distinguished by two characteristics of material import, in deciding what control shall be left over it during our recess. I allude to its greatness and its novelty.

As to its greatness, nothing is like it. Every class of men feels it. Every interest in the nation is affected by it. The merchant, the farmer, the planter, the mechanic, the laboring poor—all are sinking under its weight. But there is this that is peculiar to it, that there is no equality in its nature. It is not like taxation, which raises revenue according to the average of wealth; burdening the rich and letting the poor go free. But it presses upon the particular classes of society, in an inverse ratio to the capacity of each to bear it. From those who have much, it takes indeed something. But from those who have little, it takes all. For what hope is left to the industrious poor

when enterprise, activity, and capital are proscribed their legitimate exercise? The regulations of society forbid what was once property to be so any longer. For property depends on circulation, on exchange; on ideal value. The power of property is all relative. It depends not merely upon opinion here, but upon opinion in other countries. If it be cut off from its destined market, much of it is worth nothing, and all of it is worth infinitely less than when circulation is unobstructed.

This embargo power is, therefore, of all powers the most enormous in the manner in which it affects the hopes and interests of a nation. But its magnitude is not more remarkable than its novelty. An experiment, such as is now making, was never before—I will not say tried—it never before entered into the human imagination. There is nothing like it in the narrations of history or in the tales of fiction. All the habits of a mighty nation are at once counteracted. All their property depreciated. All their external connections violated. Five millions of people are encaged. They can not go beyond the limits of that once free country; now they are not even permitted to thrust their own property through the grates. I am not now questioning its policy, its wisdom, or its practicability: I am merely stating the fact. And I ask if such a power as this, thus great, thus novel, thus interfering with all the great passions and interests of a whole people, ought to be left for six months in operation, without any power of control, except

upon the occurrence of certain specified and arbitrary contingencies? Who can foretell when the spirit of endurance will cease? Who, when the strength of nature shall outgrow the strength of your bonds? Or if they do, who can give a pledge that the patience of the people will not first be exhausted.

AMERICAN WAYS OF LIFE IN 1811

By John Melish

JOHN MELISH was a Scotch textile manufacturer who visited this country for the purpose of collecting considerable sums of money owed him by mercantile customers. His "Travels in the United States of America," from which the accompanying observations are taken, was published in two volumes in Philadelphia, in 1812. His chief interest was in American trade and economic conditions.

Among those with whom he reports conversations was President Jefferson, who believed Norfolk, Virginia, would soon outstrip New York and Boston, and rival New Orleans, as an American seaport. Melish also reports Jefferson as stating that turnpike roads would be general throughout the country in less than twenty years. The introductory article describes a Fourth of July celebration at Louisville, Georgia, in 1811.

the mode of celebrating this day, so important in the annals of America.

About 3 o'clock we sat down to dinner. The captain took his place at the head of the table, the oldest lieutenant at the foot; the committee gave the differ-

THIS being the anniversary of American Independence, the day was ushered in by the firing of great guns; and military companies had collected in Louisville [Georgia] from the whole country round. On my return to the tavern, I found a considerable number of the military assembled there. I was waited on by a committee of the artillery company, and received a very polite invitation to dine with them, which I accepted with pleasure, being anxious to observe

ent orders, and all were on an equal footing. Several of the State officers dined with them.

After dinner they drank Madeira wine to a series of toasts, one for each State, which had been previously prepared. Among the number were "The Day We Celebrate;" "The Land We Live In;" "The President of the United States;" "Memory of General Washington;" "Memory of Benjamin Franklin;" "Memory of John Pierce," etc. Each toast was followed by a discharge of artillery, and the music played an appropriate air. A number of excellent songs were sung, and the afternoon was spent with great conviviality and good humor.

Having several calls to make in the town, I left the table early, but returned again in the evening, when I found that the cordial drop had added greatly to the elevation of the animal spirits of the company. They had also received an addition to their number, by several military officers high in command, among whom was Major-General Jackson. Having occasion to give a toast, I availed myself of that opportunity to impress them with favorable sentiments towards my native country. America had been long regarded with a jealous eye by the councils of Britain, and an almost total alienation of affection was the consequence. I knew that Mr. Fox's administration was favorably disposed towards America, and I was inclined, as far as I had opportunity, to impress the Americans with that belief. Accordingly, after thanking the company for the honor they had conferred upon me, and assuring

them of my own friendly regard for the country, I proposed as a toast, "Mr. Fox, and the independent Whigs of Britain. May their joint endeavors with the government of the United States be the means of reconciling the differences between the two countries; and to the latest prosperity may Americans and Britons hail one another as brothers and as friends." This was cordially received, and drank accordingly; and immediately after I was introduced to and politely received by the visiting officers.

A BACKWOODS BREAKFAST

AS I proposed to ride to New Philadelphia, 36 miles from Coshocton, and the road was altogether new to me, and often crossed the river, I was anxious to be gone as soon as possible, and urged the landlady to make all the haste she could. She said she would have the breakfast ready in a minute; but the first indication I saw of dispatch was a preparation to twist the necks of two chickens. I told her to stop, and she gave me a look of astonishment.

"Have you any eggs?" said I. "Yes, plenty," replied she, still keeping in a stooping posture, with the chicken in her hand. "Well," said I, "just boil an egg, and let me have it, with a little bread and tea, and that will save you and I a great deal of trouble." She seemed quite embarrassed, and said she never could set down a breakfast to me like that. I assured her I would take nothing else. "Shall I fry some ham for

you along with the eggs?" said she. "No," said I, "not a bit." "Well, will you take a little stewed pork?" "No." . . . "Preserve me, what will you take, then?" "A little bread and tea, and an egg." "Well, you're the most extraordinary man that I ever saw; but I can't set down a table that way."

I saw that I was only to lose time by contesting the matter farther; so I allowed her to follow her own plan as to the cooking, assuring her that I would take mine as to eating. She detained me about half an hour, and at last placed upon the table a profusion of ham, eggs, fritters, bread, butter and some excellent tea. All the time I was at breakfast she kept pressing me to eat; but I kept my own council, and touched none of the dishes, except the bread, tea and an egg. She affected great surprise, and when I paid her the ordinary fare, a quarter of a dollar, she said it was hardly worth anything. I mention the circumstance to show the kind of hospitality of the landlady, and the good living enjoyed by the backwoods people.

DOWN THE OHIO FROM MARIETTA TO CINCINNATI

WE started at 6 o'clock; the morning was cloudy, the temperature of the air was 70 degrees, of the water 75 degrees. We had got well accustomed to traveling by water, and found it easy and agreeable. Our boatman, Peter, answered our purpose remarkably well, and could row about three miles an

hour. The water was low, and we found the current assisted us very little. In order to relieve the boatman, and to give ourselves exercise, we frequently took a turn at the oars, and we generally made from 30 to 36 miles a day. We had found by this time, that the settlers on the Ohio side were, by far, in the most comfortable circumstances; and we never failed in an application for lodging or victuals on that side. On the Virginia side, we had of late made frequent attempts, but were always unsuccessful. On stopping there, we generally found a negro, who could give us no answer, or a poor-looking object in the shape of a woman, who, "moping and melancholy," would say, "we have no way."

I never saw the bad effects of slavery more visible than in this contrast. On the Virginia side, they seemed generally to trust to the exertions of the negroes, and we found them, as might be expected, "miserable, and wretched, and poor, and almost naked." On the Ohio side, they trusted to the blessing of God, and to their own exertions; and "God helps them that help themselves," as poor Richard says, in his almanac. We found them increasing in wealth, population and domestic comfort; and we resolved hereafter to apply on the right bank only for accommodation.

Our general rule was to look out for a settlement at sunset, and stop at the first we came to thereafter; and it was hardly ever necessary to make a second call. As soon as we had engaged lodgings we ordered

supper, and along with it two chickens to be cooked for next day's fare. The boatman got supper along with us, and then returned to the skiff, where he slept all night. I always found the people with whom we stopped very obliging, and ready to answer all my inquiries, so that it gave me real pleasure to travel on this delightful river, and to converse with the friendly settlers on its banks. Our traveling too was very cheap, for the whole did not amount to more than a dollar a day, boatman's hire included. In the morning, when we started, we carried our broiled chickens, with some bread, cheese and milk in the skiff; on which we made very comfortable repasts, without stopping. . . .

LIFE IN CENTRAL NEW YORK STATE

FARMERS and mechanics are best adapted to the country, and, if they are industrious they are sure to succeed. A farmer can get a quarter section of land, 160 acres, for 560 dollars, with eight years to pay it. If he is industrious, he may have the whole cleared and cultivated like a garden by the end of that time; when, in consequence of the rise on property, by the increase of population, and the cultivation by his individual industry, his land may be worth 50 dollars per acre, or 8,000 dollars; besides his stock of cattle, etc., which may be worth half as much more. Mechanics are well paid for their labor; carpenters have 1 dollar per day and their board; if they board

themselves, 1 dollar 25 cents. Other trades have in proportion, and living is cheap. Flour is about 5 dollars per barrel; beef 4 cents per lb.; fowls 12½ cents each; fish are plentiful and cheap. A mechanic can thus earn as much in two days as will maintain a family for a week, and by investing the surplus in houses and lots, in a judicious manner, he may accumulate money as fast as the farmer, and both may be independent and happy.

Indeed, these two classes cannot too highly prize the blessings they enjoy in this country, nor be sufficiently grateful to the Almighty Disposer of all events, for casting their lot in a land where they have advantages so far transcending what the same classes have in any other. I know there are many who hold a different opinion, but I must take the liberty to dissent from it, and the reader who has traveled with me thus far, will allow that my opinion is not founded either on a partial or prejudiced view of the subject; it is deduced from plain, unvarnished facts, which no reasoning can set aside, nor sophistry invalidate. What would the farmers, and mechanics, and manufacturers in Britain give to be in the same situation? There (I speak particularly of Scotland) a farmer pays from 7 to 28 dollars per acre, yearly, for the use of his farm, besides the taxes and public burdens. He gets, in many instances, a lease of 19 years, and is bound to cultivate the ground in a certain way, prescribed by the tenure of his lease. If he improves the farm, the improvements are for another, not for him;

and, at the end of the lease, if another is willing to give one shilling more than he, or if the proprietor has a favorite, or wishes to turn two or more farms into one, or has taken umbrage at his politics, or his religion, or anything else regarding him or his family, he will not get a renewal of the lease. Many a family have I known who have been ruined in this way. Being turned out of a farm, they retire to a town or city, where their substance is soon spent, and they pine away in poverty, and at last find a happy relief in the cold grave. Nor is there any remedy; the lands are nearly all entailed on the great families, and the lords of the soil are the lords of the law; they can bind the poor farmer in all cases whatsoever.

Compare this with the situation of the American farmer. He cultivates his own soil, or if he has none, he can procure it in sufficient quantity for 200 or 300 dollars. If he has no money he can get credit, and all that is necessary to redeem his credit is to put forth his hand and be industrious. He can stand erect on the middle of his farm, and say, "This ground is mine. From the highest canopy of heaven down to the lowest depths, I can claim all that I can get possession of within these bounds; fowls of the air, fish of the seas, and all that pass through the same." And, having a full share of consequence in the political scale, his equal rights are guaranteed to him. None dare encroach upon him; he can sit under his own vine and under his own fig tree, and none to make him afraid.

Look at the mechanic and manufacturer; in America they can earn from 6 to 9 dollars per week, and have provisions so reasonable, that they have their wheat-bread and roast-beef, or roast-pork, or fowl every day, and accumulate property for old age and their offspring. In Britain they can earn from a dollar and a half to three dollars per week, and pay at the rate of 14 or 15 dollars for a barrel of flour, and from 16 to 22 cents per lb. for beef. But, why do I talk of flour and beef? Small, indeed, is the portion of these that fall to their lot. No; they are doomed to drag out a miserable existence on potatoes and oat-meal, with this further curse entailed upon them, that, by the mandate of the powers that be, they are bound to the soil; they cannot, they dare not leave their country, except by stealth!

THE BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE

By General William Henry Harrison

GENERAL HARRISON made this report of his victory at Tippecanoe to Governor Scott, of Kentucky, from Vincennes, December 13, 1811. It was published simultaneously in the *Frankfort Argus*, the *Kentucky Gazette* and the *Lexington Reporter*. The battle had been fought on November 7.

Harrison's victory over the Shawnees, led by The Prophet, brother of the better known Indian chief, Tecumseh, made him famous and did much to make him the ninth President of the United States in the memorable "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" campaign.

Under Harrison was an American force of 800 men, opposed to 5,000 or 6,000 Indians. Less than 200 whites were killed and wounded. The number of Indian fatalities, though undoubtedly large, is not definitely known. At the time of the battle Tecumseh was in the South trying to persuade the Creeks, Choctaws and Cherokees to join in his projected federation.

unable to give you such an account as would be satisfactory. There is, however, the less need of this as my official account to the government will probably reach you nearly as soon as this letter. It appears to

I HAD the pleasure to receive your favor of the 27th ult. by the mail of Wednesday last; and I beg you to accept my sincere thanks for the friendly sentiments it contains.

You wish me to give you some account of the late action, that you "may be the better enabled to do me justice against the cavils of ignorance and presumption." I would do this with great pleasure, but the Legislature of the Territory being about to close its session, and having an unusual pressure of business, I am

me from some of the hints contained in some of your newspapers, that the charge of error in the planning or execution of the late expedition, has been more particularly aimed at the President than myself. I most sincerely thank these gentlemen for placing me in such good company; and it is hardly necessary to inform you, that the charge against the administration is as unfounded in this instance as in all the others, which have flowed from the same source. The orders of the government with regard to the expedition, evince as much wisdom as humanity. It was determined to protect its citizens, but if possible, to spare the effusion of human blood—this last object was prevented; but by whom? Why, in a great measure by those very persons who are now complaining because a battle could not be won without loss. At least in this Territory, the clamor is confined to those who opposed the expedition to the utmost of their power, and by whose exertions in circulating every falsehood, that malice and villainy could invent: the militia were prevented from turning out; and instead of a force of from 12 to 1,500 men which I expected to have had, I was obliged to march from Fort Harrison with less than 800: my personal enemies have united with the British agents in representing that the expedition was entirely useless, and The Prophet as one of the best and most pacific of mortals, a perfect Shaker in principle, who shuddered at the thought of shedding blood. Every one of his

aggressions upon us was denied or palliated and excused with as much eagerness as is the conduct of Great Britain by this same description of people in the Atlantic States. A party sent by The Prophet fired upon and wounded one of our sentinels, upon our own ground; the fact was at first boldly denied, "the man was shot by one of your own people" and I believe it was even asserted that he shot himself. When the whole circumstance was brought to light, these indefatigable gentry, shifted their ground and asserted that "the poor Indian fired in his own defence, and that he was merely gratifying an innocent curiosity in creeping to see what was going on in our camp, and that if he had not shot the sentry, the sentry would have shot him."

I regret exceedingly that the friends of Colonel Daviess should think it was necessary to his fame to suppose a difference of opinion between him and myself, which never existed; that I had slighted advice from him which was never given, and that to give color to this they had listened to stories with regard to the operations of the army that were absolutely without foundation. If the utmost cordiality and friendship did not exist between the Colonel and myself from the time of his joining the army until his death, I have been very much deceived; if our military opinions were not almost always in unison, those which he expressed (and no man who knew him will accuse him of hypocrisy,) were not his own; the Colonel's messmates, Major G. R. C. Floyd and Cap-

tain Piatt, are well acquainted with the entire confidence which subsisted between us; they are acquainted with circumstances which indisputably established the fact; and they and others know that I was the object of his eulogy, to an extent which it would be indelicate in me to repeat. Colonel Daviess did indeed advise me as to measures the day before the action, in which he was joined by all the officers around me—whether the advice was good or bad is immaterial to the present discussion, since it was followed to the extent that it was given. It is not necessary to express my opinion of the Colonel's merits at this time, since it will be found in my official letter, and I have no doubt that it will be satisfactory to his friends.

With regard to my own conduct, my dear Sir, it is not in my power to enter into a defence of it, unless I were to know in what particular it has been arraigned. However I may with safety rely for my defence upon the opinion of my army. Believing most sincerely that you do feel that "lively interest in my fame and fortune" which you profess, I am sure you will peruse with interest the inclosed declaration, signed by all the field officers of the army, (one only who was absent,) and the resolutions entered into by the militia of this country who served upon the expedition; the testimony of men who fought and suffered by my side, ought, I should suppose, to be conclusive.

An idea seems to prevail in your State, that in the action of the 7th the whole army was completely sur-

prised, and that they were placed in a situation where bravery only decided the contest, and where there was no opportunity whatever for the exercise of military skill of any kind; this was, however, far from being the case. It is true that the two companies forming the left angle on the rear line, (Barton's and Geiger's) were attacked before they were formed, and that some of the men were killed in coming out of their tents; but it is equally true that all the other companies were formed before they were fired on, and that even those two companies lost but very few men before they were able to resist. Notwithstanding the darkness, the order of battle, (such as had been previously prescribed) was taken by all the troops—the officers were active, the men cool and obedient, and perhaps, there never was an action where (for the number of men engaged) there were so many changes of position performed; not in disorder and confusion, but with military propriety—the companies, both regulars and militia, were extended, or contracted, wheeled, marched, and made to file up by word of command. My orders (and they were not a few) were obeyed with promptitude and precision. And if I am not most grossly deceived, that mutual dependence which ought to exist between a commander and his army was reciprocally felt.

It has been said that the Indians should have been attacked upon our arrival before their town, on the evening of the 6th. There were two reasons which prevented this, first, that the directions which I re-

ceived from the government, made it necessary that I should endeavor, if possible, to accomplish the object of the expedition (the dispersion of the Prophet's force) without bloodshed, and, secondly, that the success of an attack by day upon the town was very problematical.

I certainly did not understand my instructions to mean that I should jeopardize the safety of the troops, by endeavoring to bring about accommodation without fighting. But if I had commenced an attack upon them, after they had sent a chief to inform me that they were desirous of an accommodation, and that they had three days before sent a deputation to me for that purpose, who can doubt but that a much greater clamor would have been raised than exists at present; the cruelty of attacking those innocent people would have been portrayed in the strongest colors; the administration would have been represented as murderers, and myself as their wretched instrument. But the army were exposed to the "nightly incursions" of the Indians. It has been well observed by a writer in *The Argus*, that if a "nightly incursion" was really so much to be dreaded by the army, it had no business there. But the author of those objections perhaps will be still more surprised when he learns that a "nightly incursion," was precisely what I wished, because from such a one only could I hope for a close and decisive action. If they had attacked us by day they would certainly have done it upon ground favorable to their mode of fighting; they would have

killed (as in General Wayne's action) a number of our men, and when pressed they would have escaped, with a loss comparatively trifling. In night attacks discipline always prevails over disorder, the party which is able to preserve its order longest, must succeed. I had with me 250 regulars that were highly disciplined, and my militia had been instructed to form in order of battle to receive the enemy in any direction, with facility and precision. But in the immediate neighborhood of the enemy, "why were not the troops made to continue under arms through the night?" I answer, that troops can only bear a certain portion of fatigue, and when in the presence of the enemy it is a matter of calculation with the commander, when they should be kept under arms and when permitted to rest. Upon this occasion, I must acknowledge that my calculations were erroneous. In common with the whole army, I did believe that they would not attack us that night. If it was their intention to attack, why had they not done it upon our march, where situations favorable to them might easily have been found? Indeed within three miles of the town we passed over ground so broken and disadvantageous to us that I was obliged to change the position of the troops several times in the course of a mile. They had fortified their town with care and with astonishing labor for them, all indicating that they were meant to sustain the shock. It was the scene of those mysterious rites which were so much venerated, and the Prophet had taught his followers

to believe that both his person and his town were equally inviolable to us. I expected that they would have met me the next day to hear my terms, but I did not believe, however, that they would accede to them—and it was my determination to attack and burn the town the following night. It was necessary therefore that the troops should be refreshed as much as possible. But, although the men were not made to remain all night under arms, every other precaution was used as if attack was certain. In fact the troops were placed precisely in that situation that is called by military men “lying upon their arms;” the regular troops lay in their tents with their accoutrements on, and their arms by their sides—the militia had no tents, they slept with their pouches on, and their arms under them to keep them dry. The order of encampment was the order of battle for a night attack, and as every man slept opposite to his post in the line, there was nothing for them to do but to rise and take their post a few steps in the rear of the fires, and the line was formed in an instant. So little time was required for this operation that if the guard on its left flank had done its duty as well as the rest of the army, the troops on that flank would have been formed before the Indians came near them. It was customary every evening as soon as the army halted, to examine the ground of the encampment and surroundings, and afterwards to call together the field officers of the army, and give them their directions for the night. At these meetings (where every one was required

freely to express their sentiments) every contingency that was likely to happen was discussed. The orders that were proper to be given to them, were then by the field officers repeated to the captains. Every one being by these means possessed of my intentions there was no room left for mistake or confusion. The orders given on the night of the 6th were solely directed to a night attack, the officers were directed in case of such an attack, to parade their men in the order in which they were encamped, and that each corps should maintain itself upon its own ground until other orders were given. With regulations such as these, and with such a state of discipline as we claim, you must allow, my dear Sir, that we had no reason to dread "a night incursion," more than an attack by day. Indeed it was preferable, because in no other way could it have been so completely decisive. In the latter we might have lost as many men as we did lose, without having killed a third as many of the enemy.

In my letter to the Secretary it is asserted that the Indians had penetrated to the center of the encampment. I believe, however, that not more than two Indians got within the lines—men were certainly killed near the center of the camp, but it must have been from balls fired from without.

From this letter and my official despatch to the Secretary of War, you will be enabled, my dear General, to form a correct opinion of the battle of Tippecanoe. When an action is over, and we have time to

meditate upon the circumstances that attended it, there is no great judgment necessary to discover some error in the conduct of it, some thing that was done, which might have been better done, or something that was omitted, which if done might have produced great advantage. I believe the greatest generals have admitted that they could fight a second battle upon the same ground, much better than the first. If this is true with respect to them ought it not to be a motive to shield me from the severity of criticism with which some of my fellow citizens are desirous of scanning my conduct.

A victory has been gained, and the army which gained it impute it in part at least to the measures of the commander,—but this is not sufficient—it should have been achieved without loss on our side. There is certainly no man more fully impressed with the exalted merits of those brave men who fell in the action, than I am—among them were many for whom I felt the warmest regard and friendship—but they were exposed to no dangers but what were common to the whole army, and if they were selected by divine providence, as the price of our important victory, there is nothing left us but to honor their memory, and bow submissively to a decree which we can not alter.

It would, however, embitter the remaining part of my life, if I could suppose that their fate was produced by any misconduct of mine. But upon this subject I have nothing to accuse myself. I am satisfied that all my weak powers were exerted to the

utmost, for the safety and glory of my troops. Indeed no commander had ever greater reason to do so, for none ever received greater confidence and attachment from any army, than I—many of the corps forgetful of their own danger, seemed only anxious for me—and a sentiment springing from personal attachment alone was imputed by them to a belief that their fate was intimately connected with mine. For such troops it was impossible that I should not be willing to shed the last drop of my blood.

Your friendship, my dear General, will pardon the egotism contained in this letter—perhaps I ought to disregard the idle tales that have been circulated to my prejudice; knowing as I do that there are not ten persons who served under me upon the late expedition that will not be ready to contradict them; I have sufficient stoicism, however, to rest easy under unmerited reproach, and with the consciousness of having rendered some service to my country, I can not bear to be deprived of the good opinion of my fellow-citizens.

P. S. I should have covered my troops every night with a breast work of trees, but axes were so scarce (after having procured every one that the Territory afforded) that it was with difficulty that a sufficiency of wood could be procured to make the men comfortable; and the militia were without tents, and many of them without blankets. The story which has been circulated in some of the papers, of officers fighting without any clothes but their shirts, is absolutely false.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 1812

By President James Madison

OUR second war with Great Britain was declared on June 18, 1812. Its immediate causes are set forth in this correspondence between President Madison and ex-President Jefferson, the first letter being dated May 25, 1812. Madison had been Secretary of State in Jefferson's Cabinet. Like Jefferson he was essentially a man of peace, and was not successful in his management of the war.

His argument that France had respected our rights and that England should therefore withdraw her orders in council, was untenable. Moreover, Madison did not, as he admits, have a united country behind him, for most of the New Englanders preferred the British to the French. The War of 1812 lasted through almost half of Madison's second term.

FRANCE has done nothing towards adjusting our differences with her. It is understood that the Berlin and Milan Decrees are not in force against the United States, and no contravention of them can be established against her. On the contrary, positive cases rebut the allegation. Still, the manner of the French Government betrays the design of leaving Great Britain a pretext for enforcing her orders in council. And in all other

respects, the grounds for our complaints remain the same. . . . In the meantime, the business is become more than ever puzzling. To go to war with England and not with France arms the Federalists with new matter, and divides the Republicans, some of whom, with the Quids, (extreme Democrats,) make a display of impartiality. To go to war against both presents a thousand difficulties; above all, that of shutting all

the ports of the continent of Europe against our cruisers, who can do little without the use of them. It is pretty certain, also, that it would not gain over the Federalists, who would turn all those difficulties against the administration. The only consideration of weight in favor of this triangular war, as it is called, is, that it might hasten through a peace with Great Britain or France; a termination, for a while, at least, of the obstinate questions now depending with both.

But even this advantage is not certain. For a prolongation of such a war might be viewed by both belligerents as desirable, with as little reason for the opinion as has prevailed in the past conduct of both.

[June 22.] I inclose a paper containing the declaration of war. . . . It is understood that the Federalists in Congress are to put all the strength of their talents into a protest against the war, and that the party at large are to be brought out in all their force. . . .

[July 25.] The conduct of the nation against whom this resort has been proclaimed left no choice but between that and the greater evil of a surrender of our sovereignty on the element on which all nations have equal rights, and in the free use of which the United States, as a nation whose agriculture and commerce are so closely allied, have an essential interest.

The appeal to force in opposition to the force so long continued against us had become the more urgent, as every endeavor short of it had not only been fruitless, but had been followed by fresh usurpa-

tions and oppressions. The intolerable outrages committed against the crews of our vessels, which, at one time, were the result of alleged searches for deserters from British ships of war, had grown into a like pretension, first, as to all British seamen, and next, as to all British subjects; with the invariable practice of seizing on all neutral seamen of every nation, and on all such of our own seamen as British officers interested in the abuse might please to demand.

The blockading orders in council, commencing on the plea of retaliating injuries indirectly done to Great Britain, through the direct operation of French decrees against the trade of the United States with her, and on a professed disposition to proceed step by step with France in revoking them, have been since bottomed on pretensions more and more extended and arbitrary, till at length it is openly avowed as indispensable to a repeal of the orders as they affect the United States, that the French decrees be repealed as they affect Great Britain directly, and all other neutrals, as well as the United States. To this extraordinary avowal is superadded abundant evidence that the real object of the orders is, not to restore freedom to the American commerce with Great Britain, which could, indeed, be little interrupted by the decrees of France, but to destroy our lawful commerce, as interfering with her own unlawful commerce with her enemies. The only foundation of this attempt to banish the American flag from the highway of nations, or to render it wholly subservient to the com-

mercial views of the British government is the absurd and exploded doctrine that the ocean, not less than the land, is susceptible of occupancy and dominion; that this dominion is in the hands of Great Britain; and that her laws, not the law of nations, which is ours as well as hers, are to regulate our maritime intercourse with the rest of the world.

When the United States assumed and established their rank among the nations of the earth, they assumed and established a common sovereignty on the high seas, as well as an exclusive sovereignty within their territorial limits. The one is as essential as the other to their character as an independent nation. However conceding they may have been on controvertible points, or forbearing under casual and limited injuries, they can never submit to wrongs irreparable in their kind, enormous in their amount, and indefinite in their duration; and which are avowed and justified on principles degrading the United States from the rank of a sovereign and independent power. In attaining this high rank, and the inestimable blessings attached to it, no part of the American people had a more meritorious share than the people of New Jersey. From none, therefore, may more reasonably be expected a patriotic zeal in maintaining by the sword the unquestionable and unalienable rights acquired by it. . . .

THE SEEDS OF WAR

By John Quincy Adams

IT is in his biography of James Madison that J. Q. Adams, sixth President of the United States and son of our second President, discusses the origin of the War of 1812 and reviews its long period of brewing. American grievances had been accumulating steadily since Trafalgar.

More than 900 American ships had been seized by the British and more than 550 by the French, while, as Carl Schurz records, in his "Life of Henry Clay," who was John Quincy Adams's Secretary of State, "the number of American citizens impressed as British seamen, or kept in prison if they refused to serve, was reported to exceed 6,000." It was estimated that "as many more had been impressed of whom no information had been obtained." Remonstrances made by the American government "had been treated with haughty disdain."

IN the first wars of the French revolution Great Britain had begun by straining the claim of belligerent, as against neutral rights, beyond all the theories of international jurisprudence, and even beyond her own ordinary practice. There is in all war a conflict between the belligerent and the neutral right, which can in its nature be settled only by convention. And in addition to all the ordinary asperities of dissension between the nation at war and the nation at peace, she had asserted

a right of man-stealing from the vessels of the United States. The claim of right was to take by force all sea-faring men, her own subjects, wherever they were found by her naval officers, to serve their king in his wars. And under color of this tyrant's right, her naval officers, down to the most beardless midship-

man, actually took from the American merchant vessels which they visited, any seaman whom they chose to take for a British subject. After the treaty of November, 1794, she had relaxed all her pretensions against the neutral rights, and had gradually abandoned the practice of impressment till she was on the point of renouncing it by a formal treaty stipulation.

At the renewal of the war, after the Peace of Amiens, it was at first urged with much respect for the rights of neutrality, but the practice of impressment was soon renewed with aggravated severity, and the commerce of neutral nations with the colonies of the adverse belligerent was wholly interdicted on the pretense of justification, because it had been forbidden by the enemy herself in the time of peace. This pretension had been first raised by Great Britain in the Seven Years' War, but she had been overawed by the armed neutrality from maintaining it in the war of the American Revolution.

In the midst of this war with Napoleon, she suddenly reasserted the principle, and by a secret order in council, swept the ocean of nearly the whole mass of neutral commerce. Her war with France spread itself all over Europe, successively involving Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Denmark and Sweden. Not a single neutral power remained in Europe—and Great Britain, after annihilating at Trafalgar the united naval power of France and Spain, ruling thenceforth with undisputed dominion upon the ocean, conceived the project of engrossing even

the commerce with her enemy by intercepting all neutral navigation. These measures were met by corresponding acts of violence, and sophistical principles of national law, promulgated by Napoleon, rising to the summit of his greatness, and preparing his downfall by the abuse of his elevation.

Through this fiery ordeal the administration of Mr. Jefferson was to pass, and the severest of its tests were to be applied to Mr. Madison. His correspondence with the ministers of Great Britain, France and Spain, and with the ministers of the United States to those nations during the remainder of Mr. Jefferson's administration, constitute the most important and most valuable materials of its history. His examination of the British doctrines relating to neutral trade will hereafter be considered a standard treatise on the law of nations; not inferior to the works of any writer upon those subjects since the days of Grotius, and every way worthy of the author of *Publius* and *Helvidius*. There is indeed, in all the diplomatic papers of American statesmen, justly celebrated as they have been, nothing superior to this dissertation, which was not strictly official. It was composed amid the duties of the Department of State, never more arduous than at that time—in the summer of 1806. It was published unofficially, and a copy of it was laid on the table of each member of Congress at the commencement of the session in December, 1806.

The controversies of conflicting neutral and belligerent rights continued through the whole of Mr. Jef-

person's administration, during the latter part of which they were verging rapidly to war. He had carried the policy of peace perhaps to an extreme. His system of defense by commercial restrictions, dry-docks, gunboats and embargoes, was stretched to its last hair's breadth of endurance. Far be it from me to speak of this system or of its motives with disrespect. If there be a duty, binding in chains more adamant than all the rest the conscience of a Chief Magistrate of this Union, it is that of preserving peace with all mankind—peace with the other nations of the earth—peace among the several States of this Union—peace in the hearts and temper of our own people. Yet must a President of the United States never cease to feel that his charge is to maintain the rights, the interests and the honor no less than the peace of his country—nor will he be permitted to forget that peace must be the offspring of two concurring wills; that to seek peace is not always to ensure it.

He must remember, too, that a reliance upon the operation of measures, from their effect on the interests, however clear and unequivocal of nations, can not be safe against a counter-current of their passions; that nations, like individuals, sacrifice their peace to their pride, to their hatred, to their envy, to their jealousy, and even to the craft, which the cunning of hackneyed politicians not unfrequently mistakes for policy; that nations, like individuals, have sometimes the misfortune of losing their senses, and

that lunatic communities, which can not be confined in hospitals, must be resisted in arms, as a single maniac is sometimes restored to reason by the scourge; that national madness is infectious, and that a paroxysm of it in one people, especially when generated by the Furies that preside over war, produces a counter-paroxysm in their adverse party. Such is the melancholy condition as yet of associated man. And while in the wise but mysterious dispensations of an overruling Providence, man shall so continue, the peace of every nation must depend not alone upon its own will, but upon that concurrently with the will of all others.

And such was the condition of the two mightiest nations of the earth during the administration of Mr. Jefferson. Frantic, in fits of mutual hatred, envy and jealousy against each other; meditating mutual invasion and conquest, and forcing the other nations of the four quarters of the globe to the alternative of joining them as allies or encountering them as foes. Mr. Jefferson met them with moral philosophy and commercial restrictions, with dry-docks and gunboats—with non-intercourses and embargoes, till the American nation were told that they could not be kicked into a war, and till they were taunted by a British statesman in the imperial Parliament of England, with their five fir frigates and their striped bunting.

Mr. Jefferson pursued his policy of peace till it brought the nation to the borders of internal war.

An embargo of fourteen months' duration was at last reluctantly abandoned by him, when it had ceased to be obeyed by the people, and State courts were ready to pronounce it unconstitutional. A non-intercourse was then substituted in its place, and the helm of State passed from the hands of Mr. Jefferson to those of Mr. Madison, precisely at the moment of this perturbation of earth and sea threatened with war from abroad and at home, but with the principle definitely settled that in our intercourse with foreign nations, reason, justice and commercial restrictions require live oak hearts and iron or brazen mouths to speak, that they may be distinctly heard, or attentively listened to, by the distant ear of foreigners, whether French or British, monarchical or republican.

The administration of Mr. Madison was, with regard to its most essential principles, a continuation of that of Mr. Jefferson. He, too, was the friend of peace, and earnestly desirous of maintaining it. As a last resource for the preservation of it, an act of Congress prohibited all commercial intercourse with both belligerents, the prohibition to be withdrawn from either or both in the event of a repeal by either of the orders and decrees in violation of neutral rights. France ungraciously and equivocally withdrew hers. Britain refused, hesitated, and at last conditionally withdrew hers when it was too late—after a formal declaration of war had been issued by Congress at the recommendation of President Madison himself.

Of the necessity, the policy or even the justice of this war, there were conflicting opinions, not yet, perhaps never to be, harmonized. This is not the time or the place to discuss them. The passions, the prejudices and the partialities of that day have passed away. That it was emphatically a popular war, having reference to the whole people of the United States, will, I think, not be denied. That it was in a high degree unpopular in our own section of the Union, is no doubt equally true; and that it was so, constituted the greatest difficulties and prepared the most mortifying disasters in its prosecution.

Party spirit and party feeling ran high throughout the Union, and the declaration of war was very differently received in different sections of the Union. In the city of Boston, in full view of the old Temple of Liberty, the flags of the shipping were hoisted at half-mast, in token of mourning; while at Baltimore, a Federal editor was mobbed, his office in great part demolished, one of his friends killed, and he, with others, including Henry Lee, a distinguished officer of the Revolution, but a most bitter and vindictive Federal partisan, seriously injured, for having the hardihood to utter his sentiments through the columns of his paper.

In the eastern States the opposition to the war was marked and virulent. Every one who dared to speak in defense of the administration was denounced in the most unmeasured terms, and curses and anathemas were liberally hurled from the pulpit on the heads of

all those who aided, directly or indirectly, in carrying on the war. In the middle and southern States, public opinion was divided, though a large majority approved the measures adopted by Congress. But in the West there was only one sentiment: love of country sparkled in every eye, and animated every heart. The importing merchants, the lawyers in the principal cities, some planters, and the clergy for the most part, were numbered in the ranks of the opposition; and the war found its most ardent and enthusiastic advocates among the farmers and the planters, the mechanics, the mariners, and the laboring men.

The war itself was an ordeal through which the Constitution of the United States, as the government of a great nation, was to pass. Its trial in that respect was short but severe. In the intention of its founders, and particularly of Mr. Madison, it was a Constitution essentially pacific in its character, and for a nation, above all others, the lover of peace—yet its great and most vigorous energies, and all its most formidable powers, are reserved for the state of war—and war is the condition in which the functions allotted to the separate States sink into impotence compared with those of the general government.

The war was brought to a close without any definitive adjustment of the controverted principles in which it had originated. It left the questions of neutral commerce with an enemy and his colonies, of bottom and cargo, of blockade and contraband of war, and even of impressment, precisely as they had been

before the war. With the European war all the conflicts between belligerent and neutral rights had ceased. Great Britain, triumphant as she was after a struggle of more than twenty years' duration—against revolutionary, republican and imperial France, was in no temper to yield the principles for which in the heat of her contest she had defied the power of neutrality and the voice of justice. As little were the Government or people of the United States disposed to yield principles in the defense of the rights of neutrality, and of conceding too much to the lawless pretensions of naval war.

The extreme solicitude of the American government for the perpetuity of peace, especially with Great Britain, induced Mr. Madison to institute with her negotiations after the peace of Ghent, for the adjustment of all these questions of maritime collisions between the warlike and the pacific nation.

WHY AMERICA HAD TO FIGHT

By Henry Clay

AT the time Henry Clay made this speech in Congress, in 1813, he was Speaker of the House of Representatives and dominated the party that overcame President Madison's reluctance to declare war against Great Britain. As far back as 1806 Clay had shown his hostility to England by introducing in the Kentucky Legislature a resolution that its members wear no clothing made in foreign countries—a proposal that a Federalist member stigmatized as demagogic. A duel followed in which both principals were wounded.

Clay supported the War of 1812 with all his eloquence, in and out of Congress, and became known in consequence as the "War Hawk." His advocacy of a bigger army and better navy aroused nation-wide enthusiasm. When the war seemed nearly a failure, he was one of the commissioners to arrange terms, resigning the Speakership in January, 1814.

us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. . . .

. . . But it is said, that the Orders in Council are done away, no matter from what cause; and, that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. . . .

THE war was declared because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory Orders in Council—a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Orders which she refused to revoke after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the act of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against

. . . I have no hesitation then in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingencies, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it was conceded to gentlemen that such a repeal of the Orders in Council, as took place on the 23d of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war, would have prevented the war, does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms without the redress of any other injury? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would have prevented the war in the first instance should terminate the war? By no means. It requires a great struggle for a nation, prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits and encounter the difficulties of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to go to war. When it does, it should be for clear and essential rights alone, and it should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. . . .

And who is prepared to say that American seamen shall be surrendered the victims to the British principle of impressment? . . . It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that

she cannot exist without the impressment of her seamen. The truth is, she comes, by her press gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes our native seamen, as well as naturalized, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and a practice not conformable to the principle—a principle which, if it were theoretically right, must be forever practically wrong. . . . If Great Britain desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast-head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars who have won for us such splendid trophies. . . .

The gentleman from Delaware sees in Canada no object worthy of conquest. . . . Other gentlemen consider the invasion of that country as wicked and unjustifiable. Its inhabitants are represented as unoffending, connected with those of the bordering States by a thousand tender ties, interchanging acts of kindness, and all the offices of good neighborhood. Canada innocent! Canada unoffending! Is it not in Canada that the tomahawk of the savage has been moulded into its deathlike form? From Canadian magazines, Malden, and others, that those supplies have been issued which nourish and sustain the Indian hostilities? . . . What does a state of war present?

The united energies of one people arrayed against the combined energies of another; a conflict in which each party aims to inflict all the injury it can, by sea and land, upon the territories, property, and citizens of the other, subject only to the rules of mitigated war practiced by civilized nations. The gentlemen would not touch the continental provinces of the enemy, nor I presume, for the same reason, her possessions in the West Indies. The same humane spirit would spare the seamen and soldiers of the enemy. The sacred person of His Majesty must not be attacked, for the learned gentlemen on the other side are quite familiar with the maxim, that the King can do no wrong. Indeed, sir, I know of no person on whom we may make war, upon the principles of the honorable gentlemen, except Mr. Stephen, the celebrated author of the Orders in Council, or the Board of Admiralty, who authorize and regulate the practice of impressment.

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements upon the land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost everything is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that, in no instance, when engaged in an action, have our arms been tarnished. . . . It is true, that the dis-

grace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. . . . With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, had been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. . . .

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past and security for the future. The Orders in Council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet Administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the 29th June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the Secretary of State writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only; and what are they? That the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. . . . When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British Government, Lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. . . .

The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson) supposes, that if Congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on

their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt if such a law were passed, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, Lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, Administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been not in doing too little but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or Halifax. We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation that disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half-way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and if we do not listen to the councils of timidity and despair we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success; but if we fail, let us fail like men—lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for "seamen's rights and free trade."

THE SURRENDER OF DETROIT

GENERAL HULL'S STATEMENT IN HIS OWN DEFENSE

FOLLOWING the declaration of war in 1812, General Hull marched his troops into Canada. There he remained inactive while the British gathered their forces and when they made an attack he surrendered.

Hull had evidently been much shaken by the recent massacre of detachments of his troops, and historians are inclined to lighten the blame given to him at the time, but there is no doubt that in surrendering his command he left a vast territory defenseless.

This letter from General Hull to the Secretary of War was dated at Fort George, August 16th, 1812,—ten days after the surrender for which he was court-martialed and sentenced to death. This, however, was commuted because of his age.

The disfavor in which Hull was held by his fellow officers is shown by this report to the War Department made a few weeks later by Lewis Cass who became Governor of the territory in 1813 and later Secretary of War and Minister to France.

west from beyond the Mississippi, south from the Ohio and Wabash, and east from every part of Upper Canada, and from all the intermediate country, joined

ENCLOSED are the articles of capitulation, by which the Fort of Detroit has been surrendered to major general Brock, commanding his Britannic majesty's forces in Upper Canada, and by which the troops have become prisoners of war. My situation at present forbids me from detailing the particular causes which have led to this unfortunate event. I will, however, generally observe, that after the surrender of Michilimakinac, almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamies and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior,

in open hostility, under the British standard, against the army I commanded, contrary to the most solemn assurances of a large portion of them to remain neutral: even the Ottawa chiefs from Arbecrotch, who formed the delegation to Washington the last summer, in whose friendship I know you had great confidence, are among the hostile tribes, and several of them distinguished leaders. Among the vast number of chiefs who led the hostile bands, Tecumseh, Marpot, Logan, Walk-in-the-Water, Split Log, &c., are considered the principals. This numerous assemblage of savages, under the entire influence and direction of the British commander, enabled him totally to obstruct the only communication which I had with my country. This communication had been opened from the settlements in the state of Ohio, two hundred miles through a wilderness, by the fatigues of the army, which I marched to the frontier on the river Detroit. The body of the lake being commanded by the British armed ships, and the shores and rivers by gun boats, the army was totally deprived of all communication by water. On this extensive road it depended for transportation of provisions, military stores, medicine, clothing, and every other supply, on pack horses—all its operations were successful until its arrival at Detroit, and in a few days it passed into the enemy's country, and all opposition seemed to drop before it. One month it remained in possession of this country, and was fed from its resources. In different directions, detachments penetrated sixty

miles in the settled part of the province, and the inhabitants seemed satisfied with the change of situation, which appeared to be taking place; the militia from Amherstburg were daily deserting, and the whole country, then under the control of the army, was asking for protection. The Indians, generally, in the first instance, appeared to be neutralized, and determined to take no part in the contest. The fort of Amherstburg was eighteen miles below my encampment. Not a single cannon or mortar was on wheels suitable to carry before this place. I consulted my officers, whether it was expedient to make an attempt on it with the bayonet alone, without cannon, to make a break in the first instance. The council I called was of the opinion it was not. The greatest industry was exerted in making preparation, and it was not until the 7th of August, that two 24 pounders, and three howitzers were prepared. It was then my intention to have proceeded on the enterprise. While the operations of the army were delayed by these preparations, the clouds of adversity had been for some time and seemed still thickly to be gathering around me. The surrender of Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction. Reinforcements from Niagara had arrived at Amherstburg under the command of Colonel Proctor. The desertion of the militia ceased. Besides the reinforcements that came by water, I received information of a very considerable force under the command of Major Chambers, on

the river Le French, with four field pieces, and collecting the militia on his route, evidently destined for Amherstburg; and in addition to this combination, and increase of force, contrary to all my expectations, the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawatamies, Munsees, Delawares, &c., with whom I had the most friendly intercourse, at once passed over to Amherstburg, and accepted the tomahawk and scalping knife. There being now a vast number of Indians at the British post, they were sent to the river Huron, Brownstown, and Maguago to intercept my communication. To open this communication, I detached Major Van Horn of the Ohio volunteers, with two hundred men, to proceed as far as the river Raisin, under an expectation he would meet Captain Brush with one hundred and fifty men, volunteers from the state of Ohio, and a quantity of provision for the army. An ambuscade was formed at Brownstown, and Major Van Horn's detachment defeated and returned to camp without effecting the object of the expedition.

In my letter of the 7th instant you have the particulars of that transaction, with a return of the killed and wounded. Under this sudden and unexpected change of things, and having received an express from General Hall, commanding opposite the British shore on the Niagara river, by which it appeared that there was no prospect of a coöperation from that quarter, and the two senior officers of the artillery having stated to me an opinion that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pass the Turkey river

and river Aux Cannard, with the 24 pounders, and that they could not be transported by water, as the Queen Charlotte, which carried eighteen 24 pounders, lay in the river Detroit above the mouth of the river Aux Cannard; and as it appeared indispensably necessary to open the communication to the river Raisin and the Miami, I found myself compelled to suspend the operation against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit. Fully intending at that time, after the communication was opened, to re-cross the river, and pursue the object at Amherstburg, and strongly desirous of continuing protection to a very large number of the inhabitants of Upper Canada, who had voluntarily accepted it under my proclamation, I established a fortress on the banks of the river, a little below Detroit, calculated for a garrison of 300 men. On the evening of the 7th, and morning of the 8th instant, the army, excepting the garrison of 250 infantry, and a corps of artillery, all under the command of Major Denny of the Ohio volunteers, re-crossed the river, and encamped at Detroit. In pursuance of the object of opening the communication, on which I considered the existence of the army depending, a detachment of 600 men, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Miller, was immediately ordered. For a particular account of the proceedings of this detachment, and the memorable battle which was fought at Maguago, which reflects the highest honor on the American arms, I refer you to my letter of the 13th of August instant, a duplicate

of which is enclosed, marked G. Nothing however but honor was acquired by this victory; and it is a painful consideration, that the blood of seventy-five gallant men could only open the communication, as far as the points of their bayonets extended. The necessary care of the sick and wounded, and a very severe storm of rain, rendered their return to camp indispensably necessary for their own comfort. Captain Brush, with his small detachment, and the provisions being still at the river Raisin, and in a situation to be destroyed by the savages, on the 13th instant in the evening, I permitted Colonels McArthur and Cass to select from their regiment four hundred of their most effective men, and proceed an upper route through the woods, which I had sent an express to Captain Brush to take, and had directed the militia of the river Raisin to accompany him as a reinforcement. The force of the enemy continually increasing, and the necessity of opening the communication, and acting on the defensive, becoming more apparent, I had, previous to detaching Colonels McArthur and Cass on the 11th instant, evacuated and destroyed the fort on the opposite bank. On the 13th, in the evening, General Brock arrived at Amherstburg about the hour that Colonels McArthur and Cass marched, of which at that time I had received no information. On the 15th I received a summons from him to surrender Fort Detroit, of which the paper marked A is a copy. My answer is marked B. At this time I had received no information from Colonels McArthur and Cass.

An express was immediately sent, strongly escorted, with orders for them to return. On the 15th, as soon as General Brock received my letter, his batteries opened on the town and fort, and continued until evening. In the evening all the British ships of war came nearly as far up the river as Sandwich, three miles below Detroit. At daylight on the 16th (at which time I had received no information from Colonels McArthur and Cass, my expresses, sent the evening before, and in the night having been prevented from passing by numerous bodies of Indians) the cannonade re-commenced, and in a short time I received information, that the British army and Indians, were landing below the Spring Wells, under the cover of their ships of war. At this time the whole effective force at my disposal at Detroit did not exceed eight hundred men. Being new troops, and unaccustomed to a camp life; having performed a laborious march; having been engaged in a number of battles and skirmishes, in which many had fallen, and more had received wounds, in addition to which a large number being sick, and unprovided with medicine, and the comforts necessary for their situation; are the general causes by which the strength of the army was thus reduced. The fort at this time was filled with women, children, and the old and decrepit people of the town and country; they were unsafe in the town, as it was entirely open and exposed to the enemy's batteries. Back of the fort, above or below it, there was no safety for them on account of the Indians. In the first

instance the enemy's fire was principally directed against our batteries; towards the close, it was directed against the fort alone, and almost every shot and shell had their effect.

It now became necessary either to fight the enemy in the field; collect the whole force in the fort; or propose terms of capitulation. I could not have carried into the field more than six hundred men, and left any adequate force in the fort. There were landed at that time of the enemy a regular force of much more than that number, and twice the number of Indians. Considering this great inequality of force I did not think it expedient to adopt the first measure. The second must have been attended with a great sacrifice of blood, and no possible advantage, because the contest could not have been sustained more than a day for the want of powder, and but a very few days for the want of provisions. In addition to this, Colonels McArthur and Cass would have been in a most hazardous situation. I feared nothing but the last alternative. I have dared to adopt it. I well know the high responsibility of the measure, and take the whole of it on myself. It was dictated by a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its expediency. The bands of savages which had then joined the British force were numerous beyond any former example. Their numbers have since increased, and the history of the barbarians of the north of Europe does not furnish examples of more greedy violence than these savages have exhibited. A large portion of the brave and gal-

lant officers and men I commanded would cheerfully have contested until the last cartridge had been expended, and the bayonets worn to the sockets. I could not consent to the useless sacrifice of such brave men, when I knew it was impossible for me to sustain my situation. It was impossible in the nature of things that an army could have been furnished with the necessary supplies of provision, military stores, clothing and comforts for the sick, or pack horses, through a wilderness of two hundred miles, filled with hostile savages. It was impossible, sir, that this little army, worn down by fatigue, by sickness, by wounds, and deaths, could have supported itself not only against the collected force of all the northern nations of Indians; but against the united strength of Upper Canada, whose population consists of more than twenty times the number contained in the territory of Michigan, aided by the principal part of the regular forces of the province, and the wealth and influence of the north-west and other trading establishments among the Indians, which have in their employment, and under their entire control, more than two thousand white men. Before I close this despatch, it is a duty I owe to my respectable associates in command, Colonels McArthur, Findlay, Cass, and Lieutenant Colonel Miller, to express my obligations to them for the prompt and judicious manner they have performed their respective duties. If aught has taken place during the campaign, which is honorable to the army, these officers are entitled to a large share of it.

If the last act should be disapproved, no part of the censure belongs to them. I have likewise to express my obligation to General Taylor, who has performed the duty of quarter master general, for his great exertions in procuring everything in his department which it was possible to furnish for the convenience of the army; likewise to Brigade Major Jessup for the correct and punctual manner in which he has discharged his duty; and to the army generally for their exertions, and the zeal they have manifested for the public interest. The death of Dr. Foster soon after he arrived at Detroit, was a severe misfortune to the army; it was increased by the capture of the Chachago packet, by which the medicine and hospital stores were lost. He was commencing the best arrangements in the department of which he was the principal, with the very small means he possessed. I was likewise deprived of the necessary services of Captain Partridge by sickness, the only officer of the corps of engineers attached to the army. All the officers and men have gone to their respective homes, excepting the 4th United States' regiment, and a small part of the 1st, and Captain Dyson's company of artillery. Captain Dyson's company was left at Amherstburg, and the others are with me prisoners—they amount to about three hundred and forty. I have only to solicit an investigation of my conduct, as early as my situation and the state of things will admit; and to add the further request, that the government will

not be unmindful of my associates in captivity, and of the families of those brave men who have fallen in the contest.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. HULL.

CASS DESCRIBES HULL'S IGNOMINY

HAVING been ordered on to this place by Colonel McArthur, for the purpose of communicating to the government such particulars respecting the expedition lately commanded by Brigadier General Hull and its disastrous result, as might enable them correctly to appreciate the conduct of the officers and men, and to develop the causes which produced so foul a stain upon the national character, I have the honor to submit to your consideration the following statement:

When the forces landed in Canada, they landed with an ardent zeal, and stimulated with the hope of conquest. No enemy appeared within view of us, and had an immediate and vigorous attack been made upon Malden, it would doubtless have fallen an easy victory. I knew General Hull afterwards declared he regretted this attack had not been made, and he had every reason to believe success would have crowned his efforts. The reasons given for delaying our operations was to mount our heavy cannon, and to afford to the Canadian militia time and opportunity to quit an obnoxious service. In the course of two weeks

the number of their militia who were embodied, had decreased by desertion, from six hundred to one hundred men; and, in the course of three weeks, the cannon were mounted, the ammunition fixed, and every preparation made for an immediate investment of the fort. At a council, at which were present all the field officers, and which was held two days before our preparations were completed, it was unanimously agreed to make an immediate attempt to accomplish the object of the expedition. If by waiting two days we could have the service of our heavy artillery, it was agreed to wait; if not, it was determined to go without it and attempt the place by storm. This opinion appeared to correspond with the views of the general, and the day was appointed for commencing our march. He declared to me that he considered himself pledged to lead the army to Malden. The ammunition was placed in the wagons; the cannon were embarked on board the floating batteries, and every requisite article was prepared. The spirit and zeal, the ardor and animation displayed by the officers and men on learning the near accomplishment of their wishes, were a sure and sacred pledge, that in the hour of trial they would not be found wanting in duty to their country and themselves. But a change of measures, in opposition to the wishes and opinions of all the officers, was adopted by the general. The plan of attacking Malden was abandoned, and instead of acting offensively, we broke up our camp, evacuated Canada, and recrossed the river in the night, without

even the shadow of an enemy to injure us. We left to the tender mercy of the enemy, the miserable Canadians who had joined us, and the protection we afforded them was but a passport of vengeance. This fatal and unaccountable step dispirited the troops, and destroyed the little confidence which a series of timid, irresolute and indecisive measures had left in the commanding officer.

About the 10th of August, the enemy received a reinforcement of four hundred men. On the 12th, the commanding officers of three of the regiments (the fourth was absent) were informed through a medium which admitted of no doubt, that the general had stated, that a capitulation would be necessary. They on the same day addressed to Governor Meigs, of Ohio, a letter, of which the following is an extract:

"Believe all the bearer will tell you. Believe it, however it may astonish you, as much as if told by one of us. Even a c——— is talked of by the —— The bearer will fill the vacancy."

The doubtful fate of this letter rendered it necessary to use circumspection in its details, and therefore the blanks were left. The word "capitulation" will fill the first, and "commanding general" the other. As no enemy was near us, and as the superiority of our force was manifest, we could see no necessity for capitulating, nor any propriety in alluding to it. We therefore determined in the last resort to incur the responsibility of divesting the general of his command. This plan was eventually prevented by two of the

commanding officers of regiments being ordered upon detachments.

On the 13th, the British took a position opposite to Detroit, and began to throw up works. During that and the two following days, they pursued their object without interruption, and established a battery for two 18 pounders and an 8 inch howitzer. About sunset on the evening of the 14th, a detachment of 350 men, from the regiments commanded by Colonel McArthur and myself, was ordered to march to the river Raisin, to escort the provisions, which had some time remained there protected by a party under the command of Captain Brush.

On Saturday, the 15th, about 1 o'clock, a flag of truce arrived from Sandwich, bearing a summons from General Brock, for the surrender of the town and Fort of Detroit, stating he could no longer restrain the fury of the savages. To this an immediate and spirited refusal was returned. About 4 o'clock their batteries began to play upon the town. The fire was returned and continued without interruption and with little effect till dark—their shells were thrown till 11 o'clock.

At daylight the firing on both sides recommenced; about the same time the enemy began to land troops at the Spring Wells, three miles below Detroit, protected by two of their armed vessels. Between 6 and 7 o'clock they had effected their landing, and immediately took up their line of march; they moved in a

close column of platoons, twelve in front, upon the bank of the river.

The 4th regiment was stationed in the fort; the Ohio volunteers and a part of the Michigan militia, behind some pickets, in a situation in which the whole flank of the enemy would have been exposed. The residue of the Michigan militia were in the upper part of the town to resist the incursions of the savages. Two 24 pounders loaded with grape shot were posted on a commanding eminence, ready to sweep the advancing column. In this situation, the superiority of our position was apparent, and our troops, in the eager expectation of victory, awaited the approach of the enemy. Not a sigh of discontent broke upon the ear; not a look of cowardice met the eye. Every man expected a proud day for his country, and each was anxious that his individual exertion should contribute to the general result.

When the head of their column arrived within about five hundred yards of our line, orders were received from General Hull for the whole to retreat to the fort, and for the twenty-four pounders not to open upon the enemy. One universal burst of indignation was apparent upon the receipt of this order. Those, whose conviction was the deliberate result of a dispassionate examination of passing events, saw the folly and impropriety of crowding 1100 men into a little work, which 300 could fully man, and into which the shot and shells of the enemy were continually falling. The fort was in this manner filled; the men were directed

to stack their arms, and scarcely was an opportunity afforded of moving. Shortly after a white flag was hung out upon the walls. A British officer rode up to enquire the cause. A communication passed between the commanding generals, which ended in the capitulation submitted to you. In entering into this capitulation, the general took counsel from his own feelings only. Not an officer was consulted. Not one anticipated a surrender till he saw the white flag displayed. Even the women were indignant at so shameful a degradation of the American character, and all felt as they should have felt, but he who held in his hands the reins of authority.

Our morning report of that morning made our effective men present fit for duty 1060, without including the detachment before alluded to, and without including 300 of the Michigan militia on duty. About dark on Sunday evening the detachment sent to escort the provisions received orders from General Hull to return with as much expedition as possible. About ten o'clock the next day they arrived within sight of Detroit. Had a firing been heard, or any resistance visible, they would have immediately advanced and attacked the rear of the enemy. The situation in which this detachment was placed, although the result of accident, was the best for annoying the enemy and cutting off his retreat that could have been selected. With his raw troops enclosed between two fires and no hopes of succor, it is hazardous little to say, that very few would have escaped.

I have been informed by Colonel Findley, who saw the return of the quarter master general the day after the surrender, that their whole force of every description, white, red and black, was 1030. They had twenty-nine platoons, twelve in a platoon, of men dressed in uniform. Many of these were evidently Canadian militia. The rest of their militia increased their white force to about seven hundred men.

The number of their Indians could not be ascertained with any degree of precision; not many were visible. And in the event of an attack upon the town and fort, it was a species of force which could have afforded no material advantage to the enemy.

In endeavoring to appreciate the motives and to investigate the causes which led to an event so unexpected and dishonorable, it is impossible to find any solution in the relative strength of the contending parties, or in the measures of resistance in our power. That we were far superior to the enemy; that upon any ordinary principles of calculation, we could have defeated them, the wounded and indignant feelings of every man there will testify.

A few days before the surrender, I was informed by General Hull, we had 400 rounds of 24 pound shot fixed, and about 100,000 cartridges made. We surrendered with the fort 40 barrels of powder and 2500 stand of arms.

The state of our provisions has not been generally understood. On the day of the surrender we had fifteen days of provisions of every kind on hand. Of

meat there was plenty in the country, and arrangements had been made for purchasing and grinding the flour. It was calculated we could readily procure three months' provisions, independent of 150 barrels of flour, and 1300 head of cattle which had been forwarded from the state of Ohio, which remained at the river Raisin under Captain Brush, within reach of the army.

But had we been totally destitute of provisions, our duty and our interest undoubtedly was to fight. The enemy invited us to meet him in the field.

By defeating him the whole country would have been open to us, and the object of our expedition gloriously and successfully obtained. If we had been defeated we had nothing to do but to retreat to the fort, and make the best defense which circumstances and our situation rendered practicable. But basely to surrender without firing a gun—tamely to submit without raising a bayonet—disgracefully to pass in review before an enemy as inferior in the quality as in the number of his forces, were circumstances, which excited feelings of indignation more easily felt than described. To see the whole of our men flushed with the hope of victory, eagerly awaiting the approaching contest; to see them afterwards dispirited, hopeless and desponding, at least 500 shedding tears, because they were not allowed to meet their country's foe, and to fight their country's battles, excited sensations, which no American has ever before had cause to feel, and which, I trust in God, will never again be felt,

while one man remains to defend the standard of the union.

I am expressly authorized to state, that Colonel McArthur and Colonel Findley, and Lieutenant Colonel Miller, view this transaction in the light which I do. They know and feel, that no circumstance in our situation, none in that of the enemy, can excuse a capitulation so dishonorable and unjustifiable. This too is the universal sentiment among the troops; and I shall be surprised to learn, that there is one man, who thinks it was necessary to sheath his sword, or lay down his musket.

I was informed by general Hull the morning after the capitulation, that the British forces consisted of 1800 regulars, and that he surrendered to prevent the effusion of human blood. That he magnified their regular force nearly five fold, there can be no doubt. Whether the philanthropic reason assigned by him is a sufficient justification for surrendering a fortified town, an army and a territory, is for the government to determine. Confident I am, that had the courage and conduct of the general been equal to the spirit and zeal of the troops, the event would have been as brilliant and successful as it now is disastrous and dishonorable.

I have the honor to be yours, &c.,

LEWIS CASS.

THE "CONSTITUTION" CAPTURES THE "GUERRIERE"

By Captain Isaac Hull

CAPTAIN HULL drafted this report to the Secretary of the Navy of the capture of the English frigate *Guerrière* by the *Constitution* ("Old Ironsides") while he was bringing his prize into Boston harbor on August 19, 1812, eleven days after the engagement. In this, as in most of the naval battles of the War of 1812, the gunnery of the Americans was far superior to that of the British. However, this was the first time for many years that a British man-of-war had surrendered to about equal force.

Soon after the famous action, which occurred off Cape Race, Captain Hull generously resigned his command of the *Constitution* in order to give other naval officers a chance, there being more men than ships.

Captain Orme, whose report follows that of Captain Hull, was an American officer who had been captured by the *Guerrière* off Newfoundland only a few days before the battle with the *Constitution*.

miles, when I ordered the light sails to be taken in, the courses hauled up, and the ship cleared for action.

I HAVE the honor to inform you, that on the 19th inst. at 2 P.M. being in Lat. 41 42' and Long. 55 48', with the *Constitution* under my command, a sail was discovered from the mast-head bearing E. by S. or E. S. E. but at such a distance we could not tell what she was. All sail was instantly made in chase, and soon found we came up with her. At 3 P.M. could plainly see, that she was a ship on the starboard tack under easy sail, close on a wind; at half past 3 P.M. made her out to be a frigate; continued the chase until we were within about three

At this time the chase had backed his maintop-sail, waiting for us to come down. As soon as the Constitution was ready for action, I bore down with intention to bring him to close action immediately; but on our coming within gun-shot she gave us a broadside and filled away, and wore, giving us a broadside on the other tack, but without effect; her shot falling short. She continued wearing and maneuvering for about three quarters of an hour, to get a raking position, but finding she could not, she bore up, and ran under her top-sails and jib, with the wind on her quarter. I immediately made sail to bring the ship up with her, and five minutes before 6 P.M. being alongside within half pistol-shot, we commenced a heavy fire from all our guns, double shotted with round and grape, and so well directed were they, and so warmly kept up, that in 15 minutes his mizzenmast went by the board and his main yard in the slings, and the hull, rigging, and sails very much torn to pieces. The fire was kept up with equal warmth for 15 minutes longer, when his mainmast and foremast went, taking with them every spar, excepting the bowsprit. On seeing this we ceased firing, so that in thirty minutes after, we got fairly alongside the enemy; she surrendered, and had not a spar standing, and her hull below and above water so shattered, that a few more broadsides must have carried her down.

After informing you, that so fine a ship as the *Guerrière*, commanded by an able and experienced officer, had been totally dismasted, and otherwise cut

to pieces so as to make her not worth towing into port, in the short space of thirty minutes, you can have no doubt of the gallantry and good conduct of the officers and ship's company I have the honor to command; it only remains therefore for me to assure you that they all fought with great bravery; and it gives me great pleasure to say, that from the smallest boy in the ship to the oldest seaman, not a look of fear was seen. They all went into action, giving three cheers, and requested to be laid close alongside the enemy.

Enclosed I have the honor to send you a list of killed and wounded on board the Constitution [total, 14], and a report of the damages she has sustained; also a list of killed and wounded on board the enemy [total 77, and 24 missing], with his quarter bill, &c. . . .

HOW THE "GUERRIERE" WAS OUTFOUGHT

By Captain William Ormie

I COMMANDED the American brig *Betsey*, in the year 1812, and was returning home from Naples, Italy, to Boston. When near the western edge of the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, on the 10th of August, 1812, I fell in with the British frigate *Guerrière*, Captain Dacres, and was captured by him. Myself and a boy were taken on board of the frigate; the remainder of my officers and men were left in the *Betsey*, and sent into Halifax, N. S., as a prize to the *Guerrière*.

On the 19th of the same month, the wind being fresh from the northward, the *Guerrière* was under double-reefed topsails during all the forenoon of this day. At 2 P.M. we discovered a large sail to windward, bearing about north from us. We soon made her out to be a frigate. She was steering off from the wind, with her head to the southwest, evidently with the intention of cutting us off as soon as possible.

Signals were soon made by the *Guerrière*, but as they were not answered, the conclusion of course was, that she was either a French or an American frigate. Captain Dacres appeared anxious to ascertain her character, and after looking at her for that purpose, handed me his spy-glass, requesting me to give him my opinion of the stranger. I soon saw from the peculiarity of her sails, and from her general appear-

ance, that she was, without doubt, an American frigate, and communicated the same to Captain Dacres. He immediately replied, that he thought she came down too boldly for an American, but soon after added, "The better he behaves, the more honor we shall gain by taking him."

The two ships were rapidly approaching each other, when the *Guerrière* backed her maintopsail, and waited for her opponent to come down, and commence the action. He then set an English flag at each masthead, beat to quarters, and made ready for the fight. When the strange frigate came down to within two or three miles distance, he hauled upon the wind, took in all his light sails, reefed his topsails, and deliberately prepared for action. It was now about five o'clock in the afternoon, when he filled away and ran down for the *Guerrière*. At this moment, Captain Dacres politely said to me: "Captain Orme, as I suppose you do not wish to fight against your own countrymen, you are at liberty to go below the water-line." It was not long after this before I retired from the quarter-deck to the cockpit.

Of course I saw no more of the action until the firing ceased, but I heard and felt much of its effects; for soon after I left the deck, the firing commenced on board the *Guerrière*, and was kept up almost constantly until about six o'clock, when I heard a tremendous explosion from the opposing frigate. The effect of her shot seemed to make the *Guerrière* reel and tremble as though she had received the shock of

an earthquake. Immediately after this, I heard a tremendous crash on deck, and was told the mizzenmast was shot away. In a few moments afterward the cockpit was filled with wounded men.

At about half-past six o'clock in the evening, after the firing had ceased, I went on deck, and there beheld a scene which it would be difficult to describe; all the *Guerrière's* masts were shot away, and as she had no sails to steady her, she lay rolling like a log in the trough of the sea. The decks were covered with blood, the gun tackles were not made fast, and several of the guns got loose, and were surging to and fro from one side to the other.

Some of the petty officers and seamen, after the action, got liquor, and were intoxicated; and what with the groans of the wounded, the noise and confusion of the enraged survivors on board of the ill-fated ship, rendered the whole scene fearful beyond description.

CAPTURE AND DESTRUCTION OF THE "JAVA"

By Commodore William Bainbridge

THE reputation Bainbridge possessed when the United States Navy was organized in 1798, enhanced by his conduct in the war with Tripoli, in which his ship, the Philadelphia, ran aground while chasing corsairs, secured him a prominent naval position in the War of 1812. Early in the struggle he was put in command, as commodore, of a squadron consisting of the Constitution, Essex and Hornet, all of which rendered valiant service.

On December 29, 1812, when his flagship, the famous Constitution, encountered the English frigate Java off Bahia, Brazil, the Hornet and Essex were cruising to the north and had no part in the action.

In 1815 Bainbridge was made commander of a squadron of twenty sails fitted out against Algiers, but the war was averted. Later, as chief of the board of naval commissioners, he acquitted himself on shore with the distinction that had marked his career at sea.

off from the neutral coast, and separate her from the sail in company.

Wednesday, 30th Dec., 1812—(Nautical time)—
In lat. 13 deg. 6m. S and long. 38 W. 10 leagues from

AT 9 A.M. discovered two strange sails on the weather bow. At 10, discovered the strange sails to be ships, one of them stood in for the land, and the other stood off shore in a direction towards us. At 10.45, we tacked ship to the northward and westward, and stood for the sail standing towards us. At 11 A.M. tacked to the southward and eastward, hauled up the mainsail and took in the royals. At 11.30, made the private signal for the day, which was not answered, and then set the mainsail and royals to draw the strange sail



THE "CONSTITUTION"—"OLD IRONSIDES"—IN THE CHARLESTOWN NAVY
YARD, SHOWING BUNKER HILL MONUMENT IN THE BACKGROUND
(From a photograph by Baldwin Coolidge)

the coast of Brazil.—Commences with clear weather and moderate breezes from E. N. E. hoisted our ensign and pendant. At 15 minutes past meridian, the ship hoisted her colors, an English ensign, having a signal flying at her main—red, yellow, red.

At 1.26 P.M. being sufficiently from the land, and finding the ship to be an English frigate, took in the mainsail and royals, tacked ship and stood for the enemy. At 1.50 P.M. the enemy bore down with an intention of raking us, which we avoided by wearing. At 2 P.M. the enemy being within half a mile of us, and to windward, and having hauled down his colors, except an Union Jack at the mizen-mast-head, induced me to give orders to the officer of the 3d division to fire one gun ahead of the enemy to make him show his colors, which being done, brought on a fire from us of the whole broadside, on which the enemy hoisted his colors and immediately returned our fire. A general action with round and grape then commenced, the enemy keeping at a much greater distance than I wished, but could not bring him to close action without exposing ourselves to several rakes. Considerable maneuvers were made by both vessels to rake and avoid being raked. The following minutes were taken during the action:

At 2.10 P.M. Commenced the action within good grape and cannister distance, the enemy to windward (but much further than I wished).

At 2.30 our wheel was shot entirely away.

- 2.40 determined to close with the enemy, notwithstanding his raking—set the fore and main-sail, and luff'd up to him.
- 2.50 the enemy's jib-boom got foul of our mizen-rigging.
- 3.00 the head of the enemy's bowsprit and jib-boom shot away by us.
- 3.05 shot away the enemy's foremast by the board.
- 3.15 shot away his main-top-mast just above the cap.
- 3.40 shot away gaff and spanker-boom.
- 3.55 shot away his mizen-mast nearly by the board.
- 4.05 having silenced the fire of the enemy completely, and his colors in the main rigging being down, supposed he had struck, then hauled aboard the courses to shoot ahead to repair our rigging, which was extremely cut, leaving the enemy a complete wreck; soon after, discovered the enemy's flag was still flying—hove to, to repair some of our damage.
- 4.20 the enemy's main-mast went nearly by the board.
- 4.50 wore ship and stood for the enemy.
- 5.25 got very close to the enemy in a very effectual raking position, athwart his bows, and was at the very instant of raking him, when he most prudently struck his flag, for had he suffered the broadside to have raked him, his additional loss must have been extremely

great, as he laid an unmanageable wreck upon the water. After the enemy had struck, wore ship and reefed the topsails, then hoisted out one of the only two remaining boats we had left out of eight, and sent Lieutenant Parker, first of the Constitution, to take possession of the enemy, which proved to be his Britannic majesty's frigate Java, rated 38 but carrying 49 guns, and manned with upwards of 400 men, commanded by Captain Lambert, a very distinguished officer, who was mortally wounded.

The action continued from the commencement to the end of the fire, one hour and fifty-five minutes. The Constitution had 9 killed and 25 wounded. The enemy had 60 killed and 101 certainly wounded; but by a letter written on board the Constitution by one of the officers of the Java, and accidentally found, it is evident the enemy's wounded must have been considerably greater than as above stated, and must have died of their wounds previously to their being removed. The letter states 60 killed and 170 wounded. The Java had her own complement of men complete, and upwards of 100 supernumeraries, going to join the British ships of war in the East Indies, also several officers, passengers, going out on promotion. The force of the enemy in number of men, at the com-

mencement of the action, was no doubt considerably greater than we have been able to ascertain, which is upwards of 400 men. The officers were extremely cautious in discovering the number. By her quarter bill she had one man more stationed to each gun than we had.

The Constitution was very much cut in her sails and rigging, and many of her spars injured. At 7 P.M. the boat returned with Lieutenant Chads, the first lieutenant of the enemy's frigate, and Lieutenant-General Hislop (appointed Governor of Bombay), Major Walker and Captain Wood belonging to his staff.

Captain Lambert of the Java was too dangerously wounded to be removed immediately. The cutter returned on board the prize for the prisoners, and brought Captain Marshall, master and commander of the British navy, who was a passenger on board, as also several other naval officers destined for ships in the East Indies.

The Java was an important ship, fitted out in the completest manner to carry Lieutenant-General Hislop and his staff to Bombay, and several naval officers for different ships in the East Indies; and had despatches for St. Helena, Cape of Good Hope, and every British establishment in the India and China seas.

She had on board copper for a 74 and two brigs building at Bombay, and I expect a great many other valuables; but every thing was blown up in her, except the officers' baggage, when we set her on fire at 3 P.M. on the 1st of January, 1813, (nautical time).

THE ENGAGEMENT OF THE "CHESAPEAKE" AND THE "SHANNON"

By George Budd

THE 40-gun frigate Chesapeake, in 1807 under Captain Barron, had been overhauled and searched by officers of the 52-gun British flagship Leopard. Six years later, armed with 50 guns, and under Captain Lawrence, she fights with the Shannon, under Captain Broke, an engagement that had all the punctiliousness of a duel. The Shannon had a consort-ship; Broke sent her away, to make the odds even, and after the equivalent of courteous challenge, Lawrence accepted battle.

His crew, however, were unequal in experience to Barron's men (the most of whom had been for seven years under the same officers) and though they made fierce resistance, the Chesapeake was obliged to strike her colors.

This report of the engagement between the Chesapeake and the Shannon to the Secretary of the Navy is dated from Halifax, June 15, 1813.

THE unfortunate death of Captain James Lawrence, and Lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow has rendered it my duty to inform you of the capture of the late United States' frigate Chesapeake.

On Tuesday, June 1st, at 8 A. M. we unmoored ship, and at meridian got under weigh from President's Roads, with a light wind from the southward and westward, and proceeded on a cruise. A ship was then in sight in the offing, which had the appearance of a ship of war, and which, from information received from

pilot-boats and craft, we believed to be the British frigate Shannon. We made sail in chase, and cleared ship for action. At half past 4 P. M. she hove to with

her head to the southward and eastward. At 5 P. M. took in the royals and top-gallant sails, and at half past 5, hauled the courses up. About 15 minutes before 6 P. M. the action commenced within pistol shot. The first broadside did great execution on both sides, damaged our rigging, killed, among others, Mr. White the sailing master, and wounded Captain Lawrence. In about 12 minutes after the commencement of the action, we fell on board of the enemy, and immediately after, one of our arm chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown from the enemy's ship. In a few minutes, one of the captain's aids came on the gun-deck to inform me that the boarders were called. I immediately called the boarders away, and proceeded to the spar-deck, where I found that the enemy had succeeded in boarding us, and gained possession of our quarter-deck. I immediately gave orders to haul on board the fore-tack, for the purpose of shooting the ship clear of the other, and then made an attempt to regain the quarter-deck, but was wounded and thrown down on the gun-deck. I again made an effort to collect the boarders, but in the meantime the enemy had gained complete possession of the ship. On my being carried down in the cockpit, I there found Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow, both mortally wounded; the former had been carried below, previously to the ship's being boarded; the latter was wounded in attempting to repel the boarders. Among those who fell early in

the action, was Mr. Edward J. Ballard, the 4th Lieutenant, and Lieutenant James Broom, of marines.

I herein enclose you a return of the killed and wounded, by which you will perceive that every officer, upon whom the charge of the ship would devolve, was either killed or wounded, previously to her capture. The enemy report the loss of Mr. Watt, their first lieutenant, the purser, the captain's clerk, and 23 seamen killed; and Captain Broke, a midshipman, and 56 seamen wounded.

The "Shannon" had, in addition to her full complement, an officer and 16 men belonging to the "Belle Poule," and a part of the crew belonging to the "Tenedos."

I have the honor be, &c.,

GEORGE BUDD.

The Hon. William Jones,

Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

PERRY'S OWN ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

LETTER FROM PERRY AT ERIE TO COMMODORE CHAUNCEY AT
SACKETT'S HARBOR, LAKE ONTARIO, JULY 19TH

THE first and second of these letters, dated at Erie, July 19 and 23, 1813, were written by Captain Oliver Hazard Perry to Commodore Chauncey at Sackett's Harbor, Lake Ontario. They are followed by two communications from Perry to General William Henry Harrison in Ohio, the second communication being the famous dispatch of September 10, 1813, briefly informing Harrison of the victory.

The concluding documents are Perry's official account of the battle, addressed from Put-in-Bay on September 13 to the Secretary of the Navy; and the report of Captain R. H. Barclay, the British commander, who had served under Nelson at Trafalgar, dated September 12 from Lake Erie.

Not only do these documents give a vivid account of the historic battle, but they record the great exertions Perry made to build and man the squadron which furthered the conquest of Upper Canada.

concerns of the other lake. Give me men, sir, and I will acquire both for you and myself honor and glory

THE enemy's fleet of six sail are now off the bar of this harbor. What a golden opportunity if we had men! Their object is no doubt either to blockade or attack us, or to carry provisions and reinforcements to Malden. Should it be to attack us, we are ready to meet them. I am constantly looking to the eastward; every mail and every traveler from that quarter is looked to as the harbinger of the glad tidings of our men being on their way. I am fully aware how much your time must be occupied with the important

on this lake, or perish in the attempt. Conceive my feelings; an enemy within striking distance, my vessels ready, and not men enough to man them. Going out with those I now have is out of the question. You would not suffer it were you here. I again ask you to think of my situation: the enemy in sight, the vessels under my command more than sufficient, and ready to make sail, and yet obliged to bite my fingers with vexation for want of men. I know, my dear sir, full well, you will send me the crews for the vessels as soon as possible; yet a day appears an age. I hope that the wind or some other cause will delay the enemy's return to Malden until my men arrive, and I will have them.

LETTER FROM PERRY AT ERIE TO COMMODORE CHAUNCEY AT
SACKETT'S HARBOR, JULY 23D

I have this moment had the very great pleasure of receiving yours by Mr. Champlin, with the seventy men. The enemy are now off this harbor with the Queen Charlotte, Lady Prevost, Chippeway, Erie and Friend's Good Will. My vessels are all ready. For God's sake, and yours, and mine, send me men and officers, and I will have them all in a day or two. Commodore Barclay keeps just out of the reach of our gunboats. I am not able to ship a single man at this place. I shall try for volunteers for our cruise. Send on the commander, my dear sir, for the Niagara. She is a noble vessel. Woolsey, Brown, or Elliott I should like to see amazingly. I am very deficient in

officers of every kind. Send me officers and men, and honor is within our grasp. The vessels are all ready to meet the enemy the moment they are officered and manned. Our sails are bent, provisions on board, and, in fact, everything is ready. Barclay has been bearding me for several days; I long to have at him. However anxious I am to reap the reward of the labor and anxiety I have had on this station, I shall rejoice, whoever commands, to see this force on the lake, and surely I had rather be commanded by my friend than by any other. Come, then, and the business is decided in a few hours. Barclay shows no disposition to avoid the contest.

LETTER FROM PERRY AT ERIE TO GENERAL WILLIAM HENRY
HARRISON ON THE SANDUSKY, OHIO, AUGUST 5TH

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the twenty-eighth of July this morning, and hasten, in reply, to inform you that I have succeeded in getting one of the sloops-of-war over the bar. The other will probably be over to-day or to-morrow. The enemy is now standing for us with five sail. We have seven over the bar; all small, however, except the Lawrence. I am of opinion that in two days the naval superiority will be decided on this lake. Should we be successful, I shall sail for the head of the lake immediately to coöperate with you, and hope that our joint efforts will be productive of honor and advantage to our country. The squadron is not much more

than half manned; but, as I see no prospect of receiving reënforcements, I have determined to commence my operations. I have requested Captain Richardson to dispatch an express to you the moment the issue of our contest with the enemy is known. My anxiety to join you is very great, and, had seamen been sent to me in time, I should now, in all probability, have been at the head of the lake, acting in conjunction with you.

[Postscript.] Thank God, the other sloop-of-war is over. I shall be after the enemy, who is now making off, in a few hours. I shall be with you shortly.

TO GENERAL HARRISON, SEPT. 10, 1813

Dear General,

We have met the enemy, and they are ours. Two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop. Yours, with very great respect and esteem,

O. H. PERRY.

PERRY'S OFFICIAL ACCOUNT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

ON the morning of the tenth instant at sunrise, the enemy were discovered from Put-in-Bay, where I lay at anchor with the squadron under my command. We got under way, the wind light at southwest and stood for them. At ten A.M. the wind hauled to southeast and brought us to windward; formed the line and bore up. At fifteen minutes before twelve, the enemy commenced firing; at

five minutes before twelve, the action commenced on our part. Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, and its being mostly directed at the *Lawrence*, I made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline being soon shot away, she became unmanageable, notwithstanding the great exertions of the sailing master. In this situation she sustained the action upwards of two hours, within canister shot distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and a greater part of the crew either killed or wounded.

Finding she could no longer annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of Lieutenant Yarnall, who, I was convinced, from the bravery already displayed by him, would do what would comport with the honor of the flag. At half-past two, the wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the *Niagara*, gallantly into close action; I immediately went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by volunteering to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action. It was with unspeakable pain that I saw, soon after I got on board the *Niagara*, the flag of the *Lawrence* come down, although I was perfectly sensible that she had been defended to the last, and that to have continued to make a show of resistance would have been a wanton sacrifice of the remains of her brave crew. But the enemy was not able to take possession of her, and circumstances soon permitted her flag again to be

hoisted. At forty-five minutes past two, the signal was made for "close action." The Niagara being very little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy's line, bore up and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and sloop, from the larboard side, at half pistol-shot distance. The smaller vessels at this time having got within grape and canister distance, under the direction of Captain Elliott, and keeping up a well directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner, surrendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt to escape.

Those officers and men who were immediately under my observation evinced the greatest gallantry, and I have no doubt that all others conducted themselves as became American officers and seamen. Lieutenant Yarnall, first of the Lawrence, although several times wounded, refused to quit the deck. Midshipman Forrest (doing duty as lieutenant) and Sailing Master Taylor were of great assistance to me. I have great pain in stating to you the death of Lieutenant Brooks of the marines, and Midshipman Laub, both of the Lawrence, and Midshipman John Clark, of the Scorpion; they were valuable and promising officers. Mr. Hambleton, purser, who volunteered his services on deck, was severely wounded late in the action. Midshipmen Claxton and Swartwout, of the Lawrence, were severely wounded. On board the Niagara, Lieutenants Smith and Edwards and Midshipman Webster (doing duty as sailing master) behaved in a very

handsome manner. Captain Brevoort, of the army, who acted as a volunteer, in the capacity of a marine officer, on board that vessel, is an excellent and brave officer, and with his musketry did great execution. Lieutenant Turner, commanding the *Caledonia*, brought that vessel into action in the most able manner, and is an officer that in all situations may be relied upon. The *Ariel*, Lieutenant Packett, and *Scorpion*, Sailing Master Champlin, were enabled to get early into action, and were of great service. Captain Elliott speaks in the highest terms of Mr. Magrath, purser, who had been dispatched in a boat on service, previous to my getting on board the *Niagara*; and, being a seaman, since the action has rendered essential service in taking charge of one of the prizes. Of Captain Elliott, already so well known to the Government, it would be almost superfluous to speak. In this action he evinced his characteristic bravery and judgment, and since the close of the action has given me the most able and essential assistance.

I have the honor to enclose you a return of the killed and wounded, together with a statement of the relative force of the squadrons. The captain and first lieutenant of the *Queen Charlotte*, and first lieutenant of the *Detroit*, were killed. Captain Barclay, senior officer, and the commander of the *Lady Prevost*, severely wounded. The commanders of the *Hunter* and *Chippeway* slightly wounded. Their loss in killed and wounded I have not yet been able to ascertain; it must, however, have been very great.

BRITISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

THE REPORT OF CAPTAIN BARCLAY

THE last letter, dated the 6th instant, informed you that, unless certain intimation was received of more seamen being on their way to Amherstburg, I should be obliged to sail with the squadron, deplorably manned as it was, to fight the enemy (who blockaded the port), to enable us to get supplies of provisions and stores of every description; so perfectly destitute of provisions was the port that there was not a day's flour in store, and the crews of the squadron under my command were on half allowance of many things, and, when that was done, there was no more. Such were the motives which induced Major-General Proctor (whom by your instructions I was directed to consult, and whose wishes I was enjoined to execute, as far as related to the good of the country) to concur in the necessity of a battle being risked, under the many disadvantages which I labored, and it now remains for me, the most melancholy task, to relate to you the unfortunate issue of that battle, as well as the many untoward circumstances that led to that event. No intelligence of seamen having arrived, I sailed on the 9th instant, fully expecting to meet the enemy next morning, as they had been seen among the islands; nor was I mistaken.

Soon after daylight they were seen in motion in Put-in-Bay, the wind then at south-west and light,



PERRY'S VICTORY ON LAKE ERIE (From the painting by Powell in the Capitol at Washington)

giving us the weather gauge, I bore up with them, in hopes of bringing them to action among the islands, but that intention was soon frustrated by the wind suddenly shifting to the southeast, which brought the enemy directly to windward. The line was formed according to a given plan, so that each ship might be supported against the superior force of the two brigs opposed to them. About ten the enemy had cleared the islands and immediately bore up, under easy sail, in a line abreast, each brig being also supported by the small vessels. At a quarter before 12 I commenced the action by a few long guns; about a quarter past, the American Commodore, also supported by two schooners, one carrying four long 12 pounders, the other a long 32 and 24 pounder, came close to action with the Detroit; the other brig of the enemy, apparently destined to engage the Queen Charlotte, supported in like manner by two schooners, kept so far to windward as to render the Queen Charlotte's 20 pounder carronades useless, while she was, with the Lady Prevost, exposed to the heavy and destructive fire of the Caledonia, and four other schooners, armed with heavy and long guns, like those I have already described. Too soon, alas! was I deprived of the services of the noble and intrepid Captain Finnis, who soon after the commencement of the action fell, and with him fell my greatest support; soon after Lieutenant Stokes, of the Queen Charlotte, was struck senseless by a splinter, which deprived the country of his services at this very critical period. As I per-

ceived the Detroit had enough to contend with, without the prospect of a fresh brig, provincial Lieutenant Irvine, who then had charge of the Queen Charlotte, behaved with great courage, but his experience was much too limited to supply the place of such an officer as Captain Finnis, hence she proved of far less assistance than I expected.

The action continued with great fury until half past two, when I perceived my opponent drop astern, and a boat passing from him to the Niagara (which vessel was at this time perfectly fresh), the American Commodore seeing that as yet the day was against him (his vessel having struck soon after he left her) and also the very defenseless state of the "Detroit," which ship was now a perfect wreck, principally from the raking fire of the gun boats, and also that the Queen Charlotte was in such a situation that I could receive very little assistance from her, and the Lady Prevost being at this time too far to leeward, from her rudder being injured, made a noble, and alas! too successful an effort to regain it, for he bore up, and, supported by his small vessels, passed within pistol shot, and took a raking position on our bow, nor could I prevent it, as the unfortunate situation of the Queen Charlotte prevented us from wearing; in attempting it we fell on board her; my gallant first Lieutenant, Garland, was now mortally wounded, and myself so severely that I was obliged to quit the deck. Manned as the squadron was, with not more than 50 British seamen, the rest a mixed crew of Canadians and soldiers, and who

were totally unacquainted with such a service, rendered the loss of officers more sensibly felt, and never in any action was the loss more severe, every officer commanding vessels, and their seconds, was either killed or wounded so severely as to be unable to keep the deck.

Lieutenant Buchan, in the *Lady Prevost*, behaved most nobly, and did everything that a brave and experienced officer could do in a vessel armed with 12 pound carronades, against vessels carrying long guns. I regret to state that he was severely wounded. Lieutenant Bignal, of the *Dover*, commanding the *Hunter*, displayed the greatest intrepidity; but his guns being small (two four and six pounders) he could be of much less service than he wished. Every officer in the *Detroit* behaved in the most exemplary manner. Lieutenant Inglis showed such calm intrepidity, that I was fully convinced that, on leaving the deck, I left the ship in excellent hands; and for an account of the battle after that I refer you to his letter, which he wrote me for your information.—Mr. Hoffmeister, purser of the *Detroit*, nobly volunteered his services on the deck, and behaved in a manner that reflects the highest honor on him. I regret to add that he is very severely wounded in the knee. Provincial Lieutenant Purvis, and the military officers, Lieutenants Garden, of the *Royal Newfoundland Rangers*, and O'Keefe of the 41st regiment, behaved in a manner which excited my warmest admiration; the few British seamen I had, behaved with their usual intrepidity, and as long

as I was on deck the troops behaved with a calmness and courage worthy of a more fortunate issue to their exertions.

The weathergage gave the enemy a prodigious advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their position, but their distance also, which they did in such a manner as to prevent the carronades of the Queen Charlotte and Lady Prevost from having much effect; while their long guns did great execution, particularly against the Queen Charlotte. Captain Perry has behaved in a most humane and attentive manner, not only to myself and officers, but to all the wounded. I trust that, although unsuccessful, you will approve of the motives that induced me to sail under so many disadvantages, and that it may be hereafter proved that under such circumstances the honor of His Majesty's flag has not been tarnished. I enclose the list of killed and wounded.

THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES

By Henry M. Breckenridge

THIS account of the battle fought on the Thames River in Ontario, thirty miles east of Detroit, in which the celebrated Indian chief Tecumseh was killed, is from Breckenridge's "History of the War of 1812." During the war the author was a U. S. Judge of Louisiana.

The battle was fought on October 5, 1813, between an American force of about 3,000 under General William Henry Harrison, of Tippecanoe fame, and a British force of about 700 under General Proctor, aided by Tecumseh and 2,000 redskins.

The American cavalry was commanded by Colonel Richard M. Johnson, who is credited with having personally killed Tecumseh. Proctor was soon afterwards disgraced for his conduct during the battle.

Following this account of the Battle of the Thames is Tecumseh's speech to Proctor, shortly before the battle. It was found among Proctor's papers, and printed in the "National Intelligencer" in 1813.

their right on the swamp. Beyond the swamp, and between it and another morass still further to the

ON the 5th of October they reached the place where the enemy had encamped the night before. Colonel Wood was now sent forward by the commander-in-chief to reconnoiter the British and Indian forces; and he very soon returned with information that they had made a stand a few miles distant and were ready for action. General Proctor had drawn up his regular forces across a narrow strip of land covered with beech trees, flanked on one side by a swamp, and on the other by the river; their left rested on the river supported by the larger portion of their artillery, and

right, were the Indians under Tecumseh. This position was skillfully chosen by Proctor, with regard to locality, and the character of his troops; but he committed an irreparable oversight in neglecting to fortify his front by a ditch, and in drawing up his troops "in open order, that is, with intervals of three or four feet between the files"—a mode of array which could not resist a charge of cavalry. His whole force consisted of about eight hundred regular soldiers and two thousand Indians.

The American troops, amounting to something more than three thousand men, were now disposed in order of battle. General Harrison had at first ordered the mounted men to form in two lines, opposite to the Indians; but he soon observed that the underwood here was too close for cavalry to act with any effect. He was aware of the egregious error committed by Proctor as above mentioned, and well knew the dexterity of backwoodsmen in riding, and in the use of the rifle, in forest ground, so he immediately determined that one battalion of the mounted regiment should charge on the British regulars. The other was left to confront the Indians.

The requisite arrangements were made, and the army had moved forward but a short distance, when the enemy fired. This was the signal for our cavalry to charge; and, although the men and horses in the front of the column at first recoiled, they soon recovered themselves, and the whole body dashed through the enemy with irresistible force. Instantly forming

in the rear of the British, they poured on them a destructive fire, and were about to make a second charge, when the British officers, finding it impossible, from the nature of the ground and the panic which prevailed, to form their broken ranks, immediately surrendered.

On the left, the battle was begun by Tecumseh with great fury. The galling fire of the Indians did not check the advance of the American columns; but the charge was not successful, from the miry character of the soil and the number and closeness of the thickets which covered it. In these circumstances, Colonel Johnson ordered his men to dismount, and leading them up a second time, succeeded after a desperate contest in breaking through the line of the Indians and gaining their rear. Notwithstanding this, and that the colonel now directed his men to fight them in their own mode, the Indians were unwilling to yield the day; they quickly collected their principal strength on the right and attempted to penetrate the line of infantry. At first they made an impression on it; but they were soon repulsed by the aid of a regiment of Kentucky volunteers led on by the aged Shelby, who had been posted at the angle formed by the front line and Desha's division.

The combat now raged with increasing fury; the Indians, to the number of twelve or fifteen hundred, seeming determined to maintain their ground to the last. The terrible voice of Tecumseh could be distinctly heard, encouraging his warriors; and although

beset on every side except that of the morass, they fought with more determined courage than they had ever before exhibited. An incident, however, now occurred which eventually decided the contest. The gallant Colonel Johnson having rushed toward the spot where the Indians, clustering around their undaunted chief, appeared resolved to perish by his side, his uniform, and the white horse which he rode, rendered him a conspicuous object. In a moment his holsters, dress and accouterments were pierced with a hundred bullets, and he fell to the ground severely wounded. Tecumseh, meanwhile, was killed in the *mêlée*. After the rescue and removal of the wounded colonel, the command devolved on Major Thompson. The Indians maintained the fight for more than an hour; but when they no longer heard the voice of their great captain, they at last gave way on all sides. Near the spot where this struggle took place, thirty Indians and six whites were found dead.

Thus fell Tecumseh, one of the most celebrated warriors that ever raised the tomahawk against us; and with him faded the last hope of our Indian enemies. This untutored man was the determined foe of civilization, and had for years been laboring to unite all the Indian tribes in resisting the progress of our settlements to the westward. Had such a man opposed the European colonists on their first arrival, this continent might still have been a wilderness. Tecumseh fell respected by his enemies as a great and magnanimous chief. Although he seldom took pris-

oners in battle, he was merciful to those who had been taken by others; and, at the defeat of Dudley, actually put to death a chief whom he found engaged in the work of massacre. He had been in almost every engagement with the whites since Harmer's defeat in 1791, although at his death he scarcely exceeded forty years of age.

Tecumseh had received the stamp of greatness from the hand of nature; and had his lot been cast in a different state of society, he would have shone as one of the most distinguished of men. He was endowed with a powerful mind, and with the soul of a hero. There was an uncommon dignity in his countenance and manners; by the former he could easily be discovered, even after death, among the rest of the slain, for he wore no insignia of distinction. When girded with a silk sash, and told by General Proctor that he was made a brigadier-general in the British service for his conduct at Brownstown and Magagua, he refused the title. Born without title to command, such was his native greatness that every tribe yielded submission to him at once, and no one ever disputed his precedence. Subtle and fierce in war, he was possessed of uncommon eloquence. Invective was his chief merit, as we had frequent occasion to experience. He gave a remarkable instance of its power in the reproaches which he applied to General Proctor, in a speech delivered a few days before his death; a copy of which was found among the papers of the British officers.

His form was uncommonly elegant. His stature was about six feet, and his limbs were perfectly proportioned.

In this engagement the British loss was nineteen regulars killed, fifty wounded, and about six hundred taken prisoners. The Indians left one hundred and twenty on the field. The American loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to upward of fifty. Several pieces of brass cannon, the trophies of our Revolution, and which had been surrendered by Hull at Detroit, were once more restored to our country. General Proctor had basely deserted his troops as soon as the charge was made; and though hotly pursued, was enabled, by means of swift horses and his knowledge of the country, to escape down the Thames. His carriage with his private papers, however, was taken.

TECUMSEH'S SPEECH TO GENERAL PROC- TOR, SHORTLY BEFORE THE BATTLE OF THE THAMES

FATHER, listen to your children! you have them now all before you. The war before this our British father gave the hatchet to his red children, when old chiefs were alive. They are now dead. In that war our father was thrown on his back by the Americans, and our father took them by the hand without our knowledge; and we are afraid that our father will do so again at this time.

Summer before last, when I came forward with my red brethren, and was ready to take up the hatchet in favor of our British father, we were told not to be in a hurry, that he had not yet determined to fight the Americans.

Listen! When war was declared, our father stood up and gave us the tomahawk, and told us that he was ready to strike the Americans; that he wanted our assistance, and that he would certainly get us our lands back, which the Americans had taken from us.

Listen! You told us, at that time, to bring forward our families to this place, and we did so:—and you promised to take care of them, and that they should want for nothing, while the men would go and fight the enemy. That we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's garrison's; that we knew nothing about them, and that our father would attend to that part

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of the business. You also told your red children that you would take good care of your garrison here, which made our hearts glad.

Listen! When we were last at the Rapids, it is true we gave you little assistance. It is hard to fight people who live like ground-hogs.

Father, listen! Our fleet has gone out; we know they have fought: we have heard the great guns: but know nothing of what has happened to our father with one arm. Our ships have gone one way, and we are much astonished to see our father tying up everything and preparing to run away the other, without letting his red children know what his intentions are. You always told us to remain here and take care of our lands. It made our hearts glad to hear that was your wish. Our great father, the King, is the head, and you represent him. You always told us that you would never draw your foot off British ground; but now, father, we see you are drawing back, and we are sorry to see our father doing so without seeing the enemy. We must compare our father's conduct to a fat animal that carries its tail upon its back, but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off.

Listen, Father! The Americans have not yet defeated us by land; neither are we sure that they have done so by water—we therefore wish to remain here and fight our enemy, should they make their appearance. If they defeat us, we will then retreat with our father.

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At the battle of the Rapids, last war, the Americans certainly defeated us; and when we retreated to our father's fort in that place, the gates were shut against us.—We were afraid that it would now be the case, but instead of that, we now see our British father preparing to march out of his garrison.

Father! You have got the arms and ammunition which our great father sent for his red children. If you have an idea of going away, give them to us, and you may go and welcome, for us. Our lives are in the hands of the Great Spirit. We are determined to defend our lands, and if it is his will, we wish to leave our bones upon them.

THE BATTLES OF CHIPPEWA AND LUNDY'S LANE

By General Winfield Scott

AN interesting feature of this account of two important battles in the War of 1812 is that Scott was seventy-eight years old when he wrote it in his autobiography, fifty years after the battles were fought. That of Chippewa occurred on July 5, 1814, followed by Lundy's Lane on July 25. Scott, although a brigadier-general, was only twenty-eight years old.

At that time Major-General Jacob Brown was chief in command of our forces at Niagara, but credit for the Chippewa victory belongs to Scott. Incidentally, his men wore gray uniforms owing to a scarcity of blue cloth. In compliment to the Battle of Chippewa, gray uniforms were adopted for our military cadets.

The action at Lundy's Lane, Ontario—a mile and a half from Niagara Falls—was first directed by Scott and then by Brown, both of whom were wounded. The British force numbered 4,500, the American about 2,600.

ensued. The heat and dust were scarcely bearable; but not a man flagged. All felt that immortal fame lay within reach. The enemy, however, had the start

EARLY in the march, a little above Black-rock, a considerable body of the enemy was discovered. It proved to be a corps of observation under the command of the Marquis of Tweedale. All hearts leaped with joy at the chance of doing something worthy of the anniversary, and to cheer our desponding countrymen at home—something that might ever, on that returning day—

“Be in their flowing cups,
freshly remembered.”

The events of the day, however, proved most tantalizing. An eager pursuit of sixteen miles

in the race by many minutes; but his escape was only insured by a number of sluggish creeks in the way, each with an ordinary bridge, and too much mud and water to be forded near its mouth. The floors of those bridges were, in succession, thrown off by the marquis, but he was never allowed time to destroy the sleepers. Taking up positions, however, to retard the relaying the planks, obliged Scott to deploy a part of his column and to open batteries. The first bridge, forced in that way, the chase was renewed, and so was the contest at two other bridges, precisely in the manner of the first and with the same results. Finally, toward sunset, the enemy were driven across the Chippewa River behind a strong tête de pont, where they met their main army under Major-General Riall.

This running fight, of some twelve hours, was remarkable in one circumstance: in the campaigns of the autobiographer, it was the first and only time that he ever found himself at the head of a force superior to that of the enemy in his front: their relative numbers being, on this occasion, about as four to three.

The Marquis of Tweedale, a gallant soldier, on a visit to the United States soon after peace, made several complimentary allusions to the prowess of our troops in the war, and particularly to the events of the 4th of July, 1814, on the Niagara—among them, that he could not account for the impetuosity of the Americans, in that pursuit, till a late hour, when some one called out—"it is their National Anniversary!"

The proximity of Riall reversed the strength of the antagonists, and Scott, unpursued, fell back a little more than a mile, to take up a strong camp behind Street's Creek, to await the arrival of the reserve under Major-General Brown. The junction took place early in the morning of the 5th.

Brown lost no time in giving orders to prepare the materials for throwing a bridge across the Chippewa, some little distance above the village and the enemy at its mouth. (There was no traveling pontoon with the army.) The work was put under the charge of our able engineers, McRee and Wood—the wise counselors of the general-in-chief. This was the labor of the day. In the meantime the British militia and Indians filled the wood to our left and annoyed the pickets posted in its edge. Porter's militia were ordered to dislodge the enemy, and much skirmishing ensued between the parties.

The anniversary dinner cooked for Scott's brigade, with many extras added by him in honor of the day, happily came over from Schlosser on the 5th, and was soon dispatched by officers and men, who had scarcely broken fast in thirty-odd hours.

To keep his men in breath, he had ordered a parade for grand evolutions in the cool of the afternoon. For this purpose there was below the creek, a plain extending back from the Niagara of some hundreds of yards in the broader part, and a third narrower lower down. From the dinner, without expecting a battle, though fully prepared for one, Scott marched for

this field. The view below from his camp was obstructed by the brushwood that fringed the creek; but when arrived near the bridge at its mouth, he met Major-General Brown, coming in at full gallop, who, in passing, said with emphasis, "You will have a battle!" and, without halting, pushed on to the rear to put Ripley's brigade in motion—supposing that Scott was perfectly aware of the near approach of the entire British army and going out expressly to meet it.

The head of his (Scott's) column had scarcely entered the bridge before it was met by a fire, at an easy distance, from nine field guns. Towson's battery quickly responded with some effect. The column of our infantry, greatly elongated by the diminution of front, to enable it to pass the narrow bridge, steadily advanced, though with some loss, and battalion after battalion when over formed line to the left and front, under the continued fire of the enemy's battery. When Scott was seen approaching the bridge, General Riall, who had dispersed twice his numbers the winter before, in his expedition on the American side, said: "It is nothing but a body of Buffalo militia!" But when the bridge was passed in fine style, under his heavy fire of artillery, he added with an oath, "Why, these are regulars!" The gray coats at first deceived him, which Scott was obliged to accept, there being no blue cloth in the country. Two hostile lines were now in view of each other, but a little beyond the effective range of musketry.

It has been seen that the model American brigade, notwithstanding the excessive vigor and prowess exerted the day before, had failed in the ardent desire to engraft its name, by a decisive victory, on the great national anniversary. The same corps again confronting the enemy, but in an open field, Scott, riding rapidly along the line, threw out a few short sentences—among them, alluding to the day before, was this: "Let us make a new anniversary for ourselves!" Not finding his name in the official paper (*Gazette*) after his handsome services at the capture of Bastia and Calvi, early in his career, Nelson, with the spirit of divination upon him, said: "Never mind; I will have a *Gazette* of my own." A little arrogance, near the enemy, when an officer is ready to suit the action to the word, may be pardoned by his countrymen. And it has often happened, if not always, when Fourth of July have fallen on Sundays, that Chippewa has been remembered at the celebrations of Independence on the 5th of July.

The brigade had scarcely been fully deployed, when it was perceived that it was outflanked by the enemy on the plain, besides the invisible force that had just driven Porter and the militia out of the wood. Critical maneuvering became necessary on the part of Scott; for the position and intentions of Brown, with Ripley and Porter, were, and remained entirely unknown to him till the battle was over. The enemy continuing to advance, presented a new right flank on the widened plain, leaving his right wing in the wood which

Scott had caused to be confronted by Jesup's battalion, the 25th Infantry, which leaped the fence, checked and soon pushed the enemy toward the rear.

At the same time having ordered that the right wing of the consolidated battalion (9th and 22d Infantry) commanded by Leavenworth, should be thrown forward, with Towson's battery on the extreme right, close to the Niagara, Scott flew to McNeil's battalion, the 11th Infantry, now on the left, and assisted in throwing forward its left wing. The battalions of Leavenworth and McNeil thus formed, pointed to an obtuse angle in the center of the plain, with a wide interval between them, that made up for deficiency of numbers. To fire, each party had halted more than once, at which the Americans had the more deadly aim. At an approximation to within sixty or seventy paces, the final charge (mutual) was commenced. The enemy soon came within the obliqued battalions of Leavenworth and McNeil. Towson's fire was effective from the beginning.

At the last moment, blinded by thick smoke, he was about to lose his most effective discharge, when Scott, on a tall charger, perceiving that the enemy had come within the last range of the battery, caused a change that enfiladed many files of the opposing flank. The clash of bayonets, at each extremity, instantly followed, when the wings of the enemy being outflanked, and to some extent doubled upon, were moldered away like a rope of sand. It is not in human nature that a conflict like this should last many seconds. The

enemy's whole force broke in quick succession and fled, leaving the field thickly strewn with his dead and wounded. The victory was equally complete in front of Jesup. A hot pursuit was continued to within half gunshot of the batteries at Chippewa Bridge, to gather up prisoners and with good success. Returning, Scott met Major-General Brown coming out of the forest, who, with Ripley's regulars and the rallied militia of Porter, had made a wide circuit to the left, intending to get between the enemy and the Chippewa, and this might have been effected if the battle had lasted a half hour longer; but suppose that Scott in the meantime had been overwhelmed by superior numbers! . . .

Few men now alive are old enough to recall the deep gloom, approaching to despair, which about this time oppressed the whole American people—especially the supporters of the war. The disasters on the land have been enumerated, and now the New England States were preparing to hold a convention—it met at Hartford—perhaps to secede from the Union—possibly to take up arms against it. Scott's brigade, nearly all New England men, were most indignant, and this was the subject of the second of the three pithy remarks made to them by Scott just before the final conflict at Chippewa. Calling aloud to the gallant Major Hindman, he said: "Let us put down the Federal convention by beating the enemy in front. There's nothing in the Constitution against that."

History has recorded many victories on a **much**

larger scale than that of Chippewa; but only a few that have wrought a greater change in the feelings of a nation. Everywhere bonfires blazed; bells rung out peals of joy; the big guns responded, and the pulse of Americans recovered a healthy beat.

The enemy being again in the strong position behind the Chippewa, the preparation of materials for the bridge was renewed early on the 6th, but before they were quite ready, Major-General Riall decamped; sent reënforcements to his works at the mouth of the Niagara, struck off to the left at Queens-town and returned with the remainder of his army to Burlington Heights at the head of Lake Ontario. So it turned out, as we learned, in a day or two. Scott's brigade was again dispatched in pursuit. He crossed the Chippewa Bridge early on the 7th and reported from Queenstown the ascertained movements of Riall.

Major-General Brown determined to attack the forts (George and Messassauga) at the mouth of the river, and accordingly marched his whole force upon them—Scott always in the lead. Perhaps it had been better, after masking those works, to have moved at once upon Riall. But arrangements had been made between the general-in-chief and Commodore Chauncey for siege guns to be brought up by our ships of war; for the Niagara army had not a piece heavier than an eighteen-pounder. The forts were invested: Messassauga, built since McClure evacuated George, the year before.

Major-General Brown, thinking it would be more difficult to find than to beat Riall in the Highlands about the head of the lake, now resolved to try the effect of a stratagem to draw him out of his snug position. Accordingly, the Americans on the morning of the 24th assumed a panic; broke up camp and retreated rapidly up the river. There was only a moment's halt at Queenstown—to throw the sick across into hospital at Lewiston, until all were securely encamped above the Chippewa. The following was to be a day of rest and to give Riall time to come down in pursuit. It was further arranged that Scott's brigade, reënforced, should early in the morning of the 26th return rapidly upon Queenstown, and if the stratagem proved a failure, then to trace up Riall and attack him wherever found. Consequently, it was intended that the 25th of July should be to the army a day of relaxation—without other duties than cleaning of arms, the washing of clothes, and bathing, except that Scott's troops were ordered to fill their haversacks with cooked provisions.

While all were thus unbuttoned and relaxed, a militia colonel, whose regiment occupied several posts on the American side of the river, sent a specific report to Major-General Brown that the enemy had thrown across, from Queenstown to Lewiston, a strong body of troops, and as it could not be to disturb the small hospital at the latter place, Brown concluded the movement had in view the destruction of our magazines at Schlosser, and stopping the stream

of supplies descending from Buffalo. Of course, Riall must have come down from the Highlands; but as one of our brigades had beaten his entire force, twenty days before, it was difficult to believe he had risked a division of his weakened army so near to the superior numbers of Brown; for not a rumor had reached the latter that Riall had been reënforced. Indeed, it was only known, from Chauncey, at Sackett's Harbor, that Sir James Yeo had possession of the lake; for Brown's means of secret intelligence, if any, were of no avail. In this state of ignorance, but confidence in the report received, Brown ordered Scott, with his command, to march below, to find the enemy and to beat him. It was now in the afternoon, and all had dined. In less than thirty minutes the splendid column—horse, artillery, and infantry—had passed the bridge at the village of Chippewa, and was in full march for Queenstown (nine miles below), intending no halt short of that point. But "*l'homme propose et Dieu dispose.*" Turning the sweep the river makes a mile or two above the Falls, a horseman in scarlet was from time to time discovered peeping out from the wood on the left, and lower down, the advance guard, with which Scott rode, came upon a house (Forsyth's) from which two British officers fled just in time to escape capture. Only two inhabitants had been seen in the march, and these, from ignorance or loyalty, said nothing that did not mislead. The population was hostile to Americans.

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From such indications it seemed evident that there was a corps of observation in the neighborhood, and Scott so reported to headquarters; but from the information on which he had advanced, it could only be a small body, detached from an inferior army that had committed the folly of sending at least half of its numbers to the opposite side of the river. There was, therefore, no halt and no slackening in the march of the Americans. Passing a thick skirt of wood that crossed the road nearly opposite to the Falls, the head of the column emerged into an opening on the left in full view, and in easy range of a line of battle drawn up in Lundy's Lane, more extensive than that defeated at Chippewa.

Riall's whole force was in the lane; for, it turned out not only not a man had been thrown over the river, but that the night before Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond had arrived by the lake with a heavy reënforcement, and had pushed forward his battalions (sixteen miles) as they successively landed. One was already in line of battle, and the others were coming up by forced marches.

The aches in broken bones feelingly remind the autobiographer of the scene he is describing, and after the lapse of nearly fifty years he can not suppress his indignation at the blundering, stupid report made by the militia colonel to his confiding friend Major-General Brown. . . .

By standing fast, the salutary impression was made upon the enemy that the whole American reserve was

at hand and would soon assault his flanks. Emboldened, however, a little by its nonarrival, an attempt was made to turn Scott's left. The 11th, that occupied that position, threw forward (under cover of a clump of trees) its right, and drove the enemy beyond reach.

Jesup, too, on our right, had brilliant success. In making the sweep around the enemy's left flank he captured Major-General Riall and cut off a segment of his line. Sir Gordon Drummond, also, was for a moment a prisoner, but he contrived to escape in the dusk of the evening. Hindman's artillery, Brady's battalion, consolidated with Leavenworth's, had suffered and inflicted great losses under a direct fire, unremitted, till dusk. The 11th, partially covered, suffered less.

At this moment Major-General Brown and staff came up a little ahead of the reserve—of course, each with the bandage of night on his eyes; for it was now dark—after nine o'clock in the evening. Scott gave the general the incidents of the battle, and the positions of the hostile forces on the field. It was known from prisoners that further reënforcements, from below, were soon expected. Not a moment was to be lost. By desire, Scott suggested that the heaviest battalion in the reserve, the 21st, which he had instructed at Buffalo, and was now commanded by Colonel Miller, should, supported by the remainder of Ripley's brigade, charge up the lane, take the enemy

in flank, and roll his whole crumbled line back into the wood.

To favor this important movement, Scott, with the added force of Jesup, now back in line, ordered the attack, in front, to be redoubled; guided Brown, with Miller, through the darkness, to the foot of the lane, and then rejoined his own forces. Here he was assisted by the fresh batteries which came up with the reserve. The enemy, thus furiously assailed in front, remained ignorant of Miller's approach till the bayonets of his column began to be felt. The rout was early and complete, a battery captured, and many prisoners made.

Positions on the field had become reversed. The American line, reformed, now crossed that originally occupied by the enemy at right angles, and facing the wood, with backs to the river. Here it took a defensive stand. The British slowly rallied at some distance in front. Being again in collected force and in returning confidence, they cautiously advanced to recover the lost field and their battery—the horses of which had been killed or crippled before the retreat. By degrees the low commands, "halt," "dress," "forward," often repeated, became more and more audible in the awful stillness of the moment. At length a dark line could be seen, at a distance, perhaps, of sixty paces. Scott resolved to try an experiment. Leaving his brigade on the right, in line, he formed a small column of some two hundred and fifty men, and, at its head, advanced rapidly to pierce the advancing

enemy's line, then to turn to the right, and envelop his extreme left. If pierced, in the dark, there seemed no doubt the whole would fall back, and so it turned out. Scott explained his intentions and forcibly cautioned his own brigade, and Ripley's on his left, not to fire upon the little column; but the instant the latter came in conflict with, and broke the enemy, Ripley's men opened fire upon its rear and left flank, and caused it to break without securing a prisoner. The column resumed its place in line, and another pause in the battle ensued.

After a while a second advance of the enemy was made with the same slowness as before. When within short musket-shot, there was an unexpected halt, instantly followed by the crack of small arms and the deafening roar of cannon. Each party seemed resolved to rest the hope of victory on its fire. The welkin was in a blaze with shells and rockets. Though both armies suffered greatly, the enemy suffered most. The scene, perhaps, including accessories, has never been surpassed. Governor Tompkins, with a keen perception of its splendor, said, in presenting a sword of honor to Scott: "The memorable conflict on the plains of Chippewa, and the appalling night-battle on the Heights of Niagara, are events which have added new celebrity to the spots where they happened, heightening the majesty of the stupendous cataract by combining with its natural all the force of the moral sublime."

It was impossible that this conflict should be endured for more than a very few minutes. The lines at some points were separated by only eight or ten paces. Nothing but a deep, narrow gully intervened in front of the 25th Infantry. Scott, inquiring of the commander (Jesup) about a wound (in the hand) heard a call in the ranks, "Cartridges!" At the same moment a man reeling to the ground, responded, "Cartridges in my box!" The two commanders flew to his succor. The noble fellow had become a corpse as he fell. In the next second or two Scott, for a time, as insensible, lay stretched at his side, being prostrated by an ounce musket-ball through the left shoulder-joint. He had been twice dismounted and badly contused, in the side, by the rebound of a cannon-ball, some hours before. Two of his men discovering that there was yet life, moved him a little way to the rear, that he might not be killed on the ground, and placed his head behind a tree—his feet from the enemy. This had scarcely been done when he revived and found that the enemy had again abandoned the field. Unable to hold up his head from the loss of blood and anguish, he was taken in an ambulance to the camp across the Chippewa, when the wound was stanchd and dressed.

On leaving the field he did not know that Major-General Brown, also wounded, had preceded him. By seniority, the command of the army now devolved on Brigadier-General Ripley. It must then have been about midnight. Ripley, from some unknown cause,

became alarmed, and determined, in spite of dissuasion, to abandon the field, trophies, and all. The principal officers dispatched a messenger to bring back Scott, but found him utterly prostrate. Toward day some fragments of the enemy, seeking the main body, crossed the quiet field, and learning from the wounded that the Americans had flown, hastened to overtake Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Drummond below, who returned, bivouacked on the field, and claimed the victory!

THE BURNING OF WASHINGTON

By "Dolly" Madison

DOLLY" MADISON, *wife of President James Madison, wrote this letter to her sister, Anna, on August 23, 1814, the day before the City of Washington was burned by the British forces commanded by General Ross and Admiral Cockburn. The portrait of George Washington, to which she refers, was painted partly by Gilbert Stuart, and completed by Winstanley, with Colonel Smith, son-in-law of President John Adams, as a model for the unfinished body and limbs. As she was fleeing the city, she encountered her husband, and they spent a sleepless night at the home of a friend near Georgetown, Virginia, "gazing at the flames, which looked as if nothing could stop them in their mad fury."*

Supplementing this document is an account by a British soldier, who was present at the capture and burning of Washington. He published, after the war, "A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans."

MY husband left me yesterday morning to join General Winder. He inquired anxiously whether I had courage or firmness to remain in the President's house until his return on the morrow, or succeeding day, and on my assurance that I had no fear but for him, and the success of our army, he left, beseeching me to take care of myself, and of the Cabinet papers, public and private. I have since received two dispatches from him, written with a pencil. The last is alarming, because he desires I should be ready at a moment's warning to enter my car-

riage, and leave the city; that the enemy seemed stronger than had at first been reported, and it might happen that they would reach the city with the inten-

tion of destroying it. I am accordingly ready; I have pressed as many Cabinet papers into trunks as to fill one carriage; our private property must be sacrificed, as it is impossible to procure wagons for its transportation. I am determined not to go myself until I see Mr. Madison safe, so that he can accompany me, as I hear of much hostility towards him. Disaffection stalks around us. My friends and acquaintances are all gone, even Colonel C. with his hundred, who were stationed as a guard in this inclosure. French John (a faithful servant), with his usual activity and resolution, offers to spike the cannon at the gate, and lay a train of powder, which would blow up the British, should they enter the house. To the last proposition I positively object, without being able to make him understand why all advantages in war may not be taken.

Wednesday Morning, twelve o'clock.—Since sunrise I have been turning my spy-glass in every direction, and watching with unwearied anxiety, hoping to discover the approach of my dear husband and his friends; but, alas! I can descry only groups of military, wandering in all directions, as if there was a lack of arms, or of spirit to fight for their own fireside.

Three o'clock.—Will you believe it, my sister? we have had a battle, or skirmish, near Bladensburg, and here I am still, within sound of the cannon! Mr. Madison comes not. May God protect us! Two messengers, covered with dust, come to bid me fly; but here I mean to wait for him. . . . At this late hour a

wagon has been procured, and I have had it filled with plate and the most valuable portable articles, belonging to the house. Whether it will reach its destination, the "Bank of Maryland," or fall into the hands of British soldiery, events must determine. Our kind friend, Mr. Carroll, has come to hasten my departure, and in a very bad humor with me, because I insist on waiting until the large picture of General Washington is secured, and it requires to be unscrewed from the wall. This process was found too tedious for these perilous moments; I have ordered the frame to be broken, and the canvas taken out. It is done! and the precious portrait placed in the hands of two gentlemen of New York, for safe keeping. And now, dear sister, I must leave this house, or the retreating army will make me a prisoner in it by filling up the road I am directed to take. When I shall again write to you, or where I shall be to-morrow, I cannot tell!

A BRITISH ACCOUNT OF THE BURNING OF WASHINGTON

By George Robert Gleig

TOWARD morning a violent storm of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, came on, which disturbed the rest of all those who were exposed to it. Yet, in spite of the disagreeableness of getting wet, I can not say that I felt disposed to grumble at the interruption, for it appeared that what I had before considered as superlatively sublime still wanted this to render it complete. The flashes of lightning seemed to vie in brilliancy with the flames which burst from the roofs of burning houses, while the thunder drowned the noise of crumbling walls, and was only interrupted by the occasional roar of cannon, and of large depôts of gunpowder, as they one by one exploded. . . .

The consternation of the inhabitants was complete, and to them this was a night of terror. So confident had they been of the success of their troops, that few of them had dreamed of quitting their houses, or abandoning the city; nor was it till the fugitives from the battle began to rush in, filling every place as they came with dismay, that the President himself thought of providing for his safety. That gentleman, as I was credibly informed, had gone forth in the morning with the army, and had continued among his troops till the British forces began to make their appearance.

Whether the sight of his enemies cooled his courage or not I can not say, but, according to my informer, no sooner was the glittering of our arms discernible than he began to discover that his presence was more wanted in the Senate than with the army; and having ridden through the ranks, and exhorted every man to do his duty, he hurried back to his own house, that he might prepare a feast for the entertainment of his officers, when they should return victorious. For the truth of these details I will not be answerable; but this much I know, that the feast was actually prepared, though, instead of being devoured by American officers, it went to satisfy the less delicate appetites of a party of English soldiers. When the detachment, sent out to destroy Mr. Madison's house, entered his dining parlor, they found a dinner-table spread, and covers laid for forty guests. . . .

They sat down to it, therefore, not indeed in the more orderly manner, but with countenances which would not have disgraced a party of aldermen at a civic feast; and having satisfied their appetites with fewer complaints than would have probably escaped their rival gourmands, and partaken pretty freely of the wines, they finished by setting fire to the house which had so liberally entertained them.

But, as I have just observed, this was a night of dismay to the inhabitants of Washington. They were taken completely by surprise; nor could the arrival of the flood be more unexpected to the natives of the antediluvian world, than the arrival of the British

army to them. The first impulse of course tempted them to fly, and the streets were in consequence crowded with soldiers and senators, men, women, and children, horses, carriages, and carts loaded with household furniture, all hastening toward a wooden bridge which crosses the Potomac. The confusion thus occasioned was terrible, and the crowd upon the bridge was such as to endanger its giving way. But Mr. Madison, having escaped among the first, was no sooner safe on the opposite bank of the river than he gave orders that the bridge should be broken down; which being obeyed, the rest were obliged to return, and to trust to the clemency of the victors.

In this manner was the night passed by both parties; and at daybreak next morning the light brigade moved into the city, while the reserve fell back to a height about half a mile in the rear. Little, however, now remained to be done, because everything marked out for destruction was already consumed. Of the senate-house, the President's palace, the barracks, the dockyard, etc., nothing could be seen, except heaps of smoking ruins; and even the bridge, a noble structure upward of a mile in length, was almost wholly demolished. There was, therefore, no farther occasion to scatter the troops, and they were accordingly kept together as much as possible on the capitol hill.

THE BATTLE OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN

By James Fenimore Cooper

HAD this naval battle on Lake Champlain not been fought and won by the Americans under Captain Thomas Macdonough off the town of Plattsburg, September 11, 1814, a British army of 11,000 men would in all probability have invaded New York and the War of 1812 might have been indefinitely prolonged. As a result of this victory, the plan of invasion by land was abandoned, and the British forces under Sir George Prevost retreated into Canada.

Cooper, from whose "History of the Navy of the United States" this account is taken, became a midshipman in 1808 and saw various forms of service before resigning in 1811, and becoming in later years not only a distinguished historian, but the greatest pioneer American novelist.

This engagement made Macdonough famous as "The Hero of Lake Champlain." He received a gold medal from Congress and an estate on Cumberland Head, near Plattsburg, from the Legislature of Vermont.

Britain the entire possession of the lakes. In such an expedition the command of Champlain became of great importance, as it flanked the march of the invad-

IN the autumn of 1814 the enemy contemplated an invasion of the northern and least populous counties of New York, with a large force, following the route laid down for General Burgoyne, in his unfortunate expedition of 1777. It was most probably intended to occupy a portion of the northern frontier, with the expectation of turning the circumstance to account in the pending negotiations, the English commissioners soon after advancing a claim to drive the Americans back from their ancient boundaries, with a view to leaving Great

ing army for more than a hundred miles, and offered so many facilities for forwarding supplies, as well as for annoyance and defense. Until this season neither nation had a force of any moment on that water, but the Americans had built a ship and a schooner, during the winter and spring; and when it was found that the enemy was preparing for a serious effort the keel of a brig was laid. Many galleys, or gunboats, were also constructed. . . .

On the 6th of September Captain Macdonough ordered the galleys to the head of the bay, to annoy the English army, and a cannonading occurred which lasted two hours. The wind coming on to blow a gale that menaced the galleys with shipwreck, Mr. Duncan, a midshipman of the *Saratoga*, was sent in a gig to order them to retire. It is supposed that the appearance of the boat induced the enemy to think that Captain Macdonough himself had joined his galleys; for he concentrated a fire on the galley Mr. Duncan was in, and that young officer received a severe wound, by which he lost the use of his arm. Afterward one of the galleys drifted in, under the guns of the enemy, and she also sustained some loss, but was eventually brought off.

Captain Macdonough had chosen an anchorage a little to the south of the outlet of the Saranac. His vessels lay in a line parallel to the coast, extending north and south, and distant from the western shore nearly two miles. The last vessel at the southward was so near the shoal as to prevent the English from

passing that end of the line, while all the ships lay so far out toward Cumberland Head as to bring the enemy within reach of carronades, should he enter the bay on that side.

The total force of the American present consisted of fourteen vessels, mounting eighty-six guns and containing about 850 men, including officers and a small detachment of soldiers, who did duty as marines, none of the corps having been sent on Lake Champlain. To complete his order of battle, Captain Macdonough directed two of the galleys to keep inshore of the *Eagle*, and a little to windward of her, to sustain the head of the line; one or two more to lie opposite to the interval between the *Eagle* and *Saratoga*; a few opposite to the interval between the *Saratoga* and *Ticonderoga*; and two or three opposite the interval between the *Ticonderoga* and *Preble*. The Americans were, consequently, formed in two lines, distant from each other about forty yards; the large vessels at anchor, and the gallery under their sweeps.

The force of the enemy was materially greater than that of the Americans. His largest vessel, the *Confiance*, commanded by Captain Downie in person, had the gundeck of a heavy frigate, mounting on it an armament similar to that of the *Constitution* or *United States*, or thirty long twenty-fours. . . . The whole force of Captain Downie consisted of sixteen or seventeen vessels, as the case may have been, mounting in all, ninety-five or ninety-six guns, and carrying about one thousand men. . . .

The guard-boat of the Americans pulled in shortly after the sun had risen, and announced the approach of the enemy. As the wind was fair, a good working breeze at the northward and eastward, Captain Macdonough ordered the vessels cleared, and preparations made to fight at anchor. Eight bells were striking in the American squadron as the upper sails of the English vessels were seen passing along the land, in the main lake, on their way to double Cumberland Head. . . .

The enemy was now standing in, close-hauled, the Chubb looking well to windward of the Eagle, the vessel that lay at the head of the American line, the Linnet laying her course for the bows of the same brig, the Confiance intending to fetch far enough ahead of the Saratoga to lay that ship athwart hawse, and the Finch, with the gunboats, standing for the Ticonderoga and Preble.

As the enemy filled the American vessels sprung their broadsides to bear, and a few minutes were passed in the solemn and silent expectation, that, in a disciplined ship, precedes a battle. Suddenly the Eagle discharged, in quick succession, her four long eighteens. In clearing the decks of the Saratoga some hen-coops were thrown overboard, and the poultry had been permitted to run at large. Startled by the reports of the guns, a young cock flew upon a gun-slide, clapped his wings and crowed. At this animating sound the men spontaneously gave three cheers. This little occurrence relieved the usual breathing

time between preparation and the combat, and it had a powerful influence on the known tendencies of the seamen.

Still Captain Macdonough did not give the order to commence, although the enemy's galleys now opened; for it was apparent that the fire of the *Eagle*, which vessel continued to engage, was useless. As soon, however, as it was seen that her shot told, Captain Macdonough himself sighted a long twenty-four, and the gun was fired. This shot is said to have struck the *Confiance* near the outer hawse-hole, and to have passed the length of her deck, killing and wounding several men, and carrying away the wheel. It was a signal for all the American long guns to open, and it was soon seen that the English commanding ship, in particular, was suffering heavily. Still the enemy advanced, and in the most gallant manner, confident if he could get the desired position, that the great weight of the *Confiance* would at once decide the fate of the day. But he had miscalculated his own powers of endurance. The anchors of the *Confiance* were hanging by the stoppers, in readiness to be let go, and the larboard bower was soon cut away, as well as a spare anchor in the larboard fore-chains. . . .

The English vessels came to in very handsome style, nor did the *Confiance* fire a single gun until secured; although the American line was now engaged with all its force. As soon as Captain Downie had performed this duty, in a seamanlike manner, his ship appeared a sheet of fire, discharging all her guns

at nearly the same instant, pointed principally at the *Saratoga*. The effect of this broadside was terrible in the little ship that received it. After the crash had subsided Captain Macdonough saw that nearly half his crew was on the deck, for many had been knocked down who sustained no real injuries. It is supposed, however, that about forty men, or near one-fifth of her complement, were killed and wounded on board the *Saratoga* by this single discharge. The hatches had been fastened down, as usual, but the bodies so cumbered the deck that it was found necessary to remove the fastenings and to pass them below. The effect continued but a moment, when the ship resumed her fire as gallantly as ever. Among the slain was Mr. Peter Gamble, the first lieutenant. By this early loss but one officer of that rank, Acting Lieutenant Lavallette, was left in the *Saratoga*. Shortly after, Captain Downie, the English commanding officer, fell also. . . .

The rear of the American line was certainly its weakest point; and having compelled the little *Preble* to retreat, the enemy's galleys were emboldened to renew their efforts against the vessel ahead of her, which was the *Ticonderoga*. This schooner was better able to resist them, and she was very nobly fought. Her spirited commander, Lieutenant-Commandant Cassin, walked the taffrail, where he could watch the movements of the enemy's galleys, and showers of canister and grape, directing discharges of bags of musket-balls, and other light missiles, effectually

keeping the British at bay. Several times the English galleys, of which many were very gallantly fought, closed quite near, with an intent to board; but the great steadiness on board the Ticonderoga beat them back, and completely covered the rear of the line for the remainder of the day. So desperate were some of the assaults, notwithstanding, that the galleys have been described as several times getting nearly within a boathook's length of the schooner, and their people as rising from the sweeps in readiness to spring.

While these reverses and successes were occurring in the rear of the two lines, the Americans were suffering heavily at the other extremity. The Linnet had got a very commanding position, and she was admirably fought; while the Eagle, which received all her fire, and part of that of the Confiance, having lost her springs, found herself so situated as not to be able to bring her guns fairly to bear on either of the enemy's vessels. Captain Henley had run his topsail-yards, with the sails stopped, to the mastheads, previously to engaging, and he now cut his cable, sheeted home his topsails, cast the brig, and running down, anchored by the stern, between the Saratoga and Ticonderoga, necessarily a little inshore of both. Here he opened fire afresh, and with better effect, on the Confiance and galleys, using his larboard guns. But this movement left the Saratoga exposed to nearly the whole fire of the Linnet, which brig now sprung her broadside in a manner to rake the American ship on her bows.

Shortly after this important change had occurred at the head of the lines, the fire of the two ships began materially to lessen, as gun after gun became disabled; the *Saratoga*, in particular, having had all her long pieces rendered useless by shot, while most of the carronades were dismounted, either in the same manner, or in consequence of a disposition in the men to overcharge them. At length but a single carronade remained in the starboard batteries, and on firing it the navel-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage, and it actually fell down the main hatch. By this accident the American commanding vessel was left in the middle of the battle, without a single available gun. Nothing remained but to make an immediate attempt to wind the ship.

The stream anchor suspended astern was let go accordingly. The men then clapped on the hawser that led to the starboard quarter, and brought the ship's stern up over the kedge; but here she hung, there not being sufficient wind, or current, to force her bows round. A line had been bent to a bight in the stream cable, with a view to help wind the ship, and she now rode by the kedge and this line, with her stern under the raking broadside of the *Linnet*, which brig kept up a steady and well-directed fire. The larboard batteries having been manned and got ready, Captain Macdonough ordered all the men from the guns, where they were uselessly suffering, telling them to go forward. By rowing on the line the ship was at length got so far round that the aftermost gun would

bear on the *Confiance*, when it was instantly manned, and began to play. The next gun was used in the same manner, but it was soon apparent that the ship could be got no farther round, for she was now nearly end-on to the wind. At this critical moment Mr. Brum, the master, bethought him of the hawser that had led to the larboard quarter. It was got forward under the bows, and passed aft to the starboard quarter, when the ship's stern was immediately sprung to the westward, so as to bring all her larboard guns to bear on the English ship, with fatal effect.

As soon as the preparations were made to wind the *Saratoga*, the *Confiance* attempted to perform the same evolution. Her springs were hauled on, but they merely forced the ship ahead, and having borne the fresh broadside of the Americans, until she had scarcely a gun with which to return the fire, and failing in all her efforts to get round, about two hours and a quarter after the commencement of the action, her commanding officer lowered his flag. By hauling again upon the starboard hawser the *Saratoga's* broadside was immediately sprung to bear on the *Linnet*, which brig struck about fifteen minutes after her consort. The enemy's galleys had been driven back, nearly or quite half a mile, and they lay irregularly scattered, and setting to leeward, keeping up a desultory firing. As soon as they found that the large vessels had submitted, they ceased the combat, and lowered their colors. At this proud moment, it is believed, on authority entitled to the highest respect,

there was not a single English ensign, out of sixteen or seventeen, that had so lately been flying, left abroad in the bay!

In this long and bloody conflict the Saratoga had 28 men killed and 29 wounded, or more than a fourth of all on board her; the Eagle, 13 killed and 20 wounded, which was sustaining a loss in nearly an equal proportion; the Ticonderoga, 6 killed and 6 wounded; the Preble, 2 killed; while on board the ten galleys only 3 were killed and 3 wounded. The Saratoga was hulled fifty-five times, principally by twenty-four-pound shot; and the Eagle thirty-nine times.

According to the report of Captain Pring, of the Linnet, dated on the 12th of September, the Confiance lost 41 killed and 40 wounded. It was admitted, however, that no good opportunity had then existed to ascertain the casualties. At a later day the English themselves enumerated her wounded at 83. This would make the total loss of that ship 124; but even this number is supposed to be materially short of the truth. . . .

Captain Macdonough, who was already very favorably known to the service for his personal intrepidity, obtained a vast accession of reputation by the results of this day. His dispositions for receiving the attacks were highly judicious and seamanlike. By the manner in which he anchored his vessels, with the shoal so near the rear of his line as to cover that extremity, and the land of Cumberland Head so near his broad-

side as necessary to bring the enemy within reach of his short guns, he made all his force completely available. The English were not near enough, perhaps, to give to carronades their full effect; but this disadvantage was unavoidable, the assailing party having, of course, a choice in the distance. All that could be obtained, under the circumstances, appears to have been secured, and the result proved the wisdom of the actual arrangement. The personal deportment of Captain Macdonough in this engagement, like that of Captain Perry in the battle of Lake Erie, was the subject of general admiration in his little squadron. His coolness was undisturbed throughout all the trying scenes on board his own ship, and although lying against a vessel of double the force and nearly double the tonnage of the *Saratoga*, he met and resisted her attack with a constancy that seemed to set defeat at defiance. . . .

The consequences of this victory were immediate and important. During the action Sir George Prevost had skirmished sharply in front of the American works, and was busy in making demonstrations for a more serious attack. As soon, however, as the fate of the British squadron was ascertained, he made a precipitate and unmilitary retreat, abandoning much of his heavy artillery, stores, and supplies, and from that moment to the end of the war the northern frontier was cleared of the enemy.

WHAT INSPIRED "THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER"

By Francis Scott Key

IT is curious that Francis Scott Key, in this letter to his friend John Randolph, of Roanoke, describing the circumstances which moved him to write "The Star-Spangled Banner," should make no mention of the hymn itself. The letter appears in a biography of Key by a descendant, Francis Scott Key-Smith, who supplements the letter with his own historical observations.

It is known that the hymn had its birth amid the gunfire of the British attack upon the defenses near Baltimore on September 13, 1814. Its author, a lawyer who at one time was District Attorney of the District of Columbia, was on an errand, under a flag of truce, to the British fleet, but was detained while the bombardment of Fort McHenry was taking place. Nightlong he watched the progress of the fight and in the morning, seeing the Stars and Stripes still waving triumphantly, conceived the patriotic song which he completed that evening. the many faithful whose wickedness I could hardly

YOU will be surprised to hear that I have spent eleven days in the British fleet. I went with a flag to endeavor to save poor old Dr. Beans a voyage to Halifax, in which we fortunately succeeded. They detained us until after their attack on Baltimore, and you may imagine what a state of anxiety I endured. Sometimes when I remembered it was there the declaration of this abominable war was received with public rejoicings, I could not feel a hope that they would escape; and again when I thought of piety lessens that lump of feel a fear.

To make my feelings still more acute, the Admiral had intimated his fears that the town must be burned,

and I was sure that if taken it would have been given up to plunder. I have reason to believe that such a promise was given to their soldiers. It was filled with women and children. I hope I shall never cease to feel the warmest gratitude when I think of this most merciful deliverance. It seems to have given me a higher idea of the "forbearance, long suffering, and tender mercy" of God, than I had ever before conceived.

Never was a man more disappointed in his expectations than I have been as to the character of British officers. With some exceptions they appeared to be illiberal, ignorant and vulgar, and seem filled with a spirit of malignity against everything American. Perhaps, however, I saw them in unfavorable circumstances. . . .

Between two and three o'clock in the morning the British, with one or two rocket and several bomb-vessels manned by 1,200 picked men, attempted, under cover of darkness, to slip past the fort and up the Patapsco, hoping to effect a landing and attack the garrison in the rear.

Succeeding in evading the guns of the fort, but unmindful of Fort Covington, under whose batteries they next came, their enthusiasm over the supposed success of the venture gave way in a derisive cheer, which, borne by the damp night air to our small party of Americans on the Minden, must have chilled the blood in their veins and pierced their patriotic hearts like a dagger.

Fort Covington, the lazaretto, and the American barges in the river now simultaneously poured a galling fire upon the unprotected enemy, raking them fore and aft, in horrible slaughter. Disappointed and disheartened, many wounded and dying, they endeavored to regain their ships, which came closer to the fortifications in an endeavor to protect the retreat. A fierce battle ensued. Fort McHenry opened the full force of all her batteries upon them as they repassed, and the fleet responding with entire broadsides made an explosion so terrific that it seemed as though mother earth had opened and was vomiting shot and shell in a sheet of fire and brimstone.

The heavens aglow were a seething sea of flame, and the waters of the harbor, lashed into an angry sea by the vibrations, the Minden rode and tossed as though in a tempest. It is recorded that the houses in the city of Baltimore, two miles distant, were shaken to their foundations. Above the tempestuous roar, intermingled with its hubbub and confusion, were heard the shrieks and groans of the dying and wounded. But alas! they were from the direction of the fort. What did it mean? For over an hour the pandemonium reigned. Suddenly it ceased—all was quiet, not a shot fired or sound heard, a deathlike stillness prevailed, as the darkness of night resumed its sway. The awful stillness and suspense were unbearable. . . .

[I turned my] eyes in the direction of the fort and its flag, but the darkness had given place to a

heavy fog of smoke and mist which now enveloped the harbor and hung close down to the surface of the water. . . .

Sometime must yet elapse before anything definite might be ascertained. At last it came. A bright streak of gold mingled with crimson shot athwart the eastern sky, followed by another and still another, as the morning sun rose in the fullness of his glory, lifting "the mists of the deep," crowning a "Heaven-blest land" with a new victory and grandeur.

* * * * *

On his own account Mr. Key-Smith writes that his ancestor, the author of "The Star-Spangled Banner," "was soon able to see the American flag through a vista in the smoke and vapor. As it caught 'The gleam of the morning's first beam,' and, 'in full glory reflected shone in the stream' his proud and patriotic heart knew no bounds; the wounds inflicted 'by the battle's confusion' were healed instantly as if by magic; a new life sprang into every fiber, and his pent-up emotions burst forth with an inspiration in a song of praise, victory, and thanksgiving as he exclaimed:

" 'Tis the Star-Spangled Banner, Oh! long may it
wave,
O'er the land of the free and the home of the
brave."

"As the morning's sun arose, vanquishing the darkness and gloom; lifting the fog and smoke and disclosing his country's flag, victorious, bathed in the delicate hues of morn, only an inspiration caught from such a sight can conceive or describe, and so only in the words of his song can be found the description.

"The first draft of the words were emotionally scribbled upon the back of a letter which he carried in his pocket and of which he made use to jot down some memoranda of his thoughts and sentiments." . . .

"Copies of the song were struck off in handbill form, and promiscuously distributed on the street. Catching with popular favor like prairie fire it spread in every direction, was read and discussed, until, in less than an hour, the news was all over the city.

"Picked up by a crowd of soldiers assembled, some accounts put it, about Captain McCauley's tavern, next to the Holiday Street Theater, others have it around their tents on the outskirts of the city, Ferdinand Durang, a musician, adapted the words to the old tune of 'Anacreon in Heaven,' and, mounting a chair, rendered it in fine style.

"On the evening of the same day it was again rendered upon the stage of the Holiday Street Theater by an actress, and the theater is said to have gained thereby a national reputation. In about a fortnight it had reached New Orleans and was publicly played by a military band, and shortly thereafter was heard in nearly, if not all, the principal cities and towns throughout the country."

SECESSION THREATENED IN NEW ENGLAND

By James Schouler

ATTEENDED by delegates from Massachusetts, headed by Harrison Gray Otis, its originator; Connecticut and other New England States, the Memorable Hartford Convention was in session from December 15, 1814, to January 5, 1815. Its deliberations were secret, and it has been charged with being treasonable in designing the dissolution of the Union. As a fact, the object of the Convention was to devise means not only of defense against foreign powers, but for safeguarding the rights of the separate States against alleged encroachments of the Federal government. No treasonable intention could be proved.

This account is from Schouler's "*History of the United States*" (Dodd, Mead & Company), the best and fullest narrative of the period in American history between the Revolution and the Civil War.

Following it are the resolutions adopted by the Hartford Convention, which were submitted to the Legislatures of the States represented.

their expenses. The cry was raised by peace men in consequence that the National government had aban-

WHEN the invader appears honest citizens must choose sides. Forced at length to defend their own homes and firesides, Massachusetts and Connecticut now felt the recoil of unpatriotic behavior. Instead of trusting their governors with the local defense as the administration had done with States which upheld the war, the President now insisted upon retaining the exclusive control of military movements. Because Massachusetts and Connecticut had refused to subject their militia to the orders of the War Department, Monroe declined to pay

done New England to the common enemy. Upon this false assumption—for false, candor must pronounce it, inasmuch as government was maturing all the while a consistent plan of local defense—the Massachusetts leaders made hasty proclamation that no choice was left between submitting to the enemy, which could not be thought of, and appropriating to the defense of the States the revenues derived from her people, which had hitherto been spent elsewhere. The Massachusetts Legislature appropriated \$1,000,000 to support a State army of 10,000 men. And Otis, who inspired these measures, brought Massachusetts to the point of instituting a delegate convention of Eastern States—this convention to meet at Hartford. A Hartford convention was no new project to Otis's own mind.

The day for assembling was fixed at December 15th. Twelve delegates were appointed by the Massachusetts Legislature, men of worth and respectability, chief of whom were Cabot and Otis. In Connecticut, whose Legislature was not slow to denounce Monroe's conscription plan as barbarous and unconstitutional, a congenial delegation of seven was made up—Goodrich and Hillhouse, hoary men of national renown, at the head. Rhode Island's Legislature added four more to the list. So deep-rooted, however, was the national distrust of this movement that Vermont and New Hampshire shrank from giving the Convention a public sanction. New Hampshire had a Republican council; while in Vermont

the Plattsburg victory stirred the Union spirit; Chittenden himself having changed in official tone after the war became a defensive one. Violent county conventions representing fractions of towns chose, however, three delegates, two in New Hampshire and one in Vermont, whose credentials being accepted by the convention, the whole number of delegates assembled at Hartford was twenty-six.

This Hartford Convention remains famous in American history only as a powerful menstruum in national politics. What its most earnest projectors had hoped for was left but half done; but that half work condemned to political infamy twenty-six gentlemen highly respectable. Lawyers, they were, of State eminence, for the most part, and all of high social character, but inclined, like men of ability more used to courts than conventions, to treat constituencies like clients, and spend great pains over phraseology. Perhaps, indeed, these had been selected purposely to play the lion's part, that moderate fellow-citizens, Unionists at heart, whose conversion was essential, might not quake at the roar of the Convention. . . .

What bold measures were possible? one may ask. Pickering's Confederacy of 1804 would have embraced New York, perhaps Pennsylvania. But these Eastern Federalists, with that clannishness at which Hamilton himself had marveled, were now circumscribed within the limits of New England, and of

that section, moreover, but three States out of five had delegations at Hartford worthy of the name. The first effort to assemble a New England convention was, we have seen, in 1808-9. The second, if John Quincy Adams may be believed, was in 1812, immediately after the declaration of war against Great Britain, and that project Dexter defeated by a speech in Faneuil Hall. The third, and present, though partially successful, by bringing delegates into conference, was, like the Stamp Act Congress, or the Annapolis Conference of 1786, an instrument necessarily for later and riper designs. The American Confederacy, the American Union, are each the product of begetting conventions; nor without prudence were States now forbidden to enter into agreements or compacts with one another without the consent of Congress. The Hartford Convention may well have justified dire forebodings, for it did not dissolve finally, as a mass-meeting might have done, upon a full report, but contingently adjourned to Boston.

Organized on the appointed day in Hartford, then a town of four thousand inhabitants, by the choice of George Cabot as president, and Theodore Dwight as secretary, the present convention remained in close session for three continuous weeks. Of irregular political assemblies the worst may be suspected when proceedings are conducted in secrecy; and never, certainly, were doors shut more closely upon a delegate, and professedly a popular convention, than upon this one; not even doorkeeper or messenger

gaining access to the discussion. Inviolable secrecy was enjoined upon every member, including the secretary, at the first meeting, and once more before they dispersed, notwithstanding the acceptance of their final report. The injunction was never removed. Not before a single State legislature whose sanction of this report was desired, not to any body of those constituents whose votes were indispensable to the ultimate ends, if these ends were legally pursued, was that report elucidated. Four years afterward, when the Hartford Convention and its projectors bent under the full blast of popular displeasure, Cabot delivered to his native State the sealed journal of its proceedings, which had remained in his exclusive custody; but that when opened was found to be a meager sketch of formal proceedings, and no more; making no record of yeas and nays, stating none of the amendments offered to the various reports, attaching the name of no author to a single proposition, in fine, carefully suppressing all means of ascertaining the expression or belief of individual delegates.

Casual letters of contemporaries are preserved sufficient to show that representative Federalists labored with these delegates to procure a separation of the States, but how many more of the same strain President Cabot may have torn up one can only conjecture. That twenty-six public men should have consented to leave no ampler means of vindicating to their own age, and to posterity, themselves and their motives, may evince a noble disinterestedness,

sublime confidence in the rectitude of their own intentions, a comforting reliance upon "the Searcher of Hearts," but certainly an astonishing ignorance of human nature in this our inquisitive republic. Assembling amid rumors of treason and the execration of all the country west of the Hudson, its members watched by an army officer who had been conveniently stationed in the vicinity, the Hartford Convention, hardening into stone, preserves for all ages a sphinxlike mystery.

The labors of this convention, whatever they were, ended with a report and resolutions, signed by the delegates present, and adopted on the day before final adjournment. Report and resolutions disappointed, doubtless, both citizens who had wished a new declaration of independence, and citizens who had feared it. Neither Virginia nor Kentucky could, with propriety, condemn the heresies of State sovereignty which supplied the false logic of this report, and an imperfect experience of this Federal Union may excuse in Otis and his associates theoretical errors which Jefferson and Madison while in the opposition had first inculcated. Constitutional amendments were here proposed which, not utterly objectionable under other circumstances, must have been deemed at this time an insult to those officially responsible for the national safety, and only admissible as a humiliation of the majority. It requires little imagination to read, in report and resolutions, a menace to the Union in its hour of tribulation, a demand for the purse and

sword, to which only a craven Congress could have yielded, and a threat of local armies which, with the avowed purpose of mutual aid, might in some not remote contingency be turned against foes American not less than British.

HARTFORD CONVENTION RESOLUTIONS

RESOLVED, that it be, and hereby is, recommended to the Legislatures of the several States represented in this Convention to adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said States from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall contain provisions subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments not authorized by the Constitution of the United States.

Resolved, That it be, and hereby is, recommended to the said Legislatures to authorize an immediate and earnest application to be made to the government of the United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement whereby the said States may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the defense of their territory against the enemy; and a reasonable portion of the taxes, collected within said States, may be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment of the balance due said States and to the future defense of the same. The amount so paid into the said treasuries

to be credited, and the disbursements made as aforesaid to be charged to the United States.

Resolved, That it be, and hereby is, recommended to the Legislatures of the aforesaid States to pass laws (where it has not already been done) authorizing the governors or commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detachments from the same or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most convenient and conformable to their constitutions, and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped, and disciplined, and held in readiness for service; and upon the request of the governor of either of the other States to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as well as the regular forces of the State, or such part thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the safety of the State, in assisting the State, making such request to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or attempted by the public enemy.

Resolved, That the following amendments of the Constitution of the United States be recommended to the States represented as aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the State Legislatures, and in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a convention chosen by the people of each State.

And it is further recommended that the said States shall persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments until the same shall be effected.

First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respec-

tive numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed and all other persons.

Second. No new State shall be admitted into the Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses.

Third. Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days.

Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or the dependencies thereof.

Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, except such acts of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States when actually invaded.

Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States.

Seventh. The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time, nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession.

JACKSON'S DEFEAT OF THE CREEKS

His Official Report

GENERAL ANDREW JACKSON made this report of the Battle of Horseshoe Bend on the Tallapoosa River, on March 28, 1814, to his superior officer, Major General Thomas Pinckney. His victory over the Creeks, a powerful Indian confederation, was in retaliation for the Fort Mims massacre instigated by the English. They were completely crushed in three decisive battles, which made Jackson a national hero.

He distinguished himself in these military operations by his great display of energy. Besides the foe, Jackson had to contend with discord among his officers, insubordination among his men, and scarcity of provisions. Following this battle, the Creeks sued for peace, which was granted only on their submission to a peremptory demand for the surrender of more than half their ancient territory. Eventually they migrated to their present habitat in Oklahoma.

for defense than the one they had chosen, or one rendered more secure by the skill with which they had erected their breastwork. It was from 5 to 8 feet high, and extended across the point in such a

I FEEL particularly happy in being able to communicate to you the fortunate eventuation of my expedition to Talapoosie. I reached the head near Emucfau (called by the whites Horse Shoe) about 10 o'clock on the forenoon of yesterday, where I found the strength of the neighboring towns collected; expecting our approach, they had gathered in from Oakfuskee, Oakehoga, New Yorcau, Hillibeas, the Fish Pond, and Eufalee towns, to the number it is said of 1,000. It is difficult to conceive a situation more eligible

direction, as that a force approaching it would be exposed to a double fire, while they lay in perfect security behind. A cannon planted at one extremity could have raked it to no advantage.

Determined to exterminate them, I detached General Coffee with the mounted, and nearly the whole of the Indian, force, early on the morning of yesterday, to cross the river about two miles below their encampment, and to surround the bend in such a manner, as that none of them should escape by attempting to cross the river. With the infantry I proceeded slowly and in order along the point of land which led to the front of their breastwork; having planted my cannon, (one six and one three pounder) on an eminence at the distance of 150 to 200 yards from it, I opened a very brisk fire, playing upon the enemy with the muskets and rifles whenever they showed themselves beyond it; this was kept up, with short interruptions, for about two hours, when a part of the Indian force and Captain Russell's, and Lieutenant Bean's companies of spies, who had accompanied General Coffee, crossed over in canoes to the extremity of the bend, and set fire to a few of the buildings which were there situated; they then advanced with great gallantry towards the breastwork, and commenced a spirited fire upon the enemy behind it. Finding that this force, notwithstanding the bravery thus displayed, was wholly insufficient to dislodge them, and that General Coffee had entirely secured the opposite bank of the river, I now deter-

mined to take their works by storm. The men by whom this was to be effected had been waiting with impatience to receive the order, and hailed it with acclamation. The spirit which animated them was a sure augury of the success which was to follow. The history of warfare I think furnishes few instances of a more brilliant attack; the regulars led on by their intrepid and skillful commander, Colonel Williams, and by the gallant Major Montgomery, soon gained possession of the works in the midst of a most tremendous fire from behind them, and the militia of the venerable General Doherty's brigade accompanied them in the charge with a vivacity and firmness which would have done honor to regulars. The enemy was completely routed. Five hundred and fifty-seven were left dead on the peninsula, and a great number were killed by the horsemen in attempting to cross the river. It is believed that not more than twenty have escaped.

The fighting continued with some severity about five hours, but we continued to destroy many of them, who had concealed themselves under the banks of the river, until we were prevented by the night. This morning we killed sixteen who had been concealed. We took about 250 prisoners, all women and children except two or three. Our loss is 106 wounded, and 25 killed. Major M'Intosh, the Cowetau, who joined my army with a part of his tribe, greatly distinguished himself. When I get a leisure hour I will send you a more detailed account.

According to my original purpose, I commenced my return march to Fort Williams to-day, and shall, if I find sufficient supplies there, hasten to the Hickory ground. The power of the Creeks is I think forever broken.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE HORSE SHOE GENERAL JACKSON
MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS TO THE ARMY, MARCH
28, 1814.

SOLDIERS.—You have entitled yourselves to the gratitude of your country and your General. The expedition, from which you have just returned, has, by your good conduct, been rendered prosperous, beyond any example in the history of our warfare: it has redeemed the character of your state, and of that description of troops, of which the greater part of you are.

You have, within a few days, opened your way to the Tallapoosie, and destroyed a confederacy of the enemy, ferocious by nature, and grown insolent from impunity. Relying on their numbers, the security of their situation, and the assurances of their prophets, they derided our approach, and already exulted, in anticipation of the victory they expected to obtain. But they were ignorant of the influence of government on the human powers, nor knew what brave men, and civilized, could effect. By their yells, they hoped to frighten us, and with their wooden fortifications to oppose us. Stupid mortals! their yells but designated their situation the more certainly; while their walls became a snare for their own destruction.

So will it ever be when presumption and ignorance contend against bravery and prudence.

The fiends of the Tallapoosie will no longer murder our women and children, or disturb the quiet of our borders. Their midnight flambeaux will no more illumine their council-house, or shine upon the victim of their infernal orgies. In their places, a new generation will arise, who will know their duty better. The weapons of warfare will be exchanged for utensils of husbandry; and the wilderness, which now withers in sterility, and mourns the desolation which overspreads her, will blossom as the rose, and become the nursery of the arts. But before this happy day can arrive, other chastisements remain to be inflicted. It is indeed lamentable, that the path to peace should lead through blood, and over the bodies of the slain: but it is a dispensation of Providence, to inflict partial evils that good may be produced.

Our enemies are not sufficiently humbled; they do not sue for peace. A collection of them awaits our approach, and remains to be dispersed. Buried in ignorance, and seduced by their prophets, they have the weakness to believe they will still be able to make a stand against us. They must be undeceived, and made to atone for their obstinacy and their crimes, by still further suffering. The hopes which have so long deluded them, must be driven from their last refuge. They must be made to know that their prophets are impostors, and that our strength is mighty, and will prevail. Then, and not till then, may we expect to make with them a peace that shall be lasting.

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

By Major Arsène Lacarrière Latour, Jackson's chief engineer

MAJOR LATOUR is regarded as the most, if not only, trustworthy contemporary historian of the Louisiana campaign conducted by General Jackson. His position made him well qualified for his task, and he has treated the subject without bias. The battle took place January 8, 1815, fifteen days after the Treaty of Ghent was signed. Of the 7,000 veterans of the Napoleonic wars who fought at New Orleans under General Paikenham, one of Wellington's commanders, 2,500 were shot down, including Paikenham himself and Generals Gibbs and Keane. The American loss was 8 killed and 13 wounded. The attention the Battle of New Orleans attracted in Europe added enormously to American prestige.

Gleig, who gives the British side, was an Oxford man who had served as volunteer under Wellington before embarking for America. His account of the engagement in which he took part is considered the most trustworthy written from the English side.

formed in close column of about sixty men in front, in very good order, and advanced nearly in the direction of battery No. 7, the men shouldering their

A LITTLE before day-break, our outpost came in without noise, having perceived the enemy moving forward in great force. At last dawn discovered to us the enemy occupying two-thirds of the space between the wood and the Mississippi. Immediately a Congreve rocket went off from the skirt of the wood, in the direction of the river. This was the signal for the attack. At the same instant, the twelve-pounder of battery No. 6, whose gunners had perceived the enemy's movement, discharged a shot. On this all his troops gave three cheers,

muskets, and all carrying fascines, and some with ladders. A cloud of rockets preceded them, and continued to fall in showers during the whole attack. Batteries Nos. 6, 7 and 8, now opened an incessant fire on the column, which continued to advance in pretty good order, until, in a few minutes, the musketry of the troops of Tennessee and Kentucky, joining their fire with that of the artillery, began to make an impression on it, which soon threw it into confusion.

It was at that moment that was heard that constant rolling fire, whose tremendous noise resembled rattling peals of thunder. For some time the British officers succeeded in animating the courage of their troops, and making them advance, obliquing to the left, to avoid the fire of battery No. 7, from which every discharge opened the column, and mowed down whole files, which were almost instantaneously replaced by new troops coming up close after the first: but these also shared the same fate, until at last, after twenty-five minutes continual firing, through which a few platoons advanced to the edge of the ditch, the column entirely broke, and part of the troops dispersed, and ran to take shelter among the bushes on the right. The rest retired to the ditch where they had been when first perceived, four hundred yards from our lines.

There the officers with some difficulty rallied their troops, and again drew them up for a second attack, the soldiers having laid down their knapsacks at the

edge of the ditch, that they might be less encumbered. And now, for the second time, the column, recruited with the troops that formed the rear, advanced. Again it was received with the same rolling fire of musketry and artillery, till, having advanced without much order very near our lines, it at last broke again, and retired in the utmost confusion. . . .

The attack on our lines had hardly begun, when the British commander-in-chief, the honorable Sir Edward Pakenham, fell a victim to his own intrepidity, while endeavoring to animate his troops with ardor for the assault. Soon after his fall, two other generals, Keane and Gibbs, were carried off the field, dangerously wounded. A great number of officers of rank had fallen: the ground over which the column had marched, was strewed with the dead and the wounded. Such slaughter on their side, with no loss on ours, spread consternation through their ranks, as they were now convinced of the impossibility of carrying our lines, and saw that even to advance was certain death. In a word, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of some officers to make the troops form a third time, they would not advance, and all that could be obtained from them, was to draw them up in the ditch, where they passed the rest of the day. . . .

I deem it my indispensable duty to do justice to the intrepid bravery displayed in that attack by the British troops, especially by the officers. . . . The British soldiers showed, on this occasion, that it is not without reason they are said to be deficient in agility. The

enormous load they had to carry contributed indeed not a little to the difficulty of their movement. Besides their knapsacks, usually weighing nearly thirty pounds, and their musket, too heavy by at least one third, almost all of them had to carry a fascine from nine to ten inches in diameter, and four feet long, made of sugar-canes perfectly ripe, and consequently very heavy, or a ladder from ten to twelve feet long.

The duty of impartiality, incumbent on him who relates military events, obliges me to observe that the attack made on Jackson's lines, by the British, on the 8th of January, must have been determined on by their generals without any consideration of the ground, the weather or the difficulties to be surmounted, before they could storm lines defended by militia indeed, but by militia whose valor they had already witnessed, with soldiers bending under the weight of their load, when a man, unencumbered and unopposed, would that day have found it difficult to mount our breastwork at leisure and with circumspection, so extremely slippery was the soil. . . .

THE BRITISH SIDE AT NEW ORLEANS

By George Robert Gleig

IT was evident that the longer an attack was delayed, the less likely was it to succeed; that something must be done immediately every one perceived, but how to proceed was the difficulty. If we attempted to storm the American lines, we should expose ourselves to almost certain destruction from their artillery; to turn them, seemed to be impossible; and to draw their troops by any maneuvering from behind their entrenchments, was a thing altogether out of the question. . . .

. . . It was determined to divide the army, to send part across the river, who should seize the enemy's guns, and turn them on themselves; while the remainder should at the same time make a general assault along the whole entrenchment. . . .

. . . According to the preconcerted plan, Colonel Thornton's detachment was to cross the river immediately after dark. They were to push forward, so as to carry all the batteries, and point the guns before daylight; when, on the throwing up of a rocket, they were to commence firing upon the enemy's line, which at the same moment was to be attacked by the main of our army. . . .

. . . But, unfortunately, the loss of time nothing could repair. Instead of reaching the opposite bank, at latest by midnight, dawn was beginning to appear

before the boats quitted the canal . . . day had already broken, and the signal rocket was seen in the air, while they were yet four miles from the batteries, which ought hours ago to have been taken.

In the meantime, the main body armed and moved forward some way in front of the pickets. There they stood waiting for daylight, and listening with the greatest anxiety for the firing which ought now to be heard on the opposite bank. But this attention was exerted in vain, and day dawned upon them long before they desired its appearance. Nor was Sir Edward Pakenham disappointed in this part of his plan alone. Instead of perceiving everything in readiness for the assault, he saw his troops in battle array, indeed, but not a ladder or fascine upon the field. The 44th, which was appointed to carry them, had either misunderstood or neglected their orders; and now headed the column of attack, without any means being provided for crossing the enemy's ditch, or scaling his rampart.

The indignation of poor Pakenham on this occasion may be imagined, but cannot be described. Galloping towards Colonel Mullens, who led the 44th, he commanded him instantly to return with his regiment for the ladders, but the opportunity of planting them was lost, and though they were brought up, it was only to be scattered over the field by the frightened bearers. For our troops were by this time visible to the enemy. A dreadful fire was accordingly opened upon them, and they were mowed down by hundreds, while they stood waiting for orders.

Seeing that all his well-laid plans were frustrated, Pakenham gave the word to advance, and the other regiments, leaving the 44th with the ladders and fascines behind them, rushed on to the assault. On the left, a detachment of the 95th, 21st, and 4th, stormed a three gun battery and took it. Here they remained for some time in the expectation of support; but none arriving, and a strong column of the enemy forming for its recovery, they determined to anticipate the attack, and pushed on. The battery which they had taken was in advance of the body of the works, being cut off from it by a ditch, across which only a single plank was thrown. Along this plank did these brave men attempt to pass; but being opposed by overpowering numbers, they were repulsed; and the Americans, in turn, forcing their way into the battery, at length succeeded in recapturing it with immense slaughter. On the right, again, the 21st and 4th being almost cut to pieces and thrown into some confusion by the enemy's fire, the 93rd pushed on and took the lead. Hastening forward, our troops soon reached the ditch; but to scale the parapet without ladders was impossible. Some few, indeed, by mounting one upon another's shoulders, succeeded in entering the works, but these were instantly overpowered, most of them killed, and the rest taken; while as many as stood without were exposed to a sweeping fire, which cut them down by whole companies. It was in vain that the most obstinate courage was displayed. They fell by the hands of men whom they absolutely did

not see; for the Americans, without so much as lifting their faces above the rampart, swung their firelocks by one arm over the wall, and discharged them directly upon their heads. The whole of the guns, likewise, from the opposite bank, kept up a well directed and deadly cannonade upon their flank; and thus were they destroyed without an opportunity being given of displaying their valor, or obtaining so much as revenge.

Poor Pakenham saw how things were going, and did all that a general could do to rally his broken troops. Riding towards the 44th which had returned to the ground, but in great disorder, he called out for Colonel Mullens to advance; but that officer had disappeared, and was not to be found. He, therefore, prepared to lead them on himself, and had put himself at their head for that purpose, when he received a slight wound in the knee from a musket ball, which killed his horse. Mounting another, he again headed the 44th, when a second ball took effect more fatally, and he dropped lifeless into the arms of his aide-de-camp.

Nor were Generals Gibbs and Keane inactive. Riding through the ranks, they strove by all means to encourage the assailants and recall the fugitives; till at length both were wounded, and borne off the field. All was now confusion and dismay. Without leaders, ignorant of what was to be done, the troops first halted and then began to retire; till finally the retreat was changed into a flight, and they quitted the ground in

the utmost disorder. But the retreat was covered in gallant style by the reserve. Making a forward motion, the 7th and 43d presented the appearance of a renewed attack; by which the enemy were so much awed, that they did not venture beyond their lines in pursuit of the fugitives.

While affairs were thus disastrously conducted in this quarter, the party under Colonel Thornton had gained the landing place. On stepping ashore, the first thing they beheld was a rocket thrown up as a signal that the battle was begun. This unwelcome sight added wings to their speed. Forming in one little column, and pushing forward a single company as an advanced guard, they hastened on, and in half an hour reached a canal along the opposite brink of which a detachment of Americans was drawn up. To dislodge them was the work of a moment. . . . This, however, was only an outpost. The main body was some way in the rear, and amounted to no fewer than 1500 men.

It was not long, however, before they likewise presented themselves. Like their countrymen on the other side, they were strongly entrenched, a thick parapet with a ditch covering their front; while a battery upon their left swept the whole position, and two field pieces commanded the road. Of artillery, the assailants possessed not a single piece, nor any means, beyond what nature gave, of scaling the rampart. Yet nothing daunted by the obstacles before them, or by the immense odds to which they were opposed, dispositions for an immediate attack were made. . . .

. . . The sailors raising a shout, rushed forward, but were met by so heavy a discharge of grape and cannister, that for an instant they paused. Recovering themselves, however, they again pushed on; and the 85th dashing forward to their aid, they received a heavy fire of musketry, and endeavored to charge. A smart firing was now for a few minutes kept up on both sides, but our people had no time to waste in distant fighting, and accordingly hurried on to storm the works; upon which, a panic seized the Americans, they lost their order, and fled, leaving us in possession of their tents, and of eighteen pieces of cannon. . . .

When in the act of storming these lines, the word was passed through our ranks, that all had gone well on the opposite bank. This naturally added to the vigor of the assault; but we had not followed our flying enemy above two miles, when we were commanded to halt. The real state of the case had now reached us, and the same messenger who brought the melancholy news, brought likewise an order to return. . . .

. . . General Lambert, on whom the chief command had devolved, very prudently determined not to risk the safety of his army by another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond their strength. He considered, and considered justly that his chances of success were in every respect lessened by the late repulse. . . . A retreat, therefore, while yet the measure appeared practicable, was resolved upon, and towards that end were all our future operations directed.

THE TREATY OF GHENT, CONCLUDING THE WAR OF 1812

THE Peace of Ghent, which formally ended the War of 1812, was a peace without victory. It was only brought about through a drastic elimination from the treaty of all important questions in dispute. It was signed on December 24, 1814, ratified by the Senate on February 17, 1815, and was proclaimed by President Madison on the following day.

The American commissioners were John Quincy Adams, whose accompanying report of the negotiations appears in his "Memoirs"; Albert Gallatin, Henry Clay, James A. Bayard and Jonathan Russell. The British representatives were Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn and William Adams.

The Treaty, mainly the handiwork of Gallatin, failed to mention the impressment of American seamen, the chief cause of the war, or the Newfoundland fishery claims recognized in the Treaty of 1783; or the question as to naval forces on the Great Lakes, or the rights of neutrals. All these were subjects of much subsequent negotiation.

of the Imperial Parliament, and Under Secretary of State, and William Adams, Esquire, Doctor of Civil

HIS Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, desirous of terminating the war which has unhappily subsisted between the two countries, and of restoring, upon principles of perfect reciprocity, peace, friendship and good understanding between them, have, for that purpose, appointed their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Britannic Majesty, on his part, has appointed the Right Honorable James Lord Gambier, late Admiral of the White, now Admiral of the Red Squadron of His Majesty's fleet, Henry Goulburn, Esquire, a member

Laws; and the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, has appointed John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, Henry Clay, Jonathan Russell, and Albert Gallatin, citizens of the United States;

Who, after a reciprocal communication of their respective full powers, have agreed upon the following articles:

Article I.

There shall be a firm and universal peace between His Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns and people, of every degree, without exception of places and persons. All hostilities, both by sea and land, shall cease as soon as this treaty shall have been ratified by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned. All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property. And all archives, records, deeds and papers, either of a public nature or belonging to private persons, which, in the course of

the war, may have fallen into the hands of the officers of either party, shall be, as far as may be practicable, forthwith restored and delivered to the proper authorities and persons to whom they respectively belong. Such of the islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties, shall remain in the possession of the party in whose occupation they may be at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting the title to the said islands shall have been made in conformity with the fourth article of this treaty. No disposition made by this treaty as to such possession of the islands and territories claimed by both parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to affect the right of either.

Article II.

Immediately after the ratifications of this treaty by both parties, as hereinafter mentioned, orders shall be sent to the armies, squadrons, officers, subjects and citizens of the two Powers to cease from all hostilities. And to prevent all causes of complaint which might arise on account of the prizes which may be taken at sea after the said ratifications of this treaty, it is reciprocally agreed that all vessels and effects which may be taken after the space of twelve days from the said ratifications, upon all parts of the coast of North America, from the latitude of twenty-three degrees north to the latitude of fifty degrees north, and as far

eastward in the Atlantic Ocean as the thirty-sixth degree of west longitude from the meridian of Greenwich, shall be restored on each side: that the time shall be thirty days in all other parts of the Atlantic Ocean north of the equinoctial line or equator, and the same time for the British and Irish Channels, for the Gulf of Mexico, and all parts of the West Indies; forty days for the North Seas, for the Baltic, and for all parts of the Mediterranean; sixty days for the Atlantic Ocean south of the equator, as far as the latitude of the Cape of Good Hope; ninety days for every other part of the world south of the equator; and one hundred and twenty days for all other parts of the world, without exception.

Article III.

All prisoners of war taken on either side, as well by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as practicable after the ratifications of this treaty, as hereinafter mentioned, on their paying the debts which they have contracted during their captivity. The two contracting parties respectively engage to discharge, in specie, the advances which may have been made by the other for the sustenance and maintenance of such prisoners.

Article IV.

Whereas it was stipulated by the second article in the treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred

and eighty-three, between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries, between Nova Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and whereas the several islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy, which is part of the Bay of Fundy, and the Island of Grand Menan, in the said Bay of Fundy, are claimed by the United States as being comprehended within their aforesaid boundaries, which said islands are claimed as belonging to His Britannic Majesty, as having been, at the time of and previous to the aforesaid treaty of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia; In order therefore, finally to decide upon these claims, it is agreed that they shall be referred to two Commissioners to be appointed in the following manner, viz: One Commissioner shall be appointed by His Britannic Majesty, and one by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof; and the said two Commissioners so appointed shall be sworn impartially to examine and decide upon the said claims according to such evidence as shall be laid before them on the part of His Bri-

tannic Majesty and of the United States respectively. The said Commissioners shall meet at St. Andrews, in the Province of New Brunswick, and shall have power to adjourn to such other place or places as they shall think fit. The said Commissioners shall, by a declaration or report under their hands and seals, decide to which of the two contracting parties the several islands aforesaid do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three. And if the said Commissioners shall agree in their decision, both parties shall consider such decision as final and conclusive. It is further agreed that, in event of the two Commissioners differing upon all or any of the matters so referred to them, or in the event of both or either of the said Commissioners refusing, or declining, or willfully omitting to act as such, they shall make, jointly or separately, a report or reports, as well to the Government of His Britannic Majesty as to that of the United States, stating in detail the points on which they differ, and the grounds upon which their respective opinions have been formed, or the grounds upon which they, or either of them, have so refused, declined, or omitted to act. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States hereby agree to refer the report or reports of the said Commissioners to some friendly sovereign or State, to be then named for that purpose, and who shall be requested to decide on the differences which may be stated in the said report or reports, or upon the report

of one Commissioner, together with the grounds upon which the other Commissioner shall have refused, declined or omitted to act, as the case may be. And if the Commissioner so refusing, declining or omitting to act, shall also willfully omit to state the grounds upon which he has so done, in such manner that the said statement may be referred to such friendly sovereign or State, together with the report of such other Commissioner, then such sovereign or State shall decide *ex parte* upon the said report alone. And His Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United States engage to consider the decision of such friendly sovereign or State to be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred.

Article V.

Whereas neither that point of the highlands lying due north from the source of the River St. Croix, and designated in the former treaty of peace between the two Powers as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, nor the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River, has yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the source of the River St. Croix directly north to the abovementioned northwest angle of Nova Scotia, thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the northwesternmost head of

Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the forty-fifth degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay [St. Lawrence], has not yet been surveyed: it is agreed that for these several purposes two Commissioners shall be appointed, . . . [etc. as in Article IV].

Article VI.

Whereas by the former treaty of peace that portion of the boundary of the United States from the point where the forty-fifth degree of north latitude strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguay to the Lake Superior, was declared to be "along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario, through the middle of said lake, until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie, thence along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water communication into the Lake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake and Lake Superior;" and whereas doubts have arisen what was the middle of the said river lakes and water communications, and whether certain islands lying in the same were within the dominions of His Britannic Majesty or of the United States: In order, therefore, finally to decide these doubts, they shall be referred to two Commissioners, to be appointed, . . . [etc. as in Article IV].

Article VII.

It is further agreed that the said two last-mentioned Commissioners, after they shall have executed the duties assigned to them in the preceding article, shall be, and they are hereby, authorized upon their oaths impartially to fix and determine, according to the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, that part of the boundary between the dominions of the two Powers which extends from the water communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, to the most northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods, to decide to which of the two parties the several islands lying in the lakes, water communications and rivers, forming the said boundary, do respectively belong, in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three; and to cause such parts of the said boundary as require it to be surveyed and marked, . . . [etc. as in Article IV].

Article VIII.

[Stipulations regarding the expenses, proceedings, etc., of the commissions; and for the validity of land grants made by either party in territory adjudged to the other.]

Article IX.

The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

Article X.

Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.

Article XI.

This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides, without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable.

DISCUSSING THE TERMS OF PEACE

By Commissioner John Quincy Adams

DECEMBER 12, 1814.—Lord Gambier said that they did not consider the fisheries within their jurisdiction as rights, but merely as privileges granted.

Dr. Adams said that it would be very easy to draw a proviso by which it should be agreed to negotiate upon the two subjects, and yet without implying an abandonment on the part of the United States of their claim.

I said, if he thought it so easy, I would thank him to undertake it. I did not believe it possible. We had drawn up, and now proposed, a general article founded on a precedent in the Treaty of 1794, engaging to negotiate upon all the subjects of difference unadjusted, which would include those of the Mississippi navigation, and the fisheries within the British jurisdiction.

They read our article, and immediately rejected it, finding the word commerce in it.

Mr. Gallatin proposed to leave that word out.

Adams and Goulburn still rejected the article. Adams still said we might draw a proviso reserving our construction of the Treaty of 1783 and agreeing to negotiate on the two subjects; and added that he mentioned it because he believed that if the other question about the islands could be got rid of, the

British government would be disposed to some accommodation upon this.

Mr. Bayard drew a proviso for the purpose, and handed it over the table.

They read it, and Lord Gambier immediately said, "I, for one, can never agree to that."

Mr. Bayard asked what the object of the article, as proposed by the British Plenipotentiaries, was.

Adams and Goulburn said it was sent to them from England; they were not to account for the motive of their Government in proposing that or any other article.

Mr. Bayard said he did not ask them for the motive of their Government, but for the object of the article. He supposed gentlemen would at least be authorized to explain that.

Dr. Adams said they had sent us the article as they had received it, and we must construe it for ourselves; he had only said (and it was merely his individual opinion; he would not wish to be understood as pledging the opinion of his Government, or even of his colleagues), but he had said he thought we might easily agree to an article with a proviso reserving our claim to the right by the Treaty of 1783.

Mr. Gallatin asked, if we could find any expedient to come to an agreement upon the other article, whether the British Plenipotentiaries were authorized to accede to any modification of this, so that we might sign the treaty, without another reference to England.

Mr. Goulburn said they did not know. We had sent them three alternatives for their last paragraph

of the eighth article. One of these alternatives had been adopted in England, and sent back to them, modified into this article. We had offered them the navigation of the Mississippi, clogged with conditions which would render it of no effect, confining their access to a single point, and upon a payment of full duties upon merchandise intended merely to pass through our territories for exportation.

Mr. Gallatin said that had not been our intention. The access would be given sufficient for all the purposes of transporting the merchandise, and by our laws a drawback from the duties was allowed upon the exportation of goods—the benefit of which would be allowed, of course, to the merchandise only passing through for exportation. “But surely,” said he, “you could not expect to introduce into the United States your goods and merchandise duty free.”

“And,” said Mr. Clay, “as you had drawn the first paragraph, you might have gone from Quebec through any part of our territories.”

Mr. Goulburn said, “No, that was not their intention.”

Mr. Gallatin then took the Mississippi and fisheries article, proposed some alterations to it, and, Mr. Goulburn hesitating upon them, Gallatin said that we labored under great inconvenience and disadvantage in the negotiation. We had no opportunity of communicating with our Government, and were continually obliged to take responsibility upon ourselves, while they referred to their Government for every detail. . . .

22d. . . . As soon as I came into my chamber, Mr. Gallatin brought me the [British] note. It agrees to be silent upon the navigation of the Mississippi and the fisheries, and to strike out the whole of the eighth article. . . .

Mr. Clay soon after came into my chamber, and, on reading the British note, manifested some chagrin. He still talked of breaking off the negotiation, but he did not exactly disclose the motive of his ill humor, which was, however, easily seen through. He would have much preferred the proposed eighth article, with the proposed British paragraph, formally admitting that the British right to navigate the Mississippi, and the American right to the fisheries within British jurisdiction, were both abrogated by the war. I think his conversation with Lord Gambier on the subject last week, at their dinner, the day before we sent our note, had the tendency to induce the British to adhere to their paragraph, and that Clay is disappointed at their having given it up; and he has so entire an ascendancy over Mr. Russell, though a New England man and claiming to be a Massachusetts man, that Russell repeatedly told me last week, when I assured him that I would not sign the treaty with an article admitting that our right to any part of the fisheries was forfeited, that he should be sorry to sign a treaty without me, but that he did not think that part of the fisheries an object for which the war should be continued; that he was for insisting upon it as long as possible, but for giving it up at last, if the British would not sign with-

out it. We agreed to meet at half-past seven o'clock this evening. . . .

24th. . . . A few mistakes in the copies were rectified, and then the six copies were signed and sealed by the three British and the five American Plenipotentiaries. Lord Gambier delivered to me the three British copies, and I delivered to him the three American copies, of the treaty, which he said he hoped would be permanent; and I told him I hoped it would be the last treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States. We left them at half-past six o'clock. . . .

25th. Christmas-day. The day of all others in the year most congenial to proclaiming peace on earth and good will to men. . . .

. . . We received shortly after dinner a note from the Intendant, informing us that he had just received an official communication of the conclusion of the peace, and inviting us to dine with him on Wednesday next, to celebrate the event. . . .

27th. . . . Mr. Gallatin had suggested . . . that we ought to make to the British Government an official communication of our full power to negotiate a treaty of commerce. The proposition was now renewed, and after some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Gallatin should make a draft of a note for that purpose. . . .

[28th.] Lord Gambier told me that . . . he heard we were to send them a note, proposing the negotiation of a treaty of commerce. Mr. Clay had

met this morning Mr. Goulburn and Dr. Adams, and given them the information. Dr. Adams said that their powers were expired, and he doubted whether they could even receive the note. . . .

[January 5, 1815.] . . . Another important question arose, how we were to dress for the banquet of this day. To settle it, Mr. Smith, at my request, called upon Mr. Goulburn, and enquired how he proposed to go. He answered, in uniform, and we accordingly all went in uniform. The banquet was at the Hôtel de Ville, and was given by subscription by the principal gentlemen of the city. We sat down to table about five o'clock, in the largest hall of the building, fitted up for the occasion with white cotton hangings. The American and British flags were intertwined together under olive-trees, at the head of the hall. Mr. Goulburn and myself were seated between the Intendant and the Mayor, at the center of the cross-piece of the table. There were about ninety persons seated at the table. As we went into the hall, "Hail Columbia" was performed by the band of music. It was followed by "God Save the King," and these two airs were alternately repeated during the dinner-time, until Mr. Goulburn thought they became tiresome. I was of the same opinion.

The Intendant and the Mayor alternately toasted "His Britannic Majesty," and "the United States," "the Allied Powers," and "the Sovereign Prince," "the Negotiators," and "the Peace." I then remarked to Mr. Goulburn that he must give the next toast,

which he did. It was "the Intendant and the Mayor; the City of Ghent, its prosperity; and our gratitude for their hospitality and the many acts of kindness that we had received from them." I gave the next and last toast, which was, "Ghent, the city of peace; may the gates of the temple of Janus, here closed, not be opened again for a century!" . . .

OUR FIRST PROTECTIVE TARIFF

By John Randolph, of Roanoke

RANDOLPH was a planter as well as a Democratic Congressman and Senator from Virginia. A proud and haughty descendant of Pocohontas, he was renowned for his eloquence, wit, sarcasm, invective and eccentricity. He seldom wrote or spoke without denouncing something or somebody. He opposed the War of 1812, and the Missouri Compromise, stigmatizing the Northern Members of Congress who voted for the latter as "doughfaces." Yet, in his will, he manumitted his 318 slaves, and provided for their maintenance in a free state.

After the War of 1812 Randolph was a firm advocate of States' rights, although he had earlier broken with Jefferson on that principle. In this speech, delivered in 1816, he denounces our first protective tariff measure as a blow aimed at the agricultural, as distinguished from the manufacturing, interests of the country. The economic conditions following the War of 1812 brought the tariff question before the country where it has remained for over a century.

do that which, if it be advantageous to do at all, they will do, of course, for their own sakes; a largess to

MY honorable colleague (Mr. Shefey) has said, that the case of the manufacturers is not fairly before the House. True! it is not fairly before the House. It never can be fairly before the House; whenever it comes before us, it must come unfairly, not as "a spirit of health—but a goblin damned"—not "bringing with it airs from Heaven, but blasts from Hell"—it ought to be exorcised out of the House: for, what do the principles about which such a contest is maintained amount to, but a system of bounties to manufacturers, in order to encourage them to

men to exercise their own customary callings, for their own emolument; and Government devising plans, and bestowing premiums out of the pockets of the hard working cultivator of the soil, to mold the productive labor of the country into a thousand fantastic shapes; barring up, all the time, for that perverted purpose, the great, deep, rich stream of our prosperous industry.

Such a case, sir, I agree with the honorable gentleman, cannot be fairly brought before the House. It eventuates in this: whether you, as a planter will consent to be taxed, in order to hire another man to go to work in a shoemaker's shop, or to set up a spinning jenny. For my part I will not agree to it, even though they should, by way of return, agree to be taxed to help us to plant tobacco; much less will I agree to pay all, and receive nothing for it. No, I will buy where I can get manufactures cheapest; I will not agree to lay a duty on the cultivators of the soil to encourage exotic manufactures; because, after all, we should only get much worse things at a much higher price, and we, the cultivators of the country, would in the end pay all. Why do no gentlemen ask us to grant a bounty for the encouragement of making flour?—the reason is too plain for me to repeat it; then why pay a man much more than the value for it, to work up our own cotton into clothing, when, by selling my raw material, I can get my clothing much better and cheaper from Dacca.

Sir, I am convinced that it would be impolitic, as well as unjust, to aggravate the burdens of the people,

for the purpose of favoring the manufacturers; for this government created and gave power to Congress, to regulate commerce and equalize duties on the whole of the United States, and not to lay a duty but with a steady eye to revenue. With my good will, sir, there should be none but an *ad valorem* duty on all articles, which would prevent the possibility of one interest in the country being sacrificed, by the management of taxation, to another.

What is there in those objects of the honorable gentleman's solicitude, to give them a claim to be supported by the earnings of the others? The agriculturists bear the whole brunt of the war and taxation, and remain poor, while the others run in the ring of pleasure, and fatten upon them. The agriculturists not only pay all, but fight all, while the others run. The manufacturer is the citizen of no place, or any place; the agriculturist has his property, his lands, his all, his household gods to defend; and, like that meek drudge, the ox, who does the labor, and ploughs the ground, and then, for his reward, takes the refuse of the farm yard, the blighted blades and the mouldy straw, and the mildewed shocks of corn for his support;—while the commercial speculators live in opulence, whirling in coaches, and indulging in palaces; to use the words of Dr. Johnson, coaches, which fly like meteors, and palaces, which rise like exhalations. Even without your aid, the agriculturists are no match for them. Alert, vigilant, enterprising, and active, the manufacturing interests are collected in masses,

and ready to associate at a moment's warning, for any purpose of general interest to their body. Do but ring the fire bell, and you can assemble all the manufacturing interests of Philadelphia, in fifteen minutes. Nay, for matter of that, they are always assembled, they are always on the Rialto; and Shylock and Antonio meet there every day, as friends, and compare notes, and lay plans, and possess in trick and intelligence, what, in the goodness of God to them, the others can never possess.

It is the choicest bounty to the ox that he cannot play the fox or the tiger. So it is to one of the body of agriculturists that he cannot skip into a coffee-house, and shave a note with one hand, while with the other he signs a petition to Congress, portraying the wrongs and grievances and sufferings he endures, and begging them to relieve him; yes, to relieve him out of the pockets of those whose labors have fed and enriched, and whose valor has defended them. The cultivators, the patient drudges of the other orders of society, are now waiting for your resolution. For, on you it depends, whether they shall be left further unhurt, or be, like those in Europe reduced, gradatim, and subjected to another squeeze from the hard grasp of power. Sir, I have done.

DISARMAMENT ON THE LAKES

By President James Monroe

IN negotiating the Treaty of Ghent, Albert Gallatin wanted to propose mutual disarmament by both nations on the Great Lakes, but was overruled by his colleagues. Immediately after the peace, Great Britain, fearing future attacks on Canada, prepared to strengthen her defenses on the Canadian-American frontier. Hearing of this, President Madison ordered his minister at London "to propose such an arrangement respecting the naval force to be kept on the lakes by both governments as will demonstrate their pacific policy and secure their peace."

As a sequel, disarmament was secured, not by a formal treaty, but by an "agreement effected by interchange of notes" at Washington; followed, on April 28, 1818, by this proclamation of President Monroe, giving what is known as the Rush-Bagot agreement full force and effect.

This joint agreement has done more than anything else to preserve the peace for over a century between the United States and the British Empire.

WHEREAS, an arrangement was entered into at the City of Washington, in the month of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, between Richard Rush, esquire, at that time acting as Secretary for the Department of State of the United States, for and in behalf of the government of the United States, and the Right Honorable Charles Bagot, His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, for and in behalf of His Britannic Majesty, which arrangement is in the words following, to wit:

"The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by His Majesty and the Government of the

United States shall henceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side, that is—

“On Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding one hundred tons burden, and armed with one eighteen pound cannon.

“On the Upper Lakes, to two vessels not exceeding like burden each, and armed with like force.

“On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding like burden, and armed with like force.

“All other armed vessels on these lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed.

“If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice.

“The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such services as will, in no respect, interfere with the proper duties of the armed vessels of the other party.”

And whereas the Senate of the United States have approved of the said arrangement, and recommended that it should be carried into effect, the same having also received the sanction of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf of His Britannic Majesty.

Now, therefore, I, James Monroe, President of the United States, do, by this my proclamation, make known and declare that the arrangement aforesaid,

and every stipulation thereof, has been duly entered into, concluded and confirmed, and is of full force and effect. . . .

THE FIRST SEMINOLE WAR

By James Parton

PARTON, in his "Life of Jackson," gives this most interesting and trustworthy account of the campaign General Andrew Jackson conducted against the Florida Seminoles in 1817-18. Parton was almost contemporary with the period, having been born in 1822.

The American invasion of Florida, then Spanish territory, was provoked by depredations the Indians had committed at the instigation of the English traders, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, who were hanged by order of Jackson after a court-martial trial. The case aroused much controversy, the majority of the military committee of the House of Representatives condemning the action. It was approved by the House, however, on a vote of 103 to 62.

During the discussion the Spanish minister signed a treaty ceding Florida to the United States. Had Jackson failed in his campaign, it is unlikely that the treaty would have been negotiated.

son's visit to Washington on this occasion was in obedience to an order, couched in the language of an invitation, received from the Secretary of war soon after his return from New Orleans; the object

UPON the conclusion of peace with Great Britain the army was reduced to ten thousand men, commanded by two major-generals, one of whom was to reside at the North and command the troops stationed there, and the other to bear military sway at the South. The generals selected for these commands were General Jacob Brown for the Northern division, and General Andrew Jackson for the Southern, both of whom had entered the service at the beginning of the late war as generals of militia. General Jack-

of his visit being to arrange the posts and stations of the army.

The feeling was general at the time that the disasters of the War of 1812 was chiefly due to the defenseless and unprepared condition of the country, and that it was the first duty of the Government, on the return of peace, to see to it that the assailable points were fortified. "Let us never be caught napping again"; "In time of peace prepare for war," were popular sayings then. On these and all other subjects connected with the defense of the country the advice of General Jackson was asked and given. His own duty, it was evident, was first of all to pacify, and if possible satisfy, the restless and sorrowful Indians in the Southwest. The vanquished tribe, it was agreed, should be dealt with forbearingly and liberally. The general undertook to go in person into the Indian country and remove from their minds all discontent. He did so.

It is not possible to overstate his popularity in his own State. He was its pride, boast and glory. Tennesseans felt a personal interest in his honor and success. His old enemies either sought reconciliation with him or kept their enmity to themselves. His rank in the army, too, gave him unequaled social eminence; and, to add to the other felicities of his lot, his fortune now rapidly increased, as the entire income of his estate could be added to his capital, the pay of a major-general being sufficient for the support of his family. He was forty-nine years old in

1816. He had riches, rank, power, renown, and all in full measure.

But in 1817 there was trouble again among the Indians—the Indians of Florida, the allies of Great Britain during the War of 1812, commonly known by the name of Seminoles. Composed in part of fugitive Creeks, who scouted the treaty of Fort Jackson, they had indulged the expectation that on the conclusion of peace they would be restored by their powerful ally to the lands wrested from the Creeks by Jackson's conquering army in 1814. This poor remnant of tribes once so numerous and powerful had not a thought, at first, of attempting to regain the lost lands by force of arms. The best testimony now procurable confirms their own solemnly reiterated assertions that they long desired and endeavored to live in peace with the white settlers of Georgia. All their "talks," petitions, remonstrances, letters, of which a large number are still accessible, breathe only the wish for peace and fair dealing. The Seminoles were drawn at last into a collision with the United States by a chain of circumstances with which they had little to do, and the responsibility of which belongs not to them.

The Government, in the absence of a general officer from the scene of hostilities, resolved upon ordering General Jackson to take command in person of the troops upon the frontiers of Georgia. On the 22d of January, General Jackson and his "guard" left Nashville amid the cheers of the entire popula-

tion. The distance from Nashville to Fort Scott is about four hundred and fifty miles. In the evening of March 9th, forty-six days after leaving Nashville, he reached Fort Scott with eleven hundred hungry men. No tidings yet of the Tennessee troops under Colonel Hayne! There was no time to spend, however, in waiting or surmising. The general found himself at Fort Scott in command of two thousand men, and his whole stock of provisions one quart of corn and three rations of meat per man. There was no supply in his rear, for he had swept the country on his line of march of every bushel of corn and every animal fit for food. He had his choice of two courses only: to remain at Fort Scott and starve, or to go forward and find provisions. It is not necessary to say which of these alternatives Andrew Jackson selected. "Accordingly," he wrote, "having been advised by Colonel Gibson, quartermaster-general, that he would sail from New Orleans on the 12th of February with supplies, and being also advised that two sloops with provisions were in the bay, and an officer had been dispatched from Fort Scott in a large keel-boat to bring up a part of their loading, and deeming that the preservation of these supplies would be to preserve the army, and enable me to prosecute the campaign, I assumed the command on the morning of the 10th, ordered the live stock to be slaughtered and issued to the troops, with one quart of corn to each man, and the line of march to be taken up at twelve meridian."

It was necessary to cross the swollen river, an operation which consumed all the afternoon, all the dark night succeeding, and a part of the next morning. Five days' march along the banks of the Appalachicola—past the scene of the massacre of Lieutenant Scott—brought the army to the site of the old Negro Fort on Prospect Bluff. On the way, however, the army, to its great joy, met the ascending boat-load of flour, when the men had their first full meal since leaving Fort Early, three weeks before. Upon the site of the Negro Fort, General Jackson ordered his aide, Lieutenant Gadsden, of the engineers, to construct a fortification, which was promptly done, and named by the general Fort Gadsden, in honor, as he said, of the "talents and indefatigable zeal" of the builder. . . .

On the 6th of April the army reached St. Marks, and halted in the vicinity of the fort. The general sent in to the Governor his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, bearing a letter explanatory of his objects and purposes. He had come, he said, "to chastise a savage foe, who, combined with a lawless band of negro brigands, had been for some time past carrying on a cruel and unprovoked war against the citizens of the United States." He had already met and put to flight parties of the hostile Indians. He had received information that those Indians had fled to St. Marks and found protection within its walls; that both Indians and negroes had procured supplies of ammunition there; and that the Spanish garrison,

from the smallness of its numbers, was unable to resist the demands of the savages.

“To prevent the recurrence of so gross a violation of neutrality, and to exclude our savage enemies from so strong a hold as St. Marks, I deem it expedient to garrison that fortress with American troops until the close of the present war. This measure is justifiable on the immutable principle of self-defense, and cannot but be satisfactory, under existing circumstances, to his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain.” [So added Jackson.]

The Governor replied that he had been made to understand General Jackson’s letter only with the greatest difficulty, as there was no one within the fort who could properly translate it. He denied that the Indians and negroes had ever obtained supplies, succor, or encouragement from Fort St. Marks. On the contrary, they had menaced the fort with assault because supplies had been refused them. With regard to delivering up the fort entrusted to his care, he had no authority to do so, and must write on the subject to his Government. Meanwhile he prayed General Jackson to suspend his operations. “The sick your Excellency sent in,” concluded the polite Governor, “are lodged in the Royal Hospital, and I have afforded them every aid which circumstances admit. I hope your Excellency will give me other opportunities of evincing the desire I have to satisfy you. I trust your Excellency will pardon my not answering you as soon as requested, for reasons which have been given you by your aide-de-camp. I do

not accompany this with an English translation, as your Excellency desires, because there is no one in the fort capable thereof, but the before-named William Hambly proposes to translate it to your Excellency in the best manner he can."

This was delivered to General Jackson on the morning of the 7th of April. He instantly replied to it by taking possession of the fort! The Spanish flag was lowered, the Stars and Stripes floated from the flag-staff, and American troops took up their quarters within the fortress. The Governor made no resistance, and indeed could make none. When all was over, he sent to General Jackson a formal protest against his proceedings, to which the General briefly replied: "The occupancy of Fort St. Marks by my troops previous to your assenting to the measure became necessary from the difficulties thrown in the way of an amicable adjustment, notwithstanding my assurances that every arrangement should be made to your satisfaction, and expressing a wish that my movements against our common enemy should not be retarded by a tedious negotiation. I again repeat what has been reiterated to you through my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Gadsden, that your personal rights and private property shall be respected, that your situation shall be made as comfortable as practicable while compelled to remain in Fort St. Marks, and that transports shall be furnished, as soon as they can be obtained to convey yourself, family, and command to Pensacola."

Alexander Arbuthnot, a Scotch trader among the Indians, was found within the fort, an inmate of the Governor's own quarters. It appears that on the arrival of General Jackson he was preparing to leave St. Marks. His horse, saddled and bridled, was standing at the gate. General Jackson had no sooner taken possession of St. Marks than Arbuthnot became a prisoner. "In Fort St. Marks," wrote General Jackson, "an inmate in the family of the Spanish commandant, an Englishman by the name of Arbuthnot was found. Unable satisfactorily to explain the object of his visiting this country, and there being a combination of circumstances to justify a suspicion that his views were not honest, he was ordered into close confinement."

For two days only the army remained at Fort St. Marks. Suwanee, the far-famed and dreaded Suwanee, the town of the great chief Boleck, or Bowlegs, the refuge of negroes, was General Jackson's next object. It was one hundred and seven miles from St. Marks, and the route lay through a flat and swampy wilderness, little known and destitute of forage. On the 9th of April, leaving a strong garrison at the fort, and supplying the troops with rations for eight days, the general again plunged into the forest—the white troops in advance, the Indians, under General McIntosh, a few miles in the rear.

The army made slow progress, wading through extensive sheets of water; the horses starving for want of forage, and giving out daily in large numbers. Late

in the afternoon of the third day the troops reached a "remarkable pond," which the Indian guides said was only six miles from Suwanee town. At sunset the lines were formed, and the whole army rushed forward.

But the prey had been forewarned. A letter from Arbuthnot to his son had reached the place and had been explained to Bowlegs, who had been ever since employed in sending the women and children across the broad Suwanee into those inaccessible retreats which render Florida the best place in the world for such warfare as Indians wage. The troops reached the vicinity of the town, and in a few minutes drove out the enemy and captured the place. The pursuit was continued on the following morning by General Gaines; but the foe had vanished by a hundred paths, and were no more seen. . . .

In the evening of April 17th the whole army encamped on the level banks of the Suwanee. In the dead of night an incident occurred which can here be related in the language of the same young Tennessee officer who has already narrated for us the capture of the chiefs and their execution. Fortunately for us, he kept a journal of the campaign. This journal, written at the time partly with a decoction of roots and partly with the blood of the journalist—for ink was not attainable—lay for forty years among his papers, and was copied at length by the obliging hand of his daughter for the readers of these pages.

"About midnight of April 18th," wrote our journalist, "the repose of the army, then bivouacked on the plains of the old town of Suwanee, was suddenly disturbed by the deep-toned report of a musket, instantly followed by a sharp crack of the American rifle. The signal to arms was given, and where but a moment before could only be heard the measured tread of the sentinels and the low moaning of the long-leaved pines, now stood five thousand men, armed, watchful, and ready for action. The cause of the alarm was soon made known. Four men, two whites and two negroes, had been captured while attempting to enter the camp. They were taken in charge by the guard, and the army again sank to such repose as war allows her votaries. When morning came it was ascertained that the prisoners were Robert C. Ambrister, a white attendant named Peter B. Cook, and two negro servants—Ambrister being a nephew of the English governor, Cameron, of the Island of New Providence, an ex-lieutenant of British marines, and suspected of being engaged in the business of counseling and furnishing munitions of war to the Indians in furtherance of their contest with the United States.

Ignorant of the situation of the American camp, he had blundered into it while endeavoring to reach Suwanee town to meet the Indians, being also unaware that the latter had been driven thence on the previous day by Jackson."

Ambrister was conducted to St. Marks and placed in confinement, together with his companions. The fact that through Arbuthnot the Suwanee people had escaped, thus rendering the last swift march comparatively fruitless, was calculated, it must be owned, to exasperate General Jackson.

The Seminole War, so called, was over, for the time. On the 20th of April the Georgia troops marched homeward to be disbanded. On the 24th, General McIntosh and his brigade of Indians were dismissed. On the 25th General Jackson, with his Tennesseans and regulars, was again at Fort St. Marks. It was forty-six days since he had entered Florida, and thirteen weeks since he left Nashville.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By President James Monroe

THE Monroe Doctrine, so-called, was a growth, the germinal seeds of which were planted in the virgin soil of the Republic. Rooted in the conviction that the United States should not become involved in European broils, it was brought to maturity by President Monroe in 1823 when, in a message to Congress, he definitely forbade foreign colonization and intervention in this hemisphere.

The colonization passage referred to a boundary dispute in the northwest between Russia, Great Britain and the United States. The intervention passage related to the proposed action of the Holy Alliance toward reimposing the Spanish yoke upon South American colonies then in revolt, the independence of which the United States had recognized.

The development of the historic doctrine may be traced in the accompanying extracts taken from his messages and addresses dating from March 4, 1817, to December 7, 1824.

DANGERS from abroad are not less deserving of attention. Experiencing the fortune of other nations, the United States may be again involved in war, and it may in that event be the object of the adverse party to upset our government, to break our Union, and demolish us as a nation. Our distance from Europe and the just, moderate and pacific policy of our government may form some security against these dangers, but they ought to be anticipated and guarded against. . . . (March 4, 1817.)

It was anticipated at an early stage that the contest between Spain and the colonies would become highly interesting to the United States. It was natural that our citizens should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors.

It seemed probable also that the prosecution of the conflict along our coast and in contiguous countries would occasionally interrupt our commerce and otherwise affect the persons and property of our citizens. These anticipations have been realized. Such injuries have been received from persons acting under authority of both the parties, and for which redress has in most instances been withheld. Through every stage of the conflict the United States have maintained an impartial neutrality, giving aid to neither of the parties in men, money, ships, or munitions of war. They have regarded the contest not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights. Our ports have been open to both, and every article the fruit of our soil or of the industry of our citizens which either was permitted to take has been equally free to the other. Should the colonies establish their independence, it is proper now to state that this government neither seeks nor would accept from them any advantage in commerce or otherwise which will not be equally open to all other nations. The colonies will in that event become independent States, free from any obligation to or connection with us which it may not then be their interest to form on the basis of a fair reciprocity. . . . (December 2, 1817.)

By a circular note addressed by the ministers of Spain to the allied powers, with whom they are respectively accredited, it appears that the allies have

undertaken to mediate between Spain and the South American provinces, and that the manner and extent of their interposition would be settled by a congress which was to have met at Aix-la-Chapelle in September last. From the general policy and course of proceeding observed by the allied powers in regard to this contest it is inferred that they will confine their interposition to the expression of their sentiments, abstaining from the application of force. I state this impression that force will not be applied with the greater satisfaction because it is a course more consistent with justice and likewise authorizes a hope that the calamities of the war will be confined to the parties only, and will be of shorter duration.

From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the information that we have been able to obtain, there is good cause to be satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs. . . . (November 16, 1818.)

This contest has from its commencement been very interesting to other powers, and to none more so than to the United States. A virtuous people may and will confine themselves within the limit of a strict neutrality; but it is not in their power to behold a conflict so vitally important to their neighbors without the sensibility and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case. It has been the steady purpose of this government to prevent that feeling leading to excess,

and it is very gratifying to have it in my power to state that so strong has been the sense throughout the whole community of what was due to the character and obligations of the nation that very few examples of a contrary kind have occurred.

The distance of the colonies from the parent country and the great extent of their population and resources gave them advantages which it was anticipated at a very early period would be difficult for Spain to surmount. The steadiness, consistency, and success with which they have pursued their object, as evinced more particularly by the undisturbed sovereignty which Buenos Ayres has so long enjoyed, evidently give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations. These sentiments on the part of the United States have not been withheld from other powers, with whom it is desirable to act in concert. Should it become manifest to the world that the efforts of Spain to subdue these provinces will be fruitless, it may be presumed that the Spanish Government itself will give up the contest. In producing such a determination it can not be doubted that the opinion of friendly powers who have taken no part in the controversy will have their merited influence. . . . (December 7, 1819.)

. . . No facts are known to this government to warrant the belief that any of the powers of Europe will take part in the contest, whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which must have weight in producing the result, that an adjustment will

finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To promote that result by friendly counsels with other powers, including Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this government. . . . (November 14, 1820.)

This contest was considered at an early stage by my predecessor a civil war in which the parties were entitled to equal rights in our ports. This decision, the first made by any power, being formed on great consideration of the comparative strength and resources of the parties, the length of time, and successful opposition made by the colonies, and of all other circumstances on which it ought to depend, was in strict accord with the law of nations. . . . (March 5, 1821.)

. . . It has long been manifest that it would be impossible for Spain to reduce these colonies by force, and equally so that no conditions short of their independence would be satisfactory to them. It may therefore be presumed, and it is earnestly hoped, that the government of Spain, guided by enlightened and liberal councils, will find it to comport with its interests and due to its magnanimity to terminate this exhausting controversy on that basis. To promote this result by friendly counsel with the government of Spain will be the object of the government of the United States. . . . (December 3, 1821.)

At the proposal of the Russian imperial government, made through the minister of the emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been

transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. . . . In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangements by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . .

. . . The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and

treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . .

. . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are emi-

nently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. . . . (December 2, 1823.)

. . . these new States are settling down under governments elective and representative in every branch, similar to our own. In this course we ardently wish them to persevere, under a firm conviction that it will promote their happiness. In this, their career, however, we have not interfered, believing that every people have a right to institute for themselves the government which, in their judgment, may suit them best. Our example is before them, of the good effect of which, being our neighbors, they are competent judges, and to their judgment we leave it, in the expectation that other powers will pursue the same policy. The deep interest which we take in their independence, which we have acknowledged, and in their enjoyment of all the rights incident thereto, especially in the very important one of instituting their own governments, has been declared, and is known to the world. Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European governments nor in the causes which produce them. The balance of power

between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its various vibrations, can not affect us. It is the interest of the United States to preserve the most friendly relations with every power and on conditions fair, equal and applicable to all. But in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns, especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is gratifying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them. (December 7, 1824.)

DEFINING THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

By John Marshall, Chief-Justice of the United States Supreme Court

*I*N writing the decision in the celebrated bank case of *McCulloch vs. Maryland*, from which this extract is taken, Chief-Justice Marshall clearly defines the relations between the State and Federal governments. Holding to Federalist theories, this most famous of American jurists has never been excelled in the capacity to present a legal proposition from every angle, resolving an argument by the most subtle analysis into its ultimate principles, and applying them to the decision of the case in question.

As Chief-Justice for thirty-four years, he so expounded the Constitution as to make clear for the first time the nature of the National government and to forecast the lines along which, in actual development as well as in judicial interpretation, the nation was to proceed. The case in which Marshall delivered this decision was argued in 1819.

and minutely described. . . . A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could

THE first question made in the cause is, has Congress power to incorporate a bank? . . .

This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. . . .

Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that every thing granted shall be expressly

scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deducted from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American Constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. Why else were some of the limitations, found in the 9th section of the 1st article, introduced? It is also, in some degree warranted by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a Constitution we are expounding.

Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word "bank," or "incorporation," we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are intrusted to its government.

It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance, merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced. But it may, with great reason, be con-

tended, that a government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate means. Throughout this vast Republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and expended, armies are to be marched and supported. The exigencies of the nation may require, that the treasure raised in the North should be transported to the South, that raised in the East conveyed to the West, or that this order should be reversed. Is that construction of the Constitution to be preferred which would render these operations difficult, hazardous, and expensive? Can we adopt that construction, (unless the words imperiously require it,) which would impute to the framers of that instrument, when granting these powers for the public good, the intention of impeding their exercise by withholding a choice of means? . . .

It is not denied, that the powers given to the government imply the ordinary means of execution. That, for example, of raising revenue, and applying it to national purposes, is admitted to imply the power of conveying money from place to place, as the exigencies of the nation may require, and of employing

the usual means of conveyance. But it is denied that the government has its choice of means; or, that it may employ the most convenient means, if, to employ them, it be necessary to erect a corporation. . . .

. . . The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else. No sufficient reason is, therefore, perceived, why it may not pass as incidental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct mode of executing them.

But the Constitution of the United States has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added that of making "all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof."

The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged various arguments, to prove that this clause, though in terms a grant of power, is not so in effect; but is really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated powers. . . .

But the argument on which most reliance is placed, is drawn from the peculiar language of this clause. Congress is not empowered by it to make all laws, which may have relation to the powers conferred on the government, but such only as may be "necessary

and proper" for carrying them into execution. The word "necessary" is considered as controlling the whole sentence, and as limiting the right to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable, and without which the power would be nugatory. That it excludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress, in each case, that only which is most direct and simple.

Is it true, that this is the sense in which the word "necessary" is always used? Does it always import an absolute physical necessity, so strong, that one thing, to which another may be termed necessary, cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. . . . It is essential to just construction, that many words which import something excessive, should be understood in a more mitigated sense—in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary" is of this description . . . in its construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using them, are all to be taken into view.

Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in

a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of construction to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to discard it. . . .

Take, for example, the power "to establish post-offices and post-roads." This power is executed by the single act of making the establishment. But, from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post-road, from one post-office to another. And, from this implied power, has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters from the post-office, or rob the mail. It may be said, with some plausibility, that the right to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is not indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post-

office and post-road. This right is, indeed, essential to the beneficial exercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to its existence. . . .

If this limited construction of the word "necessary" must be abandoned in order to punish, whence is derived the rule which would reinstate it, when the government would carry its powers into execution by means not vindictive in their nature? If the word "necessary" means "needful," "requisite," "essential," "conducive to," in order to let in the power of punishment for the infraction of law, why is it not equally comprehensive when required to authorize the use of means which facilitate the execution of the powers of government without the infliction of punishment? . . .

But the argument which most conclusively demonstrates the error of the construction contended for by the counsel for the State of Maryland, is founded on the intention of the convention, as manifested in the whole clause. To waste time and argument in proving that, without it, Congress might carry its powers into execution, would be not much less idle than to hold a lighted taper to the sun. . . .

The result of the most careful and attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government. If no other motive for its

insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.

We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.

AN APPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE

By Thomas Jefferson

THE Missouri Compromise was the first of the great measures that followed the spirit of mutual accommodation found in the Constitution itself. It was an arrangement between the free and slave States, embodied in an Act of Congress approved March 6, 1820, which provided for the admission of Missouri into the Union as a slave State, but which prohibited slavery in all other Louisiana territory north of the southern boundary line of Missouri.

Jefferson betrays both apprehension and alarm for the future of the Union, in these three letters written in 1820. It is the Southern view of a lukewarm slaveholder. Following it is the Northern view taken from the journal of John Quincy Adams, then (1820) Secretary of State. His prophecy of civil war, in the third paragraph, was fulfilled in 1861. Niles, whose moderate view follows, founded (1815) and edited "Niles' Weekly Register," the files of which are an invaluable record of contemporary events.

that it would be recurring on every occasion and renewing irritations, until it would kindle such mutual and mortal hatred, as to render separation preferable

ALTHOUGH I had laid down as a law to myself, never to write, talk, or even think of politics, to know nothing of public affairs, and therefore had ceased to read newspapers, yet the Missouri question aroused and filled me with alarm. The old schism of Federal and Republican threatened nothing, because it existed in every State, and united them together by the fraternism of party. But the coincidence of a marked principle, moral and political, with a geographical line, once conceived, I feared would never more be obliterated from the mind;

to eternal discord. I have been among the most sanguine in believing that our Union would be of long duration. I now doubt it much, and see the event at no great distance, and the direct consequence of this question; not by the line which has been so confidently counted on; the laws of nature control this; but by the Potomac, Ohio and Missouri, or more probably, the Mississippi upwards to our northern boundary. . . .

I CAN say, with conscious truth, that there is not a man on earth who would sacrifice more than I would to relieve us from this heavy reproach, in any practicable way. The cession of that kind of property, for so it is misnamed, is a bagatelle which would not cost me a second thought, if, in that way, a general emancipation and expatriation could be effected; and, gradually, and with due sacrifices, I think it might be. But as it is, we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.

Of one thing I am certain, that as the passage of slaves from one State to another, would not make a slave of a single human being who would not be so without it, so their diffusion over a greater surface would make them individually happier, and proportionally facilitate the accomplishment of their emancipation, by dividing the burden on a greater number of coadjutors. An abstinence too, from this act of power, would remove the jealousy excited by the

undertaking of Congress to regulate the condition of the different descriptions of men composing a State. This certainly is the exclusive right of every State, which nothing in the Constitution has taken from them and given to the general government. Could Congress, for example, say, that the non-freemen of Connecticut shall be freemen, or that they shall not emigrate into any other State?

I regret that I am now to die in the belief, that the useless sacrifice of themselves by the generation of 1776, to acquire self-government and happiness to their country, is to be thrown away by the unwise and unworthy passions of their sons, and that my only consolation is to be, that I live not to weep over it. If they would but dispassionately weigh the blessings they will throw away, against an abstract principle more likely to be effected by union than by scission, they would pause before they would perpetrate this act of suicide on themselves, and of treason against the hopes of the world. . . .

THE Missouri Question is a mere party trick. The leaders of federalism, defeated in their schemes of obtaining power by rallying partisans to the principle of monarchism, a principle of personal not of local division, have changed their tack, and thrown out another barrel to the whale. They are taking advantage of the virtuous feelings of the people to effect a division of parties by a geographical line; they expect that this will insure them, on local principles,

the majority they could never obtain on principles of federalism; but they are still putting their shoulder to the wrong wheel; they are wasting Jeremiads on the miseries of slavery, as if we were advocates for it. Sincerity in their declamations should direct their efforts to the true point of difficulty, and unite their counsels with ours in devising some reasonable and practicable plan of getting rid of it.

Some of these leaders, if they could attain the power, their ambition would rather use it to keep the Union together, but others have ever had in view its separation. If they push it to that, they will find the line of separation very different from their 36° of latitude, and as manufacturing and navigating States, they will have quarrelled with their bread and butter, and I fear not that after a little trial they will think better of it, and return to the embraces of their natural and best friends. But this scheme of party I leave to those who are to live under its consequences. We who have gone before have performed an honest duty, by putting in the power of our successors a state of happiness which no nation ever before had within their choice. If that choice is to throw it away, the dead will have neither the power nor the right to control them. I must hope, nevertheless, that the mass of our honest and well-meaning brethren of the other States, will discover the use which designing leaders are making of their best feelings, and will see the precipice to which they are lead, before they take the fatal leap. . . .

A NORTHERN VIEW OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE

By John Quincy Adams

I HAD some conversation with Calhoun on the slave question pending in Congress. He said he did not think it would produce a dissolution of the Union, but, if it should, the South would be from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain.

I said that would be returning to the colonial state.

He said, yes, pretty much, but it would be forced upon them. I asked him whether he thought, if by the effect of this alliance, offensive and defensive, the population of the North should be cut off from its natural outlet upon the ocean, it would fall back upon its rocks bound hand and foot, to starve, or whether it would not retain its powers of locomotion to move southward by land. Then, he said, they would find it necessary to make their communities all military. I pressed the conversation no further; but if the dissolution of the Union should result from the slave question, it is as obvious as anything that can be foreseen of futurity, that it must shortly afterwards be followed by the universal emancipation of the slaves. . . .

After this meeting, I walked home with Calhoun, who said that the principles which I had avowed were just and noble; but that in the Southern country,

whenever they were mentioned, they were always understood as applying only to white men. Domestic labor was confined to the blacks, and such was the prejudice, that if he, who was the most popular man in his district, were to keep a white servant in his house, his character and reputation would be irretrievably ruined.

I said that this confounding of the ideas of servitude and labor was one of the bad effects of slavery; but he thought it attended with many excellent consequences. It did not apply to all kinds of labor—not, for example, to farming. He himself had often held the plough; so had his father. Manufacturing and mechanical labor was not degrading. It was only manual labor—the proper work of slaves. No white person could descend to that. And it was the best guarantee to equality among the whites. It produced an unvarying level among them. It not only did not excite, but did not even admit of inequalities, by which one white man could dominate over another.

I told Calhoun I could not see things in the same light. It is, in truth, all perverted sentiment—mistaking labor for slavery, and dominion for freedom. The discussion of this Missouri question has betrayed the secret of their souls. In the abstract they admit that slavery is an evil, they disclaim all participation in the introduction of it, and cast it all upon the shoulders of our old Grandam Britain. But when probed to the quick upon it, they show at the bottom of their souls pride and vainglory in their condition of master-

dom. They fancy themselves more generous and noble-hearted than the plain freemen who labor for subsistence. They look down upon the simplicity of a Yankee's manners, because he has no habits of overbearing like theirs and cannot treat negroes like dogs. . . .

The impression produced upon my mind by the progress of this discussion is, that the bargain between freedom and slavery contained in the Constitution of the United States is morally and politically vicious, inconsistent with the principles upon which alone our Revolution can be justified; cruel and oppressive, by riveting the chains of slavery, by pledging the faith of freedom to maintain and perpetuate the tyranny of the master; and grossly unequal and impolitic, by admitting that slaves are at once enemies to be kept in subjection, property to be secured or restored to their owners, and persons not to be represented themselves, but for whom their masters are privileged with nearly a double share of representation. The consequence has been that this slave representation has governed the Union. Benjamin portioned above his brethren has ravined as a wolf. In the morning he has devoured the prey, and at night he has divided the spoil. It would be no difficult matter to prove, by reviewing the history of the Union under this Constitution, that almost everything which has contributed to the honor and welfare of the nation has been accomplished in despite of them or forced upon them, and that everything unpropitious and dishonorable, including the

blunders and follies of their adversaries, may be traced to them. I have favored this Missouri Compromise, believing it to be all that could be effected under the present Constitution, and from extreme unwillingness to put the Union at hazard. But perhaps it would have been a wiser as well as a bolder course to have persisted in the restriction upon Missouri, till it should have terminated in a convention of the States to revise and amend the Constitution. This would have produced a new Union of thirteen or fourteen States unpolluted with slavery, with a great and glorious object to effect, namely, that of rallying to their standard the other States by the universal emancipation of their slaves. If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break. For the present, however, this contest is laid asleep.

A MODERATE VIEW OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE

By Hezekiah Niles

IT IS established (so far as large majorities in both houses of Congress can establish it), that the power to check the progress of a slave population within the territories of the United States, exists by the Constitution; but admitted that it was not expedient to exert that power in regard to Missouri and Arkansas. The latter depended on many considerations of no ordinary importance: the safety and feelings of the white population in several of the States appeared to be involved in it, and the rights and feelings of others were as deeply concerned in the subject at large. In this conflict of interests, among persons who possibly desired the same ultimate issue, though their views of it were diametrically opposed, a spirit of conciliation prevailed and a compromise was effected.

The people of those sections of country in which there are few or no slaves or persons of color, very imperfectly appreciate the wants, necessities or general principle of others differently situated. Collectively, the latter deprecate slavery as severely as the former, and dread its increase—but individual cupidity and rashness acts against the common sentiment, in the hope that an event which everybody believes must happen, may not happen in their day. It is thus

that too many of us act about death; we are sure it must come, yet we commit wrong to acquire property, just as if we should hold and enjoy it forever! That the slave population will, at some certain period, cause the most horrible catastrophe, cannot be doubted—those who possess them act defensively in behalf of all that is nearest and dearest to them, when they endeavor to acquire all the strength and influence to meet that period which they can; and hence the political and civil opposition of these to the restriction which was proposed to be laid on Missouri, &c. They have the offensive population, and no feasible plan has yet been contrived to rid them of it, if they were disposed so to do. Will the people of any of the States, so much alive to humanity, pass acts to encourage emancipation by agreeing to receive the emancipated—what will they do, what can they do, to assist the people of others to relieve themselves of their unfortunate condition? It is easy to use severe terms against the practice of slavery—but let us first tell the Southern people what they can safely do to abolish it, before we, by wholesale, condemn them.

No one can hate slavery more than I do—it is a thing opposed to every principle that operates on my mind, as an individual—and, in my own private circle, I do much to discourage it. I am, also, exceedingly jealous of it, so far as it affects my political rights as a citizen of the United States, entitled to be fairly and fully represented, and no more. But I can make great allowances for those who hold slaves in districts where

they abound—where, in many cases, their emancipation might be an act of cruelty to them and of most serious injury to the white population. Their difference of color is an insuperable barrier to their incorporation within the society; and the mixture of free blacks with slaves is detrimental to the happiness of both, the cause of uncounted crimes. Yet I think that some have urged their defensive character too far—without a proper respect for the rights and feelings of others, whose business it is also to judge on the matter, as applicable to an extension of the evil. But we advocated the compromise, as fixing certain points for the future government of all the parties concerned; believing that the moral and political evil of spreading slavery over Missouri and even in Arkansas, was not greater than that which might have arisen from restriction, though to restrict was right in itself. The harmony of the Union, and the peace and prosperity of the white population, most excited our sympathies. We did not fear the dreadful things which some silly folks talked of, but apprehended geographical oppositions which might lead to the worst of calamities. We had no pleasant feeling on the compromise, for bad was the best that could be done. Nevertheless, we hoped that the contest was at an end, and that things would settle down and adapt themselves to the agreement which necessity imposed.

Thus situated, it was with no little concern that we saw in the constitution which Missouri was about to

offer for the sanction of Congress, new causes of collision. The objectionable provisions cannot be of any use to the new State, as to the things which they aim at. We are willing to believe that they were unthinkingly introduced; but they have the appearance of braving opposition, and of manifesting a spirit which the meekest man feels disposed to resist—to say nothing of one of them as being contrary to the Constitution of the United States—that to prevent the emigration and settlement of free blacks and mulattoes. It appears that some of the former and a number of the latter are entitled to bounty lands, for services rendered in the late war: if their lots should be in Missouri, it is idle to pretend they may not settle upon and enjoy them, if they please. But we are not disposed to examine the subject in detail—the principle adopted by the convention of Missouri, to give our opinion of it in a few words, is destructive of the federative character of our great compact, and may just as well apply to the exclusion of persons with black hair or blue eyes; and no one can seriously apprehend injury from the emigration of free people of color to a slave-holding state. It would be about as reasonable as to expect that the Mississippi will discharge her waters into the lakes, instead of naturally to disembogue them into the Gulf of Mexico.

The result, in the House of Representatives, was anticipated; but we did think that both Houses, with large majorities, would have so decided, as to striking out the offensive provisions, for the sake of harmony,

in the spirit of the compromise: all would then have been well, and a great deal of time, trouble and anxiety saved. We totally reject the idea that anything which it is the business of Congress to do, should be left to the judiciary or any other power. With due deference to the eminent gentleman who proposed it, we regret that he did it; for had his plan been adopted, who can tell where the precedent would have stopped? But we think it more strange that, because Missouri was empowered to make a constitution, it should be argued that Congress was bound to accept it. Why, then, are constitutions offered, referred to committees, and sanctioned by both Houses? All this is mere mummery, if they are to be accepted at any rate—as contended for by some of the members. No one wishes harm to the people of Missouri—they are of our own kindred and lineage; they may have urged their claims imprudently, and, in our belief, have mistaken their true interests—but they have a right to judge for themselves; and if that judgment is repugnant to the general opinion or principle on the matter, they will yield it, we trust, to the law, and respect the majority.

We had written thus far when we first saw the resolution offered by Mr. Eustis, in the House of Representatives, on Tuesday last. . . . It precisely meets our wishes, so far as it goes, and may accomplish all that either party is really just now disposed to contend for. The anti-restriction members, as well as others, regretted the existence of certain clauses

in the constitution of Missouri, as unnecessary, and calculated only to create doubts and excite opposition. Let them be expunged by the unanimous voice of Congress, and then we shall hope for an obliteration of the feelings which this unfortunate controversy has given birth to, and that all will be willing to disavow sectional interests within the body of the Republic; the peace and prosperity of which can only be maintained by a spirit of forbearance and moderation:— and, if we must differ in opinion, let us differ like rational beings, and grant to others the rights which we assume for ourselves, always recollecting that the fairly expressed will of the majority must govern.

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